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 This thesis argues that early moderns conceived of speech as a material 
phenomenon; voice struck out from bodies into environments. Early modern voices thus 
participate in what sound studies scholars call the soundscape, which I link to current 
new materialist and ecological theories of network and assemblage. Within this 
soundscape, I pay special attention to the role of language as a semantic system of 
meaning. Current ecological criticism takes for granted the utter “flatness” of ontology, 
and as such discards the question of human language so central to previous 
deconstructive and discursive scholarship. My thesis attempts to account for the role of 
human language in ecological thought by turning to the early modern voice, which 
blended sonic and semiotic properties. I contend that the early seventeenth century was a 
liminal moment in the history of language, as it had not yet lost its sonic properties nor 
yet fully become textualized and representational. Thus, early modern speech embedded 
the human in its environmental context, without separating it as a discrete or superior 
entity. The first chapter, on King Lear, situates the early modern voice in the context of 
new materialist theory, establishing a “posthuman cosmography” in which humans have 
no pride of place. The next two chapters refine and even challenge the writ-large 
generality of their predecessor. The second chapter, on The Alchemist, zooms in to the 
level of the individual, to explore what life might be like for a single person inside this 
buzzing network. The third chapter grinds an even finer grain, focusing on both the 
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“Open your ears, for which of you will stop/The vent of hearing when Rumor speaks?” 
 
– Shakespeare, 2 Henry IV 
 
 
“The voice is sound, not speech. But speech constitutes its essential destination. What is 
therefore at stake in any inquiry into the ontology of the voice – where uniqueness and 
relationality come to the fore – is a rethinking, without metaphysical prejudices, of this 
destination.” 
 
– Adriana Cavarero, For More than One Voice 
 
 
According to Shakespeare, if I had spoken this sentence to you, you would have 
had no choice but to listen. Ears, as “vents” between the body and its surround, fail to 
block the inrush of the quite literal noise pouring in. 2 Henry IV begins with a striking 
manifesto from Rumor, a character less personified – it is distinctly inhuman, “painted 
with many tongues” – than animated, as sound itself. “Making the wind [its] post horse,” 
Rumor proclaims that “Upon my tongues continual slanders ride,/The which in every 
language I pronounce,/Stuffing the ears of men with false reports” (6-8). Rumor flattens 
ontology with a steamroller, as its sheer force “in every language” refuses to recognize 
distinctions among its auditors; all ears are “stuffed” alike. We might ask, though, how 
can the reports be “false”? What makes a true report if, as Rumor claims, “The posts 
come tiring on,/And not a man of them brings other news/Than they have heard of me” 
(37-9)? It seems logical that, if all information is tainted by its material transmission, if 
many tongues supplant a single one, then purity is a moot point. It may be real, but it is 
certainly inaccessible. In other words, what are semantics doing in this material world? 
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Through such vexed enjambment, Rumor poses the question that animates this study: 
what is the difference between a voice and the sound that comprises it?  
My hunch is that the answer has changed over time, as I intend my epigraphs to 
suggest. Shakespeare seems to be telling us that the material always intrudes on the 
semantic, blocking (if, importantly, not foreclosing entirely) interpretation. These days, 
of course, we tend to believe the opposite, that words obstruct our access to things. 
We’ve lowered an absolute partition between the two; signs can only point, they cannot 
go. Yet there still exists a privileged category of language in contemporary thought: the 
voice. Voice retains a magic connection to the raw essence of a person, whose being is 
expressed in it. Cavarero invokes this paradox, in which our “metaphysical prejudices” 
both refuse access to a reality beyond the letter and make spoken letters a metonym for 
identity. Her solution is to return to the material as a way to mind the gap; we can 
distinguish the “uniqueness” of entities and their “relationality” by paying attention to the 
sounds they make, without denying the possibility for semantic communication in the 
process. In essence, Cavarero is restoring the early modern conception of sound. I 
contend that early moderns did not polarize the voice as we do, as either dead language or 
living essence. Instead, vocal sound was a material entity with a semiotic overlay that did 
not comprise its essential being. Early moderns viewed language as an affordance, a 
human use of material sound that did not exhaust its potential. Language was a property 
of, and not a telos for, sound. This conception, as we will see, allows us to gain purchase 
on an especially hairy problem facing contemporary ecocriticism: how to account for 
specifically human ways of being-in-the-world without separating us ontologically from 
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our nonhuman chrysalis. To place the early modern voice in this debate, I will first situate 
it against contemporary ideas about what speech is, and its relation to self.  
 On one hand, voice is our synecdoche of choice for identity and agency. “Free 
speech,” “speaking truth to power,” “the concert of voices” – liberation is imagined as a 
spoken password granting entry into the coterie of free selves. But, the linear 
progressivism of this account overlooks what Wendy Brown has called “the regulatory 
potential of speaking ourselves” (83). Does speech manifest a latent identity? Or, by 
contrast, can voice be a kind of constitutive exposure? One need think only of Foucault’s 
history of madness, in which the subject is made to confess his “crimes,” to see the 
pitfalls of identitarian speech. As he puts it, “psychoanalysis doubled the absolute 
observation of the watcher with the endless monologue of the person watched – thus 
preserving the old asylum structure of non-reciprocal observation but balancing it, in a 
non-symmetrical reciprocity, by the new structure of language without response” (250-1). 
Speech, far from liberating the marginalized subject, renders her accountable to power, as 
her doctor-priest pathologizes the words into a transgression that merits discipline.1 In 
this case, speech does not express, it binds.  
At the opposite pole, we find Derrida’s critique of logocentrism, the privileging of 
spoken over written word – the original (pun optional) deconstructed binary. Briefly, 
Derrida claims that speech has been classically associated with what he calls presence, 
meaning the pure association of words with the speaker producing them. This is for two 
reasons: time and space. The words emanate from a living body, and do not escape the 
moment – what Derrida elsewhere calls the “context,” meaning both the temporal 
immediacy and the speaker’s intention – of their origin:  
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When I speak, it belongs to the phenomenological essence of this operation that I 
hear myself at the same time that I speak. The signifier, animated by my breath 
and by the meaning-intention…is in absolute proximity to me. The living act, the 
life-giving act, the Lebendigkeit, which animates the body of the signifier and 
transforms it into a meaningful expression, the soul of language, seems not to 
separate itself from itself, from its own self-presence. It does not risk death in the 
body of a signifier that is given over to the world and the visibility of space. (497) 
 
“Self-presence” is here a spatial and temporal discreteness, in which the spoken word 
never drifts beyond the speaker, who instantly hears her own words in a feedback loop 
that ensures meaning and truth by virtue of its purity, uncontaminated by “the world.” 
But, even by thinking “the world” I have broken the spell. Since speech’s presence draws 
force only from its radical separation from everything else, the very interrelation of that 
binary paradoxically ushers the world into the speech act itself, canceling it from within. 
In his words, “But this pure difference, which constitutes the self-presence of the living 
present, introduces into self-presence from the beginning all the impurity putatively 
excluded from it. The living present springs forth out of its nonidentity with itself” (501). 
Presence is only present through its “difference” from everything else, is “constituted” as 
itself by not being the world, rendering its claims for purity merely relative. It isn’t that 
speech, after leaving the body, encounters dirt “out there” – a deaf recipient, ambient 
noise, etc. – that clouds its reception. Rather, speech is always-already multiple, sullied, 
or, I would add, ecological.   
 Derrida’s other major critique of presence has to do with time – all speech takes 
place in time, phenomenologically, and gestures both forward and backward, to different 
contexts than the one that produced it.2 Taken together, these ideas render the speech act 
non-self-present: 
Through empirical variations of tone, voice, etc., possibly of a certain accent, for 
example, we must be able to recognize the identity, roughly speaking, of a 
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speaking form…this unity of the speaking form only constitutes itself by virtue of 
its iterability, by the possibility of its being repeated in the absence not only of its 
‘referent,’ which is self-evident, but in the absence of a determinate signified or of 
the intention of actual signification, as well as of all intention of present 
communication…every mark, including those which are oral, a grapheme in 
general; which is to say, as we have seen, the nonpresent remainder of a 
differential mark cut off from its putative ‘production’ or origin (10) 
 
All writing – speech included, which for the reasons given here Derrida refuses to 
separate – is defined by its “iterability,” an amorous reference both to past usages and 
meanings (“contexts”), and to possible repetitions in the future. If I say “I want an apple,” 
the phrase retains no privileged attachment to “me,” as you only understand what I mean 
by having heard others use the same phrase, in different contexts. Communication is thus 
invariably “citational,” a sliding matrix of intra- and inter-reference that creates endless 
“différance” – the difference of language from itself and its deferral of meaning onto 
other language – unmooring any stable origin on which we might pin identity. In other 
words, speech is temporal, and time brings difference, while identity is always static.  
For all the salience of Derrida’s critiques, they rest on the unquestioned 
assumption that all speakers want to communicate, or that they imagine their speech acts 
as willed volleys of meaning.3 In effect, by assuming a singular purpose for speech, he 
gives it the very transhistorical – acontextual, in his words – self-present telos he just 
taught us was impossible. I will devote my chapters here to the argument that, for early 
moderns, speech was not merely semantic. Instead, speech was – alongside rather than 
prior to its entrance into various symbolic orders, as in the logocentric tradition – a 
material force, pure vibrational potential that struck out into, and onto, its environment. 
Such force sharply diverges from J.L. Austin’s illocutionary acts, which are practical in 
that they make something happen, but that thing is still a social rather than a material 
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effect – if one is passed the salt on request, it’s because the auditor knew what the words 
meant; likewise a marriage, while “literally” enacted through speech, still refers to 
(“cites,” in Derridean parlance) a social institution that authorizes the words to do their 
thing. Any approach to material speech thus needs to loosen words from their teleological 
injunction to mean.   
Words were not always thought of as representative; as Margreta de Grazia 
argues, prior to roughly the seventeenth century, most linguistic thinking was done by 
humanist rhetoricians, for whom “Linguistic virtuosity requires exercise in wielding the 
material properties of words: their duration as sound when spoken and their extension as 
marks when written” (233). Spoken word was supposed to change reality, rather than 
obediently reflect it, for the purposes of persuasion. This change was imagined literally, 
as a sonic unit impacted its surroundings: “a word is a thing in the sixteenth but a 
nonthing in the seventeenth century. In the domain of rhetoric, whose purpose was 
persuasion and not representation, a word was permitted to retain its materiality, for it 
was the source of this power” (234). Even the word “persuasion” encodes this 
materiality; it can be both verb and noun, an action taken toward another (“I persuade you 
to like oranges”), and a state that one possesses (“I have a persuasion toward oranges”). 
The OED tells us that early moderns imagined persuasion as distinctly literal – as when 
the priest John Palsgrave says “Perswasion sytteth in thy lyppes” – and not inherently 
linked to human semantics, as in Twelfth Night when Antonio says to Viola, “Is’t possible 
that my deserts to you/Can lack persuasion?” (3.4.314-5). The deserts can speak for 
themselves. Thus, persuasion for early moderns was akin to Sara Ahmed’s idea of an 
“orientation,” an embodied, pre-conscious vector that is constantly being reshaped by its 
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environment. They had persuasions, like we have orientations, which turned them toward 
certain objects, but they could also be persuaded, as we can be oriented, toward new 
ones. Speech was the literal currency of this persuasive economy.4 
According to de Grazia, burgeoning empirical science in the seventeenth century 
coupled with religious crisis increasingly recast the manipulation celebrated by 
rhetoricians as dangerous artifice. As such, attempts sprang up to revive “Adamic” 
language, the unqualified harmony between word and thing.5 In 1668, the Royal Society 
tried to establish a new language that graphically depicts things and thus restores words’ 
organic connections to them, evincing a generalized crisis of signification.6 That crisis 
was ongoing twenty years later, when Locke says of persuasive language, “all such 
words, however put into discourse, according to the right construction of grammatical 
rules, or the harmony of well-turned periods, do yet amount to nothing but bare sounds” 
(214). Locke is talking about “abuses,” implying a correct use of words that would 
restore their plenary connection to things, and indeed he proceeds to urge a pared-down, 
literal rhetoric: “a man shall take care to use no word without a signification, no name 
without an idea for which he makes it stand” (215). Moreover, Locke distinctly separates 
matter and meaning. Grammar and syntax, as formal elements of speech, are linked to 
sound, a kind of brute, meretricious materiality that obscures the “real” content within.  
If words are thus things in one century and pesky nonthings in the next, I’m 
interested in partial thing-ness, the liminal space between the two, when conflicting ideas 
about how words worked productively mingled the material and semantic qualities of 
speech. For that reason, I have chosen the first decade (or so) of the seventeenth century 
(the three plays I read were first performed in 1606, 1610, and 1614) as a focal point. If, 
	  
	  8	  
as James Bono asserts, “Renaissance cultural narratives negotiate between the poles of 
Piconian exultation of man’s abilities and Lutheran insistence upon man’s limitations,” 
and “Such narratives inculcate views of language that, to varying degrees, regard humans 
as alternately enabled or disabled by words” (57), these plays depict a tangled skein of 
linguistic ability, in which speech is used by but not inherently human, interpretable yet 
distinctly tactile. I write not to resolve but to expand this “polar negotiation,” by 
examining the ways material speech functioned in a world becoming increasingly, but not 
yet fully, visual and textual.  
Intriguingly, the words/things tango in the early seventeenth century finds an echo 
in the current climate of early modern scholarship; arguably the two “hottest” subfields 
are the nonhuman and philological turns, both of whose central positions are more or less 
explicit reactions to the other. On one hand, scholars of the nonhuman – drawing broadly 
on ecocritical, new materialist, and posthumanist theories – attempt to bypass radical 
constructivism to better address ecological crisis; it’s hard to call an earthquake a 
grapheme. Diana Coole and Samantha Frost make this pivot clear: “Everywhere we 
look…we are witnessing scattered but insistent demands for more materialist modes of 
analysis…We interpret such developments as signs that the more textual approaches 
associated with the so-called cultural turn are increasingly being deemed inadequate for 
understanding contemporary society” (2-3). On the other hand, a growing cadre of early 
modern scholars are returning to the word as the indivisible unit of lived experience. 
Many of these follow in the wake of Roland Greene’s seminal Five Words, in which he 
tells the story of the Renaissance in (what else?) five colloquial words. He calls this an 
“elemental approach,” which tries “not to retell the history of humanism in intellectual, 
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cultural, or social terms but to capture the elusive character of the movement at the 
cellular level, where its values and contradictions are embodied in semantics” (3). 
“Elemental, cellular”: this is materialist rhetoric, but with words instead of matter at the 
core of being. He juxtaposes traditional scholarship – dealing in macro “discourses” – 
with his own approach, almost a linguistic phenomenology, to single words used by 
ordinary people. Greene seeks reality through the letter, culling the realist approach of 
materialist theories without endorsing their central claim that ontology precedes 
linguistics. This approach is taken up by Jeffrey Masten (directly citing Greene as a 
forerunner), who argues that queer theory should return to philology out of necessity: 
“There can be no nuanced cultural history of early modern sex and gender without 
spelling out its terms – for what alternatives of historical access do we have? 
Comprehension of sex will require philology.”7 Masten takes as self-evident the 
surprising claim that, to paraphrase Philip Larkin, where can we live but words? Again 
we detect, however implicit, the rebuke to materialist theories that claim it’s possible to 
talk about reality without linguistic interference. These two groups of scholars – res and 
verba – are engaged in classic dialectic, but instead of synthesizing the two positions, or 
claiming one over the other, I wish to embrace the tension between them as itself an 
accurate reflection of the historical moment I’ve chosen. And, indeed, our own: if 
earthquakes aren’t graphemes, neither can we think about earthquakes without 
accounting for the graphemic tint on our lenses.  
 
1. The Chapters 
I turn now to an overview of the chapters, the rationales for which make plain the 
stakes of this argument. Broadly conceived, I imagine my work to rethink the body of 
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theory collectively referred to as the “new materialism(s),” by pointing to the ways early 
modern texts allow us to address some of the biggest critiques made against it. The first 
chapter, on King Lear, will situate the early modern voice in the context of new 
materialist theory, establishing the terms of what Karen Raber calls a “posthuman 
cosmography,” in which humans have no pride of place.8 The next two chapters refine 
and even challenge the writ-large generality of their predecessor. The second chapter, on 
The Alchemist, zooms in to the level of the individual, to explore what life might be like 
for a single person inside this buzzing network. The third chapter grinds an even finer 
grain, focusing on both the gendered voice and its relation to technological prosthesis in 
The Duchess of Malfi. Seen from above, the chapters winnow into a nest, each resolving 
problems raised in the last by descending into a lower, tighter orbital: 
Chapter 1: Posthuman Collective 
Chapter 2: The Individual 
Chapter 3: Gender 
The first chapter sketches the materially-networked voice through the example of 
earthquakes, understood by early moderns as the earth’s roar, forceful enough to 
foreclose the spatial and categorical distinctions necessary to explain its causes by ocular 
means. I read various responses to England’s 1580 earthquake – and King Lear I count 
among them – to argue for the radical ontological equivalence established by loud sound, 
culminating in Edgar’s vocal redemption of his blind father. In so doing I unearth a 
counter-discourse of sonic community at the very moment modern scholars contend the 
eye ousts the ear as arch-sense, a byword for the empirical reason anchoring subjective 
consciousness. This chapter does much of the historical heavy-lifting, shading in the brief 
outline made here by establishing a framework for understanding sound as an almost 
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tactile force in early modern anatomical works. I also chart the concomitant rise of visual 
culture, against which a trace of egalitarian, extrahuman orality lingers.  
While the chapter primarily uses posthumanist theory to ground the materiality of 
sound, an analogue can be found in what Roland Barthes calls “the grain” of the voice, 
the problems with which will invite the second chapter. As Barthes puts it, 
The ‘grain’ is the body in the voice as it sings, the hand as it writes, the limb as it 
performs. If I perceive the ‘grain’ in a piece of music and accord this ‘grain’ a 
theoretical value…I inevitably set up a new scheme of evaluation” which is “in no 
way ‘subjective’ (it is not the psychological ‘subject’ in me who is listening; the 
climactic pleasure hoped for is not going to reinforce – to express – that subject, 
but, on the contrary, to lose it) (509) 
 
Importantly, the “grain” isn’t sheer bodily force, as he locates it in music, at what he calls  
“the very precise space (genre) of the encounter between a language and a voice” (505). 
The Barthian grain is thus more than raw sound; it is the interplay between sound’s 
material and semantic valences. This is why it attends “voice,” and not sound per se, and 
is thus germane to a historical moment in which an absolute partition between materiality 
and textuality had yet to descend. Although, as he claims, the grain transcends 
interpretation, toward a pure Sontagian “erotics of art” (14), we note that in order to 
experience this erotic pleasure one must abandon the very “self” that would enjoy it. Here 
Barthes invokes jouissance, the psychoanalytic drive toward the pure ecstasy that exists 
beyond the chain of signifiers, a kind of annihilating negation.9 A double problem 
emerges. First, the very notion of an utterly impersonal theory is a contradiction in terms; 
pure dissolution renders accounts of it both irrelevant and, worse (better?), impossible. 
Second, it ignores the fact that bodies will invariably inflect voices differently; a single 
“grain” supplants a variegated beach. This non-specificity drives Adriana Cavarero’s 
critique of Barthes: “Although [the grain] gets linked to deep drives and to the vitality of 
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breath, and although it is seen as subverting or destabilizing the codes of language, the 
voice still remains a voice in general” (528). Language may not be anyone’s in particular, 
but when animated as voice always stems from singular bodies, affording us a vantage 
from which to describe the ways specific entities take specific actions with specific 
effects on others, human and non.  
This action-focus gains urgency in the face of recent ecological criticism, which 
tends to vaunt passivity as the only response to a churning cosmos that swallows the 
human whole. For example, Jeffrey Jerome Cohen and Lowell Duckert decry “traditional 
environmental history” for its urgings to humans to help repair the damage they’ve 
caused: “To think that the world is ours to ruin or to save are two expressions of the same 
hubris” (6). Instead, they use Empedocles’s ancient elemental theory of the cosmos to 
naturalize disaster as simply the way things are: “In the wake of tsunamis, earthquakes, 
and superstorms we know all too well elemental discord, battle, and strife (the work of 
neikos). In the face of ruin, what invitations do the elements extend?” (6). The threat here 
is that, in dissolving the human into gooey strife, questions of responsibility and of action 
go with us. By invoking Empedocles they eclipse the human causes of the Anthropocene, 
not unlike other Greek myths (The Republic’s metals allegory, for example) which 
anchor in “nature” a specific ideology. Indeed, the grand tone here betrays a hint of 
masochism, the guilt of complicity in ecological destruction, for which the only cure is a 
self-canceling fatalism that belies the point of even writing it down. Such doffing of 
human form also clearly gives pleasure, sheer unmeaning, and un-responsible, pleasure – 
a Barthian jouissance, perhaps?10 Caverero’s critique is again applicable, as is Valerie 
Traub’s timely reminder that “As a radical divestiture of the self, jouissance is opposed 
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to…ego- and identity-affirming gestures” (29). To talk of dissolution is to stop talking. 
Cohen and Duckert are thus more fiddling Nero than lyrical Orpheus, dancing us into the 
dark instead of filling a water bucket.  
Daniel Stout has recently taken Levi Bryant to task for a similar failure to 
consider the problem of action, which for Stout rests on the ability to isolate individual 
entities in order to trace their specific doings: 
No matter how intensively we remind ourselves, as Bryant thinks we should, ‘that 
humans occupy no privileged place within being’ and ‘that objects of all sorts and 
at all scales are on equal ontological footing,’ there’s no way to avoid stepping on 
the spirit of that recognition as soon as we start to describe, as Bryant also thinks 
we should, the actual ‘collectives and entanglements’ that exist ‘between a variety 
of different temporal and spatial scales.’ Ontology may be flat; descriptions, 
however various, never are. (175) 
 
Graham Harman makes a related point, describing Latourian actor-network theory as too 
chameleonic for practical use: “by overidentifying an actor with its sum total of relations 
in any instant, ANT does not really allow for the existence of ‘the same’ object over time. 
In the strict sense, Latourian actors…last only for an instant, and are replaced in the 
following instant by a similar but not identical actor” (105). Ecological criticism needs to 
account for my unique impact on the planet, just as it does that of my trash, my cat, or my 
ideas. Specificity that yet is not identity is the name of the game.11 Stout’s designations 
and Harman’s withdrawn essences ultimately point to the same problem: a flat ontology 
of promiscuous and aleatory actors turns everything into soup. While that may deal the 
killing blow to liberal humanism (isn’t it dead yet?), at this point we arguably need less 
paranoid critique and more reparative action – to paraphrase Eve Sedgwick, “How TV-
starved would someone have to be to not know that the earth is in trouble, or that 
humanity is a toxic construct, or that we’re all made of matter?”12 As such, the remaining 
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chapters focus on individual humans, to move toward a sonic praxis of engagement with 
the nonhuman that affords a kind of legible specificity to the actors involved – a 
differential equation or exploded-view of speech acts – that also does not de facto reify 
the human as a privileged user of sound, or its linguistic yield. 
 In this spirit, my second chapter suggests that early modern England was 
producing a slew of new soundscapes that allowed for fresh conceptions of the human 
individual, as a kind of sonic node. I argue that in Jonson’s The Alchemist, newly-
metropolitan London concentrates a din that overwhelms each character’s attempt to 
distinguish him or herself by visually-legible signs of identity. In response, Face, Doll, 
and Subtle, the “alchemists,” cheat their marks through a series of collaborative vocal 
disguises and improvised responses to knocks at the door of their master’s house. These 
fleeting sonic poses become makeshift subject positions from which to conduct the 
orchestra of people flowing through the house, effective precisely due to their short 
duration and sensitivity to the circuitry of sound. Thus, while most scholarship on 
London’s rapidly expanding cityscape charts the crises of individuality produced by 
sensory overload, I read those crises instead as opportunities.  
 Finally, the third chapter narrows the aperture yet further, by considering the 
problem of gender. This is another notorious blind spot for new materialist theory – 
doesn’t saying “it’s all just matter” amount to the same thing as saying “it’s all just 
language,” for which the deconstructionists were (rightly) critiqued for ignoring political 
reality?13 Jennifer Munroe has pointed to the dangers of “speaking for”: a seemingly 
egalitarian “flat ontology” not only ignores the lived experience of patriarchy (among 
other differentiations) but renders women-made-objects subject to the puppeteering 
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voices of others, both within and without the texts. Again, we’re back to Stout and 
Harman: the problem is specificity. On a related note, others have asked if we can just 
abandon humanism if it was never complete in the first place. How much privilege does it 
take to divest ourselves of liberal autonomy when that autonomy has never been enjoyed 
by people of color, or queer people, or women?14 Rosi Braidotti notes humanism’s vexed 
history, “Complicitous with genocides and crimes on the one hand, supportive of 
enormous hopes and aspirations to freedom on the other” (16). Sure, “humanism” as 
conceived always meant white male European humanism,15 but does that stop us from 
expanding its conception of self outward? Well, yes, we might say, because humanism 
encodes a fundamental anthropocentrism that has killed the planet. But, as Joseph 
Campana and Scott Maisano show, such exultant autonomy is actually Enlightenment 
humanism, unfairly cathected backward onto the “straw Vitruvian man” of the 
Renaissance.16 The original humanism, far from unilaterally championing self-definition, 
concerned the rediscovery of classical texts, which offered various, even conflicting, 
cosmological models; Kenneth Gouwens notes that “if the revival of antiquity 
bequeathed to Renaissance intellectuals the building blocks for their own master 
narratives, it also equipped them with some powerful tools and techniques for 
dismantling and arguably at times transcending those very narratives” (51). Such a 
syncretic, collage effect opens a conceptual space for the lived specificity of categories 
like gender, race, and sexuality to be charted, again without uncritically posing the human 
as the motive counterpart to material dross. This specificity is best revealed through 
affinities that certain kinds of humans shared with certain nonhuman objects or entities.17 
 As such, the third chapter traces an association between early modern women, 
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voice, and technology, crystallized in the echo. I argue that early moderns understood 
echoes as technological phenomena: voices bounce off a nonhuman resonator to 
reverberate in new contexts. While nothing ties women inherently to such mediated 
sound, they – from Ovid’s myth on – were disproportionately troped with echoic sound 
as a kind of dissembling artifice, thus indexing male anxieties about control of truth and 
origin. In The Duchess of Malfi, female speech escapes male control through 
technological projection beyond the manageable body. While most critics claim the 
Duchess roots a feminist challenge to patriarchy in bodily autonomy, only to lose it after 
her murder, I argue she is from the beginning an echoic character, drawing power by 
distributing self into surroundings – husband, classical precedent, hearsay, even 
nonhuman matter like stones. This distribution is always linked to the portability of 
speech. Throughout, echoic sound finds kinship with that other great Renaissance 
artificer: the theater. Readers will have noticed that this project exclusively focuses on 
drama, a conceit thematized directly here. Staged sound overlays the material and the 
semantic, as both real and representational. It is thus always echoic, a literal version of 
Derrida’s “citational” writing.  
Throughout I try to channel the collage aesthetics of Renaissance humanism in 
my invitations to thinkers from many critical, historical, and philosophical positions to 
help make this case. While this may seem slapdash alchemy, or worse, postmodern 
pastiche that cherrypicks glitzy surfaces, I believe that escaping the twin solipsisms of 
language and matter entails redirecting thought beyond the sedimentation of genre. 
Bringing disparate traditions together is therefore crucial; it is my purpose here, after all, 
to make introductions. The semantic and the material entwine to tell the story of the early 
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modern voice, in which, as the old Depeche Mode song goes, “words, like violence, 



































I. INCONTINENT CONTINENTS: THE ACOUSTIC ECOLOGY OF 
EARTHQUAKES IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND 
 
 
“In the beginning is the noise; the noise never stops. It is our apperception of chaos, our 
apprehension of disorder, our only link to the scattered distribution of things. Hearing is 
our heroic opening to trouble and diffusion” 
 
 – Michel Serres, The Parasite 
 
 
Let’s follow Serres through these words. Reframing the Genesis account where 
God’s spoken fiat tames the cosmic void, Serres recasts “noise” as a democratic agent, 
upsetting inside and outside, there and here, our divinely-ordained human claims to 
dominion and distance. To hear is to passively “open” to “scattered distribution,” to 
become “heroic” precisely by becoming nothing at all, a conduit for heteroglossic 
Otherness. To hear is to dwell in a perceptual ecology wherein things speak. Inhabiting as 
we do a postmodern epoch in which, as Rachel Carson has noted, “no birds sing” to 
unsettle or distract what Fredric Jameson calls “the culture of the image,”18 the eye has 
muffled the “noise.” This eye spatially partitions human and environment – indeed, 
creates such a thing as environment by rendering it an object over there to be perceived. 
It affords control: one cannot stop one’s ears in the same way one may blink or turn 
away. By contrast, sound plays on the body; its immediacy is felt as sound waves rend the 
air, warping the adamantine lines of separation between inwardness and ambience. 
The paradigmatic shift from aural to ocular regimes has been traced to the late-
sixteenth century. The classic account by Lucien Febvre claims “The sixteenth century 
did not see first: it heard and smelled, it sniffed the air and caught sounds. It was only 
	  
	  19	  
later, as the seventeenth century was approaching…that vision was unleashed in the 
world of science as it was in the world of physical sensations” (432). Febvre juxtaposes 
the passive receptivity of “catching sounds” with the violent activity of vision 
“unleashed.”19 Martin Jay pieces out Febvre’s assertion, foregrounding the rediscovery of 
perspective in Renaissance art as a crucial catalyst for this visual turn: “the medieval 
assumption of multiple vantage points from which a scene could be painted…was 
replaced by one, sovereign eye” (54).20 Again, the potential inclusivity of “multiple 
viewpoints” gives way to a rigid subject/object demarcation. Moreover, this exempts the 
body of the subject, whose “viewpoint was just that: a monocular, unblinking fixed 
eye…This assumption led to a visual practice in which the living bodies of both the 
painter and the viewer were bracketed…in favor of an externalized eye above temporal 
duration” (54-5). Time and the body, guarantors of contingency and imbrication, are 
vacated in favor of a panoptic eye spatially outside and thus president over the canvas of 
static, pliable objects.21 
This paper turns back the clock, attempting to recuperate the ecological potential 
of the early modern conception of sound, in order to frame a more inclusive model of 
environmental thinking than our current ocular regime offers. This requires attentiveness 
both to the porousness of the human ear, and to the material power of the more-than-
human voice. Early modern theories of the voice treat it not only as an almost tactile 
object emanating from and affecting bodies, but also as an autonomous entity that resists 
singular fixation in any one source. This is imagined less as disembodiment and more as 
a kind of transembodiment which forges connections across seemingly discrete entities, 
living and non, offering a potent vehicle for re-thinking the human as always-already 
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imbricated in its surroundings. As such, I’ll pay special attention to the spatiality of 
sound, its ability to upset notions of depth, orientation, and perspective within what Wes 
Folkerth, after R. Murray Schafer’s famous coinage, calls the “soundscape.”22 In his 
words, “While we generally experience and therefore regard landscapes as objective 
entities, as existing ‘out there,’ the soundscape is more specifically situated at the 
interface between the ‘out there’ and the perceiving subject’s involvement in its 
constitution” (15). Sound thus blurs the lines between epistemology and ontology, not 
naïvely jettisoning the subject entirely, but foregrounding rather the assemblage of bodies 
that recast space as less a void that precedes action and more a collaborative heterotopia 
of emergent effects.23 
Towards this end, I’ll focus my analysis around a very particular acoustic 
phenomenon: the earthquake. Early moderns experienced earthquakes as a kind of 
forceful speech, a material and auditory exhalation that ruptured their settled ontologies 
of being, forcing them to reevaluate all sorts of received truths, from the efficacy of 
representation, to gender hierarchy, even to the very nature of God. Earthquakes 
rearrange space, shifting bodies and tumbling topography, resisting the reduction of place 
to mere backdrop. Such a violent and sudden disaster is also noticeable, sending tremors 
through the complacency of human dominion, provoking vehement responses thus fertile 
for study. And indeed, the material rift often sparks a cultural one; I wish to shake the 
ocular episteme from its throne by contextualizing it as one option among many, rather 
than a teleologically superior means of knowing. As such, I imagine this paper as itself a 
kind of earthquake, shaking loose old ways of being-in-the-world from their status as 
quaint relics. As Foucault described his archaeology of science, “In attempting to uncover 
	  
	  21	  
the deepest strata of Western culture, I am restoring to our silent and apparently immobile 
soil its rifts, its instability, its flaws; and it is the same ground that is once more stirring 
under our feet” (xxiv). Quite simply, this is quake-speak; Foucault invests the “soil” of 
seemingly-ossified truth with both sound and fury, a vibrant motion that exhales the 
trapped vapors of bygone cultural forms.  
This paper claims that earthquakes offered early moderns a kind of makeshift 
sound laboratory, acutely concentrating and amplifying the contemporary struggle 
between visual and aural regimes. They were experienced first and foremost, I argue, as 
vocal phenomena, most decidedly in the way spatial distances and partitions – maintained 
by visual perspective and dissolved by loud, immediate sound – were violently disrupted. 
Moreover, the extreme trauma earthquakes wrought provoked reactionary attempts to 
reimpose empirical certainty onto the events, through visual practices such as scientific 
measurement and appeals to textual tradition. The catastrophic failure of these attempts 
ultimately left no alternative but a vocality reconceived as inclusive and porous, thus 
staging in spectacular fashion the more gradual elision of the oral, and then reversing its 
progress. Towards this claim, I’ll first contextualize the early modern voice, emphasizing 
the ways in which its messy materiality troubles notions of individual agency and human 
primacy. I’ll then turn to a pair of texts that parse the 1580 earthquake in England, which 
will serve as my test case: an eyewitness account by Thomas Churchyard, and Gabriel 
Harvey’s letter to Edmund Spenser. These attempt to corral the roiling chaos of the quake 
into tidy textual accounts, setting up – and, I insist, collapsing – the eye/ear binary that 
will prepare us for a reading of King Lear as quake-text. There, I argue that Lear’s 
attempt to splice his kingdom literally rends the land, unleashing an all-consuming polis-
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quake that not only accounts for the apocalyptic weather,24 but also the queasy spatial 
movements – Lear’s pinballing from Goneril to Regan, Cornwall usurping Gloucester’s 
home – and most importantly the utter abnegation of the eye, from Gloucester’s “vile 
jelly” to the absurdity of Lear’s attempt to measure himself “Every inch a king.” 
However, these hollow sockets then become the very doors to another kind of perception, 
the embodied plenitude and communal potential of sound, as Edgar shepherds his blind 
father to Dover and vocally conjures a cliffside deliverance. Throughout each section, I 
foreground the un- and re-settling potential of the earthquake, as its voice fissures both 
topography and taxonomy. 
Gina Bloom erects a thoroughly materialist framework for the early modern 
voice, contending that all manner of sources “represent vocal matter as taking on a 
variety of forms (breath, seed, and so on) that are alienable from the speaking subject” 
(3). First, note her phrasing: “vocal matter.” Voice isn’t some ethereal spirit, but a 
substance, a particulate. To highlight voice’s status as “breath” sutures it firmly to an 
exhaling body, dissipating its metaphorical potential as some sort of animating spirit or 
unambiguous guarantor of agency. Also, its material status renders it an actant in the 
sense elaborated by Bruno Latour, “something that acts or which activity is granted to it 
by others. It implies no special motivation of human individual actors” (7).25 Finally, 
emphasis is laid on the air itself as packaging medium, a potentially troubling means of 
transport that inflects and refracts the messages sifting through it. The air is not so much 
blank void conveniently affording beings their differentiating space, but occupied 
territory. Bloom is primarily interested in the gendered voice, particularly the potential 
afforded to women by embracing highly unstable discharges of voice, but my concern is 
	  
	  23	  
broader, stressing the equivalence between Bloom’s model of the human voice, and its 
counterparts in larger bodies, namely the earth itself.  
It was a Renaissance commonplace that the human body was a microcosm of the 
universe at large. There are striking similarities between the period’s meteorology and its 
anatomy. Rebecca Totaro notes that “Subject to this macrocosmic system of influence, 
human bodies largely conformed to the rules governing all sublunary bodies” (191). 
These “rules” include the need for balance among all constituent elements, and the 
fundamental fluidity and motion of all bodies, cosmic and local. Earthquakes are thus 
explicable as eruptions or purges from an earth trying to restore balance, the same way 
bloodletting might for human illness:  “the physiological symptoms of rising heat and 
ignition that were also believed to give rise to the comets, earthquakes, and thunderbolts 
of early modern meteorology” (192). “Macrocosmic” traces phenomena outward from 
the human, while the microcosmic model I’m positing decenters the human as locus of 
understanding, establishing us as a copy of and not a pattern for these larger forces.  
English anatomist Helkiah Crooke makes the human-cosmic linkage quite plain in 
the title of his 1615 treatise on the human body: Mikrokosmographia: A Description of 
the Body of Man.26 Its explication of the origin of voice stresses the very interdependence 
of bodies I’ve been positing: 
the voyce is the Ayre strucken, and a sound is the percussion of one body against 
another in some other. There be therefore three things required to the effecting of 
a sound, to wit, two seuerall bodyes which doe mutually strike one another, & the 
ayre in which the purcussion is made, which ayre is beaten and broken betwixt the 
two bodies (645) 
 
Voice is here what Jane Bennett has called (following Deleuze) an assemblage, “ad-hoc 
groupings of diverse elements” whose effects are “emergent in that their ability to make 
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something happen…is distinct from the sum of the vital force of each materiality 
considered alone” (23-4). Crooke’s passage is rife with non-hierarchical interconnection: 
the larynx must combine with the glottis inside the human body to produce sound, which 
has tangible effects on the air, itself rendered almost solid as it is “beaten and broken” 
(Figure 1).27 The aggressive diction is also notable; sound is no polite thing, “striking” in 
ways that foreclose the critical distance offered by visual phenomena.  
Such violence colors not merely the production but the reception of voice, as a 
thoroughly embodied and interdependent activity: “those things which be heard, take a 
deeper impression in our minds, which is made by the appulsion or arrivall of a reall 
voyce. But those things which are seene are alwayes intentionally imprinted, & therfore 
the Act of Seeing is sooner ended and passeth more lightly by the Sense then the Act of 
Hearing.”28 “Appulsion,” the OED tells us, is “a driving against,” here explicitly naming 
the voice itself as active entity, forcefully “impressing” the mind in ways the objects of 
vision cannot, because they are “intentionally imprinted,” watered down by the mediating 
subject. Voice thus becomes less a lazy metonym for individual agency and more a fully 
autonomous force both requiring and establishing a rich assemblage of bodies in its 
communicative arc. Finally, note the eye’s elision with reading and textuality, “im-
printing;” these mediating forms that promise empirical human certainty will recur 
throughout the following sections. Having sketched the terms by which early moderns 
think the voice, I’ll now turn to some primary texts, to see the ways in which earthquakes 




Figure 1. Helkiah Crooke, Mikrokosmographia, 635: the larynx. Over ten individual parts 
are labeled, all collaborating in the collective and thoroughly material enterprise that is 




1. Tremor: Quake Texts 
On the 6th of April, 1580, a positively Biblical earthquake struck England, killing 
two people in London and registering tremors all the way to the young James I’s 
residence in Scotland. The responses to it, while various, hinge on a single problem: how 
to slot the quake back into a tidy moral ledger where the sins of man are punished in a 
one-to-one ratio by God’s literally quaking wrath. This task, I argue, is carried out by 
juxtaposing an account of the quake itself as spoken word, with the written language 
humans use to make sense of it, and thus render it safely under control. As Steven Connor 
has claimed, “In literate or, so to speak, ‘sighted’ cultures, words are thought of as forms 
of record, signs capable of capturing bits of the world and of experience, and holding 
them in place. In aural-oral cultures, words are events” (15). Lurking just beneath the 
surface of these accounts, however, indeed as their animating premise, is the suspicion 
that the vocal quake might be extra-human, mere material excess, potentially bearing no 
inherent link to the sins – and thus the influence – of people. Writing, as I will show, in 
these accounts is not the passive reflection of an obvious moral truth, but its active 
creation, a desperate toss of the visual regime’s normalizing lasso around the noise – and 
white noise – of the quake’s indiscriminate carnage. This section thus extends my critique 
of the nascent ocular culture by emphasizing both its contingency and its frailty.  
Just days after its ravages, Thomas Churchyard penned one of the most well-
known verse accounts of the 1580 earthquake. It subscribes to the idea that God is 
punishing the sins of wicked men by sending the quake, and draws the speech/writing 
binary discussed above. He justifies the tract by lamenting that “man thinkes no longer on 
a wonder than a dreame, and makes no more accompt of a merualie, than if a trifle had 
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bene tolde him. Yet my hope is (good Reader) that the wise will be warned” (emphasis 
mine). Transient hearing and permanent writing are juxtaposed here; reading a written 
admonition against sin is supposed to impress on the mind in ways an ephemeral spoken 
account cannot.29 Of further interest is the bipartite structure of the tract. The account of 
the earthquake itself is in prose, registering only the facts, a chaotic jumble of destruction 
and fright. Following this, though, is a verse account, which explicitly moralizes the 
quake as divine punishment for human sin. Such form structures the events, shaping them 
into a pattern of clear meaning that in themselves they seem to lack. Crucially, this 
meaning is human-mediated, even if it originates from God. The first poem ends, “From 
him [God] you do good warning take,/and weigh these wordes of me.” The implication is 
that God’s speech, ventriloquized through the earthquake, cannot be registered by feeble 
human bodies, who resort instead to writing as their sole means of comprehension.30  
The problem here is that Churchyard’s attempt to art-ificially suture meaning onto 
chaos is belated; it can only happen after the fact, and offers nothing in the way of 
explaining the event, or repairing the damage. In terms of the actual representation of the 
quake, the account falters to figure anything at all. It records that “the Abbey Church at 
Westminster was therewith so shaken, that one of the Pinacles of the same, loste above 
one foote oh his toppe…Also the steeple in the Pallace so shoke, that the bel of the great 
Clocke sounded therewith, as though it hadden bene striken with some tamer.” The 
immediate impulse is to wrangle these events into a human-centered metaphor: the 
church falling must signal the sin of its congregation, the palace’s destruction some 
political judgment. But a strictly factual account offers none of this, merely following an 
aleatory doom as it traipses through the streets at will. The bell is struck, but by no 
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human hand. Rather than knowledge, then, a space opens for the urgent immediacy of 
sound, an affect short-circuiting the eye and the impotent comfort offered by its belated 
writing.31 
Cambridge scholar, self-appointed wit, and poet Gabriel Harvey moves in this 
direction in his own account of the 1580 earthquake; his letter to Edmund Spenser figures 
the vibrancy of earth’s motion as both God’s doing and thoroughly material: “God 
himself…whose only voice carrieth such a reverend and terrible majesty with it that the 
earth again and highest mountains quake & tremble at the sound and noise hereof” (11, 
emphasis mine). Air is far more than spirit, or life, ethereally tendered; it is itself a 
transport mechanism, acquiring its own agency in the process as part of the assemblage 
of vocal communication. In this way, it collapses the artificial life/matter binary Karl 
Steel finds inherent in the Christian Creation myth, where God’s voice invests inert 
matter with vibrant spirit: “All living things are tethered by this voice to the order 
inaugurated and controlled by the Divine Father…this divine force also imagines the 
heavy earth as needing something extra to liven it up” (213). The earth itself is resituated 
as the speaking body in Harvey’s account; rather than merely receiving God’s voice, it is 
ventriloquized by him, rendering the process entirely material and folding the breathing 
earth and thick air into the collaborative event of communication.32 
Leaving aside the ultimate cause of the earthquake, we may still attend to its 
mechanism. The letter casts the quake as the violent exhalation of an unstable 
corporeality, or breath from a body:  
The earth, you know, is a mighty great huge body, and consisteth of many divers 
and contrary members & veins and arteries and concavities, wherein, to avoid the 
absurdity of vacuum, must necessarily be very great store of substantial 
matter…either good or bad or mixed…Which evil working in the parts, and 
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maliciously encountering the good, forcibly tosseth and cruelly disturbeth the 
whole…that it must needs (as well, or rather as ill, as in men and women’s 
bodies) burst out in the end (8) 
 
First, note the parallels between human and cosmic bodies: both operate under the 
Galenic model of humors, requiring balance of various inner elements. Next, a gloss on 
the “absurdity of vacuum:” the letter avers that non-being is impossible; even the spaces 
between matter are material.33 For all the usefulness of Harvey’s material turn, he still 
ultimately tries to distance the disinterested observing scientist from the seeming 
incontinence of the earth’s body, by casting both in gendered terms. The letter equates 
women and earthquakes as mutually fractious, ungoverned bodies: “Good Lord, quoth I, 
is it not wonderful strange that the delicate voices of two so proper fine gentlewomen 
should make such a sudden terrible earthquake?” (7). The feminine virtues of “delicacy” 
and “properness” are a thin crust concealing the noisy and noisome entrails beneath. 
However, the women of Harvey’s party boldly challenge this paradigm, not by denying 
the equation but by flipping its value judgment, reclaiming their unruly corporeal voices 
against the dead language the male scientists use to ground their authority. Such 
interference is a prime example of the vocalic agency Gina Bloom contends early modern 
women could attain. This is grounded not in the traditional sense of control, prerogative, 
or platform to speak. Instead, “female characters that embrace breath’s volatile attributes 
– calling attention to its unpredictability and transience – are able to practice a subtle but 
robust form of vocal agency” (68). In other words, these women thwart male fantasies 
that they know and govern themselves, by emphasizing the sites and means by which 
autonomous bodies produce independent voices that upset stable regimes of management 
	  
	  30	  
and care. Notice also the focus on “breath” as the building block of voice, a stubbornly 
material phenomenon that severs the bonds between voice and individual sovereignty.34 
Harvey tries to have it both ways when gendering the quake, contradicting his 
earlier equation of female incontinence with the roiling soil by pontificating that he is 
“flatly of opinion the earth whereof man was immediately made, and not woman, is in all 
proportions and similitudes liker us than you…and I believe reason and philosophy will 
bear me out in it, it only moveth with the very impulsive force of the malady, and not 
trembleth or quaketh for dastardly fear” (9, emphasis mine). Here the same gender binary 
is sketched, but with the roles reversed, male mechanism and rational responsiveness 
against female emotion, established by a written record, “philosophy.” Harvey constantly 
cites classical texts (Aristotle, Ovid) as wellsprings of authority: classical as opposed to 
Christian (linked as we’ve seen with the inaccessible vocality of God), and texts as 
opposed to the embodied immediacy of sensory perception. Moreover, he believes 
“flatly,” the adverb suggesting the two-dimensionality of paper, here inflexible and 
resolute.  
Harvey’s pompous surety is mocked by his female interlocutors, who remark, “I 
can neither pick out rime nor reason out of anything I have heard yet. And yet methinks 
all should be gospel that cometh from you doctors of Cambridge” (9, emphasis mine). 
Here, male authority as rooted in tradition is explicitly challenged, with “gospel” 
suggesting first that these men presumptuously ape God in their explanations of His 
work, and second that patriarchy itself manifests as written record, a “gospel,” a “rime,” 
and a Cambridge degree being equally papery – and paper-thin – assurances of 
knowledge and power. Against this, the ladies pose an ad hominem attack, questioning 
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the men’s ability to keep their abstract reasoning free of their vibrant bodies: “believing 
as the learned believe, and saying, It is so because it is so) is nigh enough to cast you both 
into a fit or two of a dangerous shaking fever” (9). Dependence on tradition is mere 
tautology (“it is because it is”), and bodily needs will out. Hammering this home, the 
discourse ends with a supremely ironic touch, as the very desires of those round bodies – 
as opposed to flat words – forestall further discourse: “Being set, and new occasion of 
speech ministered, our supper put the earthquake out of our minds, or at the leastwise, out 
of our tongues” (14). Throughout this section I’ve introduced a set of tensions – body and 
text, eye and ear, self as closed and autonomous or porous and receptive, the slippery 
couplings of gender and species with sound and the body – that I mean as a primer for 
King Lear, where these same tensions reach their nadir. That is where I turn next.  
 
2. Eruption: King Lear 
“The following Generations…saw that that vast Map was Useless, and not without some 
Pitilessness was it, that they delivered it up to the Inclemencies of Sun and Winters” 
 
-Jorge Luis Borges, “On Exactitude in Science” 
 
 The gyrating vortex of nullity that is the England of King Lear is the aftermath of 
an earthquake. I stake this claim, large as it is, on the premise that Lear’s initial splitting 
of his kingdom quite literally enacts a rupture of the land, unleashing the purgative 
vapors within. As such, the land speaks, in just the ways we have already traced through 
Churchyard and Harvey. Moreover, the same dichotomy between a visual regime of 
distance and control and an aural regime of inclusive imbrication obtains; the play’s 
ubiquitous motif of blindness clashes against and cedes to the thunderous sound – the 
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“eyeless rage” (III.1.8) – of the play’s weather, which bypasses Lear’s attempts to 
harness its force. However, despite the play’s blistering assault on anthropocentric 
“visions” of tame and responsive nature, I maintain that in the rift left by the violated, 
gaping earth of England’s body, and the oozing sockets of its denizens’ eyes, a space has 
been cleared for the material voice, which offers perhaps the play’s only model of 
successful communication and partnership – Edgar and Gloucester’s reconcilement. 
Thus, while most critics gravely pronounce King Lear Shakespeare’s most nihilistic 
vision of cosmic entropy, I attempt to salvage a potential praxis of being-in-the-world 
from the churning cacophony of the play’s soundscape.  
 The link between the 1580 earthquake in England and the play has recently been 
forged by Karen Raber, who highlights the extensive reparations made to Dover after the 
quake. The town is thus “a location associated both with the aspirations of English 
technology, but also with the catastrophic effects of earthquakes and storms, and thus 
assaults on the premise that human industry could tame nature and make it serve human 
ends” (2). Resurgent here, then, is the question of which direction the arrow points in the 
human/cosmos, micro/macrocosmic model – are we shepherds of nature, or fellow 
sheep? Morgan Souza, who traces parallels between the 1580 earthquake and Edmund’s 
eruptive villainy, by contrast roots responsibility squarely in human morality: “natural 
disasters are a reactionary force to the sins of men, as Edmund’s havoc is on the noble 
families of Lear’s kingdom” (8). Such reasoning is useful towards a critique of human 
abuses of the natural world, but I’d suggest it also has the potential to overstate the 
degree to which human enterprise can sway and bend the biosphere, and the accuracy of a 
balance-based model of the cosmos, as Raber has suggested. Steve Mentz goes further, 
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arguing not just for the impotence of humanity in the face of nature, but its instability as a 
discrete category: “The storm scenes in King Lear represent what I shall call…’strange 
weather’: neither receptive to nor reflective of human desires, this version of the elements 
re-draws the boundaries between self and the world and puts the body-nature relationship 
in crisis” (140). If Mentz severs the link between human intention and natural behavior, 
he still frames the dissolution of the human/nature binary as a “crisis,” something entirely 
lamented in the world of the play, even if no longer by us. By attending to the play’s 
acoustic ecology, however, I argue we may recognize the earthquake within bodying 
forth a voice that fully situates the human amidst the ambient.  
 Grandly heralded into the room by resounding trumpets, Lear proclaims to his 
hotly anticipating subjects, “Give me the map there. Know that we have divided/In three 
our kingdom” (I.1.37-8).35 From these, almost his first words of the play, the trouble 
springs. What he has done, so much more than the mere political gaffe of dividing power, 
is to literally wrench the land apart. He has reduced a unified oikos, or house, the root 
word of ecology, to division and exposure. The disastrous symptoms that follow are 
consistent with those of earthquakes as we’ve explored them so far. A plague seeps forth 
from the gouged earth; Lear calls Goneril “A plague-sore, an embossed carbuncle/In my 
corrupted blood” (II.4.223-4), as though human relations have become diseased and 
impure, a parasitic contagion that puts neat categories like family and nation at risk. 
Gloucester’s stumblings on the way to Dover, and the play’s cluster of references to 
“shaking” – nine times, from Lear’s “fast intent/To shake all cares and business from our 
age” (I.1.38-9) to Gloucester’s exhortation, “This world I do renounce, and in your 
sights/Shake patiently my great affliction off” (IV.6.35-6) – crack selves loose from the 
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“lendings” that constitute them, and shunt bodies off their thrones onto the earth, 
exposed. Most centrally, the great storm that torments Lear on the heath would’ve been 
understood by early moderns to have a terrestrial origin. Following Aristotle’s 
Meteorologica, the standard cause of earthquakes was held to be the uneasy confluence 
of wind and water in the body of the earth, as seen previously in Harvey: 
Now it is clear, as we have already said, that there must be exhalation both from 
moist and dry, and earthquakes are a necessary result of the existence of these 
exhalations. For the earth is in itself dry but contains much moisture because of 
the rain that falls on it; with the result that when it is heated by the sun and its 
own internal fires, a considerable amount of wind is generated both outside it and 
inside, and this sometimes all flows out (205) 
 
The storm is thus understandable as the “exhalation,” or breath – the material voice, in 
other words – of the land itself.  
 Significantly, the breath-taking presumption required to splice the body of the 
kingdom comes from a map. Lear accomplishes his breach of the earth by aspiring to a 
godlike, panoptic perspective over his lands, as though the ability to view them from on 
high constituted absolute sovereign power.36 And indeed, Lear consistently tropes his 
authority with lines of sight. When Kent speaks out against his unfair treatment of 
Cordelia, Lear imagines banishment as the removal from his gaze: “Hence and avoid my 
sight” (I.1.125). And again, when Cordelia offends him by refusing to flatter his vanity, 
he exclaims, “we/Have no such daughter, nor shall ever see/That face of hers again” 
(I.1.268-70), as though to remove her from his field of vision stripped her very selfhood. 
Identity is here bestowed only as object to perceiving subject, as though the sight of Lear 
were the sole constitutive force. Even his name, “Lear,” although deriving from the 
quasi-mystical king of Holinshed’s Chronicles, inescapably also connotes presumptuous 
vision; the OED defines the verb form of “leer” as “to look or gaze with a sly, immodest, 
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malign expression in one’s eye,” quite germane to the king’s vestment of gaze with 
actuating power. The map, of course, is also a tool of mediated measurement that 
prosthetically enhances Lear’s vision; like the writing of Churchyard and Harvey, it 
purports to demarcate and circumscribe the physical topography.37 
 Once the earthquake erupts, though, the phenomenological register of the play 
shifts from Lear’s scopic regime to the pan-sensory morass of the storm-addled outdoors, 
much as the Borgesian cartographers’ “vast Map” is swamped by the “Inclemencies of 
Sun and Winters” in this section’s epigraph. This is figured most consistently as 
blindness, perhaps King Lear’s most prevalent motif. Blindness, of course, is a staple in 
the play’s criticism, but is represented there overwhelmingly as metaphoric register of the 
characters’ lack of judgment.38 Robert Bechtold Heilman avers that “Shakespeare has 
found in sight a flexibly responding symbol for the problems which arise in connection 
with the point of view for which man judges the meaning of experience” (61). David 
Bevington invokes “the enlargement of tragic vision” achieved as “Gloucester achieves 
spiritual vision when he is physically blinded” (1171). Such poetic and characterological 
readings are valuable, certainly, but these critics neglect the embodied, material fact of 
blind eyes, whether the gouged sockets of Gloucester or the rheumied orbs of Lear. Such 
focus on the eye itself as perceiving mechanism makes it vulnerable, opens it up to error 
and sabotage.  
 The eye is rendered abject matter in King Lear. Most vividly, Gloucester’s is 
referred to as “vile jelly” by Cornwall as he unceremoniously plucks it out (III.7.84). Its 
viscous depiction here lends the material eye a liquidity that belies the rigid lines of 
demarcation and degrees of separation promoted by the bodiless idea of “vision.” And 
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liquid returns again later, when Lear plaintively exhorts Gloucester: “If thou wilt weep 
my fortunes, take my eyes” (IV.6.176). Here, eyes have taken a long fall from the cliff of 
panoptic power; now, they are linked to the material vulnerability of tears, the effusion of 
inner pain into an external sphere, worrying neat partitions of inside and outside. Finally, 
Gloucester’s orbless sockets are referred to by Edgar as “his bleeding rings,/Their 
precious stones new lost” (V.3.192-3). The eye as jewel renders it a kind of extraneous 
adornment, a pretty trapping that is more luxury good than inherent, constitutive fixture 
of humanity.  
 Such a matrix of references to the material eye not only renders it vulnerable to 
attack, but also suspect in its very operation. Gloucester on his wanderings muses, “I 
have no way, and therefore want no eyes;/I stumbled when I saw” (IV.1.18-9). Human 
sight is thus discredited as a synonym for knowledge or intention, an idea epitomized at 
Dover itself, when Edgar describes to Gloucester the scene from the cliff. Cliffside vision 
immediately summons to our post-Romantic minds associations with sublime nature, 
defiant individuals, and awe-inspiring power. However, the actual focus of the scene is 
the deficiency of sight, the inability of godlike perspective to afford godlike power: 
 How fearful/And dizzy tis to cast one’s eyes so low! 
 The crows and choughs that wing the midway air  
Show scarce so gross as beetles… 
The fishermen that walk upon the beach/Appear like mice… 
The murmuring surge/That on th’unnumb’red idle pebble chafes… 
I’ll look no more,/Lest my brain turn, and the deficient sight 
Topple down headlong    (IV.6.11-24)39 
 
Here, the eye fails time and again: to correctly identify the birds, to establish human 
actors (fishermen) as distinct from beasts, to count the pebbles, or even to support the 
	  
	  37	  
comfortable remove of the observer, who threatens to “topple” at the immensity of the 
view and its ineffable details. 
 So, if the earthquake loosed by Lear shakes eyes from their sockets, is that the end 
of the story? Most critics, like Mentz, seem to think so, even if they excavate a valuable 
rebuke to anthropocentric, Gaia-earth models of natural harmony and sustainability. 
However, I insist that the raw sockets are not merely registers of loss, they are also points 
of ingress, porous holes inviting encounter and exchange. And indeed, that is quite likely 
how early moderns would’ve understood them. Mark Paterson has recently historicized 
our commonplace metonymic reading – blindness as bad judgment – to Descartes’s 1637 
Dioptrique, arguing that since then our conceptions of blindness rely on “a configuration 
of readerly empathy, where blindness as darkness is similarly understood as lack (of 
light), as deprivation” (15).40 Situated historically, then, blindness may be recast as less 
the eye’s loss, a dire catastrophe, and more the ear’s gain, an opportunity. As such, I 
maintain that attentiveness to the spoken oikos of the quake offers a potent model of 
inclusiveness and reciprocity foreclosed by optic regimes.  
Kenneth Gross offers one such route into the play, citing the ubiquity of the curse 
as emblematic of the aural praxis of the wronged Lear: “Curses crystallize around 
moments of violation, real or imaginary; they are provoked by breakings of law, by 
damage done to bodies and wishes…Curses mark a breach, and risk a breach in turn” 
(165). Perhaps unwittingly, Gross employs earthquake rhetoric here, as vocal matter 
issues from a rupture, a fault in the stable ground of order. Problematically, though, Gross 
positions the curse as a sort of compensatory gesture for pain, an attempt to turn the 
tables and reimpose one’s will, an exclusively human response to the depredations of 
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nature, still figured as a hurdle in our story of autopoietic transcendence.41 What’s needed 
instead is a more positive study of the complex web of interrelations that vocality affords 
in the play. 
Such a focus animates the recent work of Craig Dionne, who notes the abundance 
of proverbs in the play, tracing their lineage to Renaissance commonplace books and the 
mnemonics of humanist education to argue that “the proverbial voice can be seen to offer 
a secreted book of conditioned responses through which the speaking subject can monitor 
and adjust their position to their world” (67). Unlike the textual tradition invoked by 
Harvey, adages seek less to explain and demystify events by parsing their causes, than to 
offer a form of collective speech therapy after the trauma, a coping mechanism that 
situates suffering and endurance in a timeless communal (and thus bearable) context. 
Cherrypicking Dionne’s focus on reactive integration rather than Gross’s active 
compensation, I’d like to shift focus from the content of the speech act (curse, proverb) to 
its form as an embodied eruption that – as Bloom says – does not require the rational 
guidance of a human agent. Such an approach resists the correlationist aim of 
psychologizing the responses to trauma in favor of a material study of the ways sound de-
individuates bodies and selves, with human speech fully situated as but one example of a 
larger vocality emanating from and linking all cosmic bodies.  
 Bruce R. Smith moves us in this direction in his gloss on the many valences of 
“O” as a fundamental unit of vocal experience in early modern England: “As a burst of 
energy from within, [o:] is an act of aggression, a projection of one’s body into the world. 
It is, in the most basic sense of the word, an environmental gesture” (14). Smith 
foregrounds the expansion of the vocal body into its surroundings, dissolving its definite 
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center as it radiates outward into a zone of imbrication. An acoustic polity is chartered by 
the voice, or what Smith calls a “totalizing experience of sound that surrounds each 
hearer completely, penetrating his or her body through the ears” (271). I’d tack an “its” 
onto that list, enfolding the nonhuman into the ecology of voice. For indeed, the O shape 
invokes not only a rounded mouth, but also the gaping earth during a quake, wedged 
open to speak its complaint. From such a rupture comes a circumscription, another 
valence of the O that draws a line of non-hierarchical inclusion, a zone of contact with 
common borders – in this instance, the entire world of the play.  
Lingering in the rattled quake-world of King Lear, amidst its alienating despair, is 
a stubborn undercurrent of community forged by the power of the voice, seen most 
clearly in the partnership of Gloucester and Edgar. Edgar operates as sound engineer at 
Dover, vocally summoning a scene that is not actually present, but exists as such to 
Gloucester; when he tells Edgar “Methinks thy voice is altered, and thou speak’st/In 
better phrase and matter than thou didst” (IV.6.7-8), he not only demonstrates his 
heightened aural sensitivity after losing his eyes, but also quite literally refers to the 
“matter” of speech, tangibly present to him through the voice of his son. Edgar reinforces 
this in another double entendre when he tells Gloucester after the fall that “thou dost 
breathe,/Hath heavy substance, bleed’st not, speak’st, art sound” (IV.6.51-2). While 
“sound” refers obviously to “safe” or “healthy,” it is again also palpably literal, as 
Gloucester has become a receptacle to be filled by “sound,” he is sound, his very being 
materially constituted by its entrance into him, as “matter.” He is so receptive to its 
influx, in fact, that it eventually kills him, at the moment his son reveals himself, 
exposing Gloucester to the “two extremes of passion, joy and grief” (V.3.201); the influx 
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of otherness unselfs him, is too much to be borne by anything like an individual 
subjectivity.  
Indeed, the auricular polity we’ve been shaping denies the sovereign individual, 
and perhaps this is why Lear never enters its circular arms. He laments to Gloucester the 
fallen state of the world, legible by the jumbling of its organizing categories: “A man 
may see how this world goes with no eyes. Look with thine ears…Hark in thine ear: 
change places and, handy-dandy, which is the justice, which is the thief?” (IV.6.150-4). 
The synesthesia of “looking” with one’s “ears,” elevating the ear as the primary 
epistemological tool, suggests that sound itself has flattened experience and warped lines 
of demarcation. Power, represented here as the right to pass sentence, to label based on 
one’s own titled status, is short-circuited by the democracy of sound, which refuses to 
register these distinctions. Lear pushes this further, to the realm of species: “Thou hast 
seen a farmer’s dog bark at the beggar?...And the creature run from the cur. There thou 
might’st behold the great image of authority – a dog’s obeyed in office” (IV.6.154-9). 
Here, the animals have skirted human “authority,” their vocal “bark” toppling the human 
hegemony of the visual “image.”42 For Lear, “every inch a king” (IV.6.107), who clings 
so fiercely to “lendings” of all sorts to reify his individuated authority, such an egalitarian 
aural polity is more intolerable than intoxicating. Indeed, individuality must be forfeited 
at the gate, to be replaced by the swirling interpenetration of mutually constitutive bodies, 
human and non. To the last, Lear remains invested in the false tyranny of the eye, dying 
after a quintuple reference to vision, failing to register Cordelia’s life, her stubborn body 
recalcitrant to his vivifying desire: “Do you see this? Look on her! Look, her lips,/Look 
there, look there –“ (V.3.317-8, emphasis mine). 
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3. Aftershock: Conclusions 
  “The host counter-parasites his guests, not by taking away his food from 
them…but by making noise” (52). I began this essay with Michel Serres, whose insurgent 
noise opened a rift in the fabric of our dwelling, and by returning to him now I wish less 
to neatly stitch it up, than to open it yet further, to let the earth speak its resounding and 
enfolding “O”. Serres reminds us that the space we find ourselves in is no void, but the 
house of the Other; when that Other “counter-parasites” us, no symbiotic harmony but 
rather a cacophonous soundscape of fretful voices emerges. Early moderns lived during 
the Little Ice Age, a time of profound ecological disturbance wherein to be alive was “to 
experience with some frequency the thunder, lightning, high winds, and flooding that 
were much less pronounced two centuries later.”43 Two, perhaps, but not four: our own 
era is feeling these same effects from the opposite side. According to geologist Bill 
McGuire, substantial boosts in earthquake frequency and severity may be caused by 
global warming, as melting icecaps put pressure on seismic fault lines.44 Noise pollution 
and tectonic viscosity mark our increasingly disaster-riddled, post-sustainable world, 
rending open what Lear calls our “concealing continents” (III.2.58). The early modern 
quake-scape thus uncannily presages our present moment, but in it we find not merely a 
rebuke to our ocular regime’s fantasy of static control, but also a model of inclusivity 
drawn by sound, as all beings, human and non, swim in its waves.45 Edgar seems to 
recognize this when he ends King Lear with an earthquake image: “The weight of this 
sad time we must obey,/Speak what we feel, not what we ought to say” (V.3.330-1). Pain 
and need form a “weight” that will out, bodied forth as an eruption of sound which just 










“The knocking at the gate is heard; and it makes known audibly that the reaction has 
commenced: the human has made its reflux upon the fiendish; the pulses of life are 
beginning to beat again; and the re-establishment of the goings-on of the world in which 
we live, first makes us profoundly sensible of the awful parenthesis that had suspended 
them” 
 
– Thomas de Quincey, “On the Knocking at the Gate in Macbeth” 
 
 
It is surely significant that, at the key moment of an essay some consider a 
precursor to psychological criticism,46 sound figures the re-encroachment of the social 
and the material into the castle of the mind. Even more radically, that mind itself, 
Macbeth’s in the throes of guilt and ambition, is shown to be nothing more than the 
negative space or “parenthesis” between the “pulses” of communal responsibility. 
Giorgio Agamben makes a similar point. For him, the “human” is a self-perpetuating 
machine, forced to reiterate its own definition by ceaseless expulsion of all that it is not: 
"precisely because the human is already presupposed every time, the machine actually 
produces a kind of state of exception, a zone of indeterminacy in which the outside is 
nothing but the exclusion of an inside” (37). De Quincey’s essay, then, rather than 
vaunting deep interiority admits its dependence on an “outside” which gives it relative 
shape, and more importantly, establishes sound as the rhizome vaulting the threshold, the 
“gate” into the “zone of indeterminacy.”47 Gates of all sorts would’ve been familiar to 
Macbeth’s original audience, those Londoners either visiting or dwelling, passing through 
the gates in the City’s wall, 48 crossing many thresholds shopping or dining, and 
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imagining themselves as humoral fortresses in miniature,49 all while hearing the 
cacophonous din of the metropolis which leapt those boundaries at will. This essay 
expands their story, mapping the intersections between sound, the city, and an individual 
agency not dependent on the “state of exception” characterizing Macbeth’s “fiendish” 
solitude.  
The last chapter argued that sound dissolved the categorical boundaries preserved 
by optical perspective, but did so broadly, without exploring the consequences of a 
sonically interconnected world for individual speakers or listeners. This chapter makes 
such an attempt, charting the ways individuals could and did constitute themselves in 
sonic terms, through use of vocal effects like dialect, tone, and volume, as well as 
through response to ambient noise like bells or knocks. These sounds provided material 
leverage rather than social status, a way to situate one’s own and other bodies in space 
toward a definite end like navigation or money. This appropriative use of sound, I 
suggest, was directly linked to the rapid expansion of early modern England’s most 
complex soundscape: London. Newly-metropolitan London, I argue, concentrated an 
overload of sensory stimuli which threatened to collapse the individual into the mass. As 
such, it threatened the visual distinctions maintained by London’s booming clothing 
market. A variety of advice pamphlets for the young gallant encouraged sartorial 
panache, as an optically dazzling means to shore up – or, more often, establish – a status 
newly vendible in the proto-capitalist marketplace. Such a model has certain classed and 
gendered limitations, as I proceed to show. Moreover, since clothing was a commodity, it 
was subject both to cultural shifts in meaning and the non-particularity of exchange 
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value, undermining its ostensive purpose of self-fashioning.50 By contrast, sound cannot 
be bought, suggesting agential potential beyond market forces.  
My final section constellates all these dynamics within Ben Jonson’s The 
Alchemist. I argue that sound in the play is figured as a kind of vestment, a clothing item 
that can be donned and doffed at will, conferring a makeshift subject position that affords 
an ephemeral agency for the user. Such agency is collaborative and improvisational, as 
Face, Doll, and Subtle – the alchemists – cheat their marks by adapting on the fly to 
knocks at the door of their master’s house, which like the one de Quincey traces at 
Inverness Castle serve as sonic catalysts for a reassemblage of identity, spatial position, 
and relationality. These fleeting sonic poses allow the cozeners to conduct the orchestra 
of people flowing through the house, and are effective precisely due to their short 
duration and sensitivity to the communal circuitry of sound.  
 
1. “A mighty arme and instrument”: London c. 1600 
I begin by repeating a mantra that every critic discussing early modern London 
must invoke: the population was exploding. An average estimate for growth is from 
around 50000 in 1500 to more than 200000 by 1600.51 Yet more staggering is the city’s 
relative growth; David Harris Sacks notes that “in 1500 London’s inhabitants accounted 
for only about 1.5 percent of the English and Welsh population; in 1700, they represented 
about 11.5 percent” (23), meaning that London arrogated an ever-increasing share of 
“Englishness” both material and cultural to itself. By contrast with this exponential 
expansion, and – I would suggest – in response to the difficulty of totalizing critique in 
the face of such complexity, London criticism has seen a gradual process of narrowing. 
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The first major studies were macro, detailing institutions, statistics, and edifices.52 Later, 
towards the turn of the millennium, scholars zoomed in towards the cultural, attempting 
to recuperate the practices that colored and scripted those physical spaces.53 This paper 
narrows the aperture a stop further, focusing on the phenomenological experience of 
individual Londoners, the sensorial possibilities newly opened by the city.54 That is to 
say, I’m interested less in the cultural self-understanding of a subject, and more in the 
physical, tangible agency accessible through the multifaceted and unmoored vocal 
posturing London afforded.  
It may seem strange to begin an essay about reclaiming the individual by stressing 
the difficulty of individuality, but a praxis can emerge only in relation to a problematized 
set of conditions, and London on the cusp on the seventeenth century certainly offered 
those. In addition to the population boom charted above, London was increasingly the 
hub of an international commercial market, centrifugally dispersing its trading logic 
throughout the nation. As Nina Levine puts it, “the increasing claims of extra-parish 
associations, including company membership and new trading networks, exerted outward 
pressures on parochial insularities” (6). Both emergent from and fueling this proto-
capitalist bevy of exchange networks was a new class of worker: the migrant from the 
provinces or abroad. Jean Howard notes that “Many people from other parts of the British 
Isles moved to London to find employment…who worked in and around the metropolis 
as manservants, day laborers, chambermaids, and workers in unsanctioned guilds” (8).55 
These developments embedded the individual in larger and larger networks of relation – 
mobility came to characterize all aspects of urban life, a churning flux of expenditure, 
encounter, and role-play.  
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Accordingly, anxiety about the anonymity of urban experience steadily inflects 
the period’s writing, structured most frequently by the overlapping dyads of 
order/disorder and one/many. Even as staunch a conservative as John Stow avers in his 
1598 Survey of London that “neither is London, I feare me, so great as 
populous…whatsoeuer the number bee, it breedeth no feare of sedition: for as much as 
the same consisteth not in the extreames, but in a verie medio critie of wealth and riches” 
(490). While Stow intends to extol the peaceable order of London, he implicitly admits 
that such order only obtains by sacrificing the individual, who by virtue of her normality, 
his averageness, disappears from legibility and thus from threat – quite a different logic 
from his typical litany of great, titled men and their deeds.56 While such thinking diverges 
from Michel de Certeau’s well-known formulation that the unfixable crowd actually 
resists power’s panoptic reach,57 it borrows the same operating premise, that the city 
dissolves the individual person into a solute whose borders and zones of influence are 
both indeterminate and mutable.58  
Over and against this creeping illegibility, the state increasingly turned to the 
visually impressive and the measurably regular to reassert order.59 The theatricality of 
Elizabethan and Jacobean court culture is a critical commonplace,60 but I’m positing its 
visuality as a specific response to London’s explosion, both in terms of development and 
population, as Westminster itself was slowly swallowed by the expanding London 
suburbs.61 De Certeau roots the rise of geometric thought, which jettisons particularity for 
the clean perspectival remove and totality of statistics and figures, in the sixteenth 
century, what he calls “the transformation of the urban fact into the concept of a city…it 
assumes that this fact can be dealt with as a unity determined by an urbanistic ratio” (94). 
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And indeed, the early seventeenth century saw the city’s first planned development 
projects, such as Goldsmith’s Row in Cheapside. Paul Griffiths explains the historical 
exigency behind this shift; the crown tightly regulated urban space to project 
synchronized, seamless power as a response to urban entropy. As he writes, “In the late 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries a run of royal proclamations…tried to curb or set 
high standards for fresh building. ‘Uniformity’ was a by-word…There was a microscopic 
care for appearance” (183).62 More locally, Michael Berlin notes a sea change in 
parochial religious practice from communal ritual to hierarchized ceremony, “a gradual 
shift away from outdoor annual celebrations involving mixed groups of parishioners to 
socially restricted forms of ceremonial…These included the distribution of relief to the 
parish poor, who were now to be more distinctly identified from their neighbors by 
separate seating” (48). Ritual cements commonality, while ceremony affirms structure – 
the poor are naturalized as inferior by their readable position in church. That said, I wish 
to shift this conversation from the epistemological – what power can or cannot know 
about its subjects, and what those subjects can know about their place in the city – to the 
ontological. 
Timothy Morton’s notion of the hyperobject offers us a useful way to characterize 
early modern London as a problem not just of knowledge, but of being. The hyperobject 
is viscous, meaning that its visitor “sticks” to it, is part of it. It is nonlocal, meaning that 
“London” is only accessible in single moments and points that can never be sufficiently 
coalesced into a totalized, measurable whole – London is its topography, but is also the 
effects of that topography, partially its cultural practices, and partly the habitus of its 
dwellers, who might carry these London logics far beyond the physical borders. Adopting 
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a more contemporary example, Morton reminds us that “I do not see global warming as 
such. I see this brilliant blade of sunlight, burning the top of my head” (38). Global 
warming is thus a thing accessible only through its manifestations, but this doesn’t mean 
it isn’t real, just that its reality is never fully graspable, always withdrawn from its human 
observers because they themselves have become part of it: “Hyperobjects…present us 
with scalar dilemmas in which ontotheological statements about which thing is the most 
real (ecosystem, world, environment, or conversely, individual) become impossible” (19). 
Reconceiving the city as a hyperobject allows us to skirt the individual/community 
distinction by refusing to separate the terms – any Londoner is both uniquely in and 
inseparably of the city, and we are thus freed to sketch the contours of their interrelation. 
We can also escape the congruent subversion/containment dialectic dominating critical 
discourse about the city by observing that both power and subject are “stuck” to London, 
manifestations of its being – individual action is thus freed, an affordance of the city’s 
material reality rather than a ruse of its hegemonizing “social energy.” Even if we 
acknowledge that, of course, material London is inseparable from the social values that 
build and instrumentalize it, its tangible effects and potentialities are still not reducible to 
those values – we caused global warming, but its existence transcends and enfolds us.63  
Other, more historically-particular scholarship helps us ground this idea. Jean 
Thirsk argues that early modern “London” stretches far beyond its physical borders, as its 
commercial tastes infected the provinces through the mobility of gentlemen even as it 
appropriated the unique crafts and customs of those provinces to catalyze further 
consumptive trends: “they were drawn into the consumerist vortex, and by 1600 they had 
been tied to London, as well as being tied to one another. The demands of material 
	  
	  49	  
London were weaving a veritable spider’s web, linking to itself and to each other 
scattered centers of production” (106). London is thus more than its buildings, or its 
people: it is the sum total of its effects, which include but zoom beyond the cultural to 
constellate a space of ontological indeterminacy. Ian Munro approaches this same 
problem demographically, arguing that the city came increasingly to be defined by its 
population, an unstable and volatile referent: “The experiential space of early modern 
London can be fully understood only in a framework that takes into account the visible 
and tangible presence of more and more bodies” (4). While his study is actually about 
how the “figure” of the crowd became a problem for representation, I’d like to linger over 
this moment, moving from the representational to the materially “experiential.” I seek to 
explore not how power comes to know its bodies, but what one of those bodies could do.  
Enter sound. The order/disorder binary also structures discourse on the sonic 
makeup of London, with the crucial caveat that sound presents a problem of experience 
rather than representation, a phenomenological exchange immanently tied to the body in 
ways the epistemological debate about visual legibility was not. Accounts both 
contemporary and modern posit London sound as disruptive and multifarious, a threat to 
communal stability and self-identity. Hristomir Stanev notes that “The ears of the 
unaccustomed London visitor, in fact, would not only become troubled by the loud 
rumblings of vehicular transportation, but rang daily with the nearly incessant clamor of 
church bells and the animated voices of criers hawking their wares” (38). Returning to 
John Stow, I’d like to more closely examine London’s bells, because they explicitly 
figure the corruption of a communal signifier into indeterminate chaos. Bells would have 
structured many rituals for early moderns, including church attendance, civic 
	  
	  50	  
celebrations, and time itself. For his entry on Farringdon Ward Within – the ward 
containing Blackfriars, where Lovewit’s house in The Alchemist is – Stow uses the bells 
as a byword for communal order:  
Neare vnto this schoole, on the north side therof, was of old time a great and high 
Clochier, or bell house, foure square, builded of stone, and in the same a most 
strong frame of timber, with foure Belles, the greatest that I haue heard, these 
were called Iesus Belles…but [were] pulled downe by Sir Miles Partridge 
knight, in the raigne of Henry the eight. The common speech then was, that hee 
did set an hundred pound vpon a cast at dice against it, and so wonne the said 
Clochiard and belles of the king: and then causing the bels to bee broken as they 
hung, the rest was pulled downe.  
In place of this Clochiarde, of olde times the common Bell of the Cittie was vsed 
to be rung for the assembly of the citizens to their Folke motes (295-96) 
This is a common moment in Stow: an older, communally inscribed and legible past 
cedes to a decaying modernity in which things lose their shapes, vectors, and connections 
to individual people. Sir Miles Partridge gambles for the bells as fungible objects rather 
than generators of sound, his individual desire for profit and pleasure carelessly melting 
the sonic glue of the ward.64  
In fact, even when the bells did ring, by 1600 their number had grown so great 
that they risked interfering with each other, or being hijacked from their scheduling 
purpose (Figure 1). The Duke of Stettin-Pomerania remarked on his 1602 visit that “we 
heard a great ringing of bells in almost all the churches going on very late in the evening, 
also on the following days until 7 or 8 o’clock in the evening. We were informed that the 
young people do that for the sake of exercise and amusement.”65 Noting the bells at all 
distinguishes them as a London phenomenon distinct from the Duke’s native customs. 







Figure 2: Section of a 1616 engraving by Claes Visscher, looking northward across the 
Thames into the walled City. Numerous steeples are named; each would have had its own 
elaborate bell-tower and ringing schedule, potentially overlaying each other as the city 
grew in density. The engraving even suggests this, as not all the steeples are named, their 





ubiquity, suggesting overstepped boundaries as well as an inability to precisely measure 
the time of their ringing, against their timekeeping purpose. Finally, the Duke names 
youthful caprice as the culprit for this sonic deviance, as if the din both represented and 
encouraged just one of a number of inverted categories.66 Sound thus indexes a larger 
problem of sensation, an overdetermination of stimuli inside the body, a kind of 
possession. Against such inward colonizing, Londoners turned to a variety of practices to 
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reassert selfhood and status on the outside, the exterior – and none were more ubiquitous 
or spectacular than clothing. 
2. “Fantasticke Fashions”: Clothing on the Urban Stage 
Ann Rosalind Jones and Peter Stallybrass have drawn attention to the constitutive 
nature of early modern clothing, which inflected rather than reflected inner essence, 
dissolving the boundaries of subject and object they place at the center of modernity.67 
They stress “the animatedness of clothes, their ability to ‘pick up’ subjects, to mold and 
shape them both physically and socially, to constitute subjects through their power as 
material memoirs” (2). However, they also trace to the late sixteenth century a shift in 
clothing’s function from investiture to market cipher; clothes show up more than any 
other item on London markets, as fungible sources of ready cash. 68 Since these two 
models of clothing uneasily coexisted, one could still be what one wore, but what one 
wore was increasingly overdetermined by exchange value, a flattening that washed all 
particularity in the annihilating Lethe of the market.69 A complex situation emerges. The 
individual is now radically free to sartorially self-determine, since the clothes of other 
trades, ranks, and even genders are readily available for purchase, but the signifying 
potential of those clothes is weakened. The socially aspiring gallant is thus given a 
powerful tool, but one requiring constant maintenance, a continuous parley of display and 
confirmation, splicing identity into a compulsive carnival of the new.  
 By contrast with the anxiety I’ve just emphasized, Amanda Bailey charts the 
potential afforded by consciously outré fashion, as a certain set of comparatively elite but 
disenfranchised young men increasingly adopted style – both clothes and comportment – 
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as the bedrock of a subculture resisting traditional ideals of elite conduct and 
moderation.70  This subculture “involved constituting and reconstituting an ongoing 
sartorial conversation that included specific venues of display, collective standards of 
judgment, and a receptive audience” (6). Thus for Bailey, a booming textile market 
renders clothing radically performative instead of materially encoded, its meaning a 
product of bearing and reception rather than an inherent feature of the actual cloth. An 
oppositional identity embraces such transitivity: “the social meaning of the body of the 
man…resided not in its temporal endurance but in its value as a nodal point of a 
contemporary cultural network” (7). We’re thus at an impasse; contingent clothing seems 
simultaneously to negatively dissolve individuality and positively enable remaking. 
A brief detour into Thomas Dekker’s Guls’ Horn-booke, an advice pamphlet for 
the new man about town, will illustrate this tension. The pamphlet purports to guide “that 
true humorous Gallant that desires to powre himself into all fashions (if his ambition be 
such to excell even Complement itselfe)” through a typical day, supplying the tips and 
tricks needed to achieve social distinction in various London hotspots, in which clothing 
plays the (literally) pivotal role (32). First, the pamphlet avers that clothes are the vessels 
of individuality and status, that bodies come to fit them: “Hee therefore that would strive 
to fashion his leggs to his silke stockings, and his proud gate to his broad garters” (32). 
Wearing the clothes fuses a body to its investiture, as Jones and Stallybrass argue. 
However, the pamphlet also insists on the performative nature of clothing, in which a 
communally inscribed self must always keep abreast of flux and complexity: “take heede 
you pick out such an hour, when the maine shoale of Ileanders are swimming up and 
downe” (32). Finally, Dekker tropes the sartorial pageant of status with visual art, calling 
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St. Paul’s “the onely gallery, wherein the pictures of all your true fashionate and 
complementall Guls are, and ought to be hung up: into that gallery carry your neat body” 
(32). Returning briefly to the last chapter’s discussion of perspective, and its 
subject/object split, here the gulls are decidedly objects, their selves secured only as fixed 
points distinct from the mass of eyes that themselves escape notice.  
We might pose two further objections to such a praxis of self-making. First, the 
Horn-booke is satirical, meaning it deals in typology – the “gull” is decidedly not an 
individual, but a class of rowdy, desperate young man recognizable to any Londoner.71 
The very fact that Dekker can write such a tract speaks to the cemented traits and familiar 
figure of the gull, already ossified into a tired cliché worthy of mockery. Moreover, an 
advice book offers the same tips to each aspirant, making the pamphlet (surely Dekker’s 
intention) a guidebook for conformity and sameness rather than distinguishing flair. The 
gull is told to “warne your Tailor to attend you in Powles, who…shall like a spy discover 
the stuffe, colour, and fashion of any hose that dare be seene there” (36). Here, he seeks 
not to distinguish himself but to keep up with a norm, a fashion in the modern sense of 
the term, as opposed to its older meaning of making or creating.72 
Much more seriously, the Horn-booke recognizes at times the terrifying maw of 
anonymity lurking just beneath the performance. Sharklike, stoppage is death – the 
gallant must always innovate, or risk merging back into the mere body: “Now if you 
chance to be not must crost among Citizens…your Powles walke is your onely refuge: 
the Dukes Tomb is a Sanctuary, and wil keepe you alive from wormes and land-rattes, 
that long to be feeding on your carkas” (34-5). To be an individual is always to be 
“crost,” to be seen, and without it one is only one’s body, its abject “carkas” the material 
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locus of indistinction. Earlier, the pamphlet even vaunts such nothingness, in an 
encomium to the peaceful egalitarianism of sleep, “this kinseman of death…sleepe is that 
golden chaine that ties health and our bodies together. Who complains of want? Of 
woundes? Of cares? Of great mens oppressions, of captivity? Whilest he sleepeth? 
Beggers in their beds take as much pleasure as kings” (21). Here Dekker renders 
annihilation desirable; the “great chaine” is the only cure for the sickness of individuality 
and its compulsive maintenance, which entails here nothing but invidious comparison and 
inequality. One can escape the rat race only by becoming food for the rats.  
Thus we can identify, for our purposes at least, two limitations to Bailey’s 
subculture of flaunting. First, it is class and gender specific, a localized practice of 
younger sons specifically in dialogue with the demands of elite and apprentice culture. 
This certainly isn’t a knock on Bailey – she is very clear that her study concerns this 
particular subgroup.73 However, I’m interested in new urban forms of phenomenological 
agency, possibilities for material action, and not the subjective self-understanding of a 
cultural group. Second, flaunting turns out to be less about individual identity and more 
about forging a counterpublic on the fringes of elite culture, another version of the 
subversion/containment dialectic. That said, Bailey’s work highlights the possibilities for 
a provisional selfhood, one defined reactively and improvisationally in response to the 
affordances of the urban tempest, protean and emergent. I’ll now argue that sound 
provides a similar form of makeshift agency, but one not subject to the vagaries of the 
market. In Ben Jonson’s The Alchemist, where we turn next, sound is figured as a 
vestment in the full semantic richness of that term as charted by Jones, Stallybrass, and 
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Bailey: it constitutes the essence of its wielder, but only momentarily, just long enough 
for him or her to make something happen. It provides an impersonal self.   
 
3. “His lungs, his Zephyrus”: The Alchemist 
  Critics have pronounced Jonson an urban naysayer, horrified by the noise 
pollution that jumbled the individual sensorium and the distinctions it preserved.  
Karen Newman avers that Jonson’s plays present an “aural register of the sounds that 
assaulted the senses of inhabitants of the early modern city regardless of their 
socioeconomic status” (89). Bruce Boehrer carries the pollution imagery even farther, 
arguing that Jonson indexes sound as a kind of ever-accumulating detritus: “The sonic 
environment of London carries everything before it, overpowering any efforts to resist or 
ignore it, swelling into the acoustic equivalent of an urban landfill” (64). Hristomir 
Stanev concurs, shifting focus to the individual, who is shorn not only of social status but 
of all agency: “we cannot escape a gut feeling that Jonson appears to have been disturbed 
by the overbearing sensory output of the metropolitan body, and by its capacity to 
confuse, alienate, and sometimes even deprive of agency and essence the sensorium, 
particularly by debilitating the sense of hearing” (134).  
 Disabling the ear, this sonic overload decouples spoken language from its twin 
functions of evincing the speaker’s status through the classical idea of decorum, and 
communication. Stanev notes the “wounded” hearing in the plays, resulting in the 
“diminished value of communication in Jonson’s contemporary urban milieu” (135). 
Sound is no longer an informational conduit; instead, only the raw vibrations remain, 
rendering sound a mere thing, pure “noise.”74 The semiotic has been emptied from the 
sonic. Sound becomes, according to Boehrer, but one more example of Jonson’s manic 
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catalogue of London stuff, a horrifying zoo of monstrous, meaningless commodities: 
“The general impression is of a creative process gone mad, producing a seemingly 
endless series of random, illogical forms, until the entire catenating assemblage collapses 
in on itself to reveal an essential poverty beneath the giddy display” (59). A conservative, 
reactionary Jonson emerges from these accounts, longing for a clean taxonomy of social 
distinction and inveighing against those grotesques who defy it.  
For all the aptness of their insights, these critics base their arguments on low-
hanging fruit, almost always mentioning only Epicoene or Bartholomew Fair, yet 
claiming to be explicating Jonson’s sonic outlook tout court. The Alchemist is 
consistently left out of sonic analyses of Jonson’s work, and I argue that this isn’t because 
the play is uninterested in sound, but rather because it breaks the dominant critical 
paradigm, refusing to condemn sound as yet another insurgent reflective of larger 
metropolitan decay, an “illogical form,” in Boehrer’s words. Instead, the play casts 
denatured sound as a neutral tool, which the cozeners adopt as a kind of vibrational 
energy, pushing their gulls into and out of the house, and, ultimately, away from their 
money. I thus seek to complicate our picture of Jonsonian sound by using its materiality 
as a pivot, shifting focus away from the loss of meaning toward the technological 
potential thereby exposed.  
The Alchemist understands sound ontologically, as a mediating device that, 
because it isn’t tied to essentialist ideas of decorum or clothing’s reifying potential, can 
provide an agency – understood as the physical ability to move objects, including bodies, 
through space – that is not identity. Sound may be a thing, but its thinginess makes it 
wieldable, a Heideggerian tool-being avant la lettre.75 This makes sound rather like a 
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clothing item, affording a temporary subject position, as the cozeners don a variety of 
vocal disguises, accents, and tones. I argue that these brief vocal poses assume three 
primary features, the explication of which will occupy the remainder of this chapter. 
They are: 1.) improvisational, reactive to the local conditions and actions of each 
customer, catalyzed by their knocks at the door; 2.) collaborative, requiring the 
conjunction of all three cozeners over and against the individualizing desires of the 
customers; and 3.) virtual, characterized by a restless motion that defers satisfaction into 




 As we saw in Dekker, sartorial savvy involved active display, an aggressive 
positioning of one’s body in front of the eyes that could stamp its legitimacy. The rogues’ 
disguises, however, are always reactive, local responses to immediate environmental 
stimuli – knocks at the door of Lovewit’s house or a stray phrase spoken by a gull. These 
sounds vibrate through the house, galvanizing two things: a rearrangement of space, as 
the current mark is swept into a back room and the new one ushered in, and a new 
disguise, a makeshift subject position with its own dialect and demeanor. Because the 
alchemists make up the majority of their strategy on the spot, they can’t be said to have 
an identity by its OED definition, “the very same, selfsame: said of one thing viewed at 
different times or in different relations.” Their bodies are porous, reshaped from within 
by the latest stimuli, those “different relations” that produce a new person at each 
“different time.” The last section will address time, but here our focus is space, the ways 
sound’s vibrational arc rhizomatically warps straight lines.  
	  
	  59	  
Scholars have long drawn attention to the “produced” nature of space, as an 
amalgam of lived practices that dress its contours, scripting possible behaviors within.76 
Sara Ahmed highlights the prescriptive nature of this process. Spaces allow certain 
“orientations,” or phenomenological exchanges between a body and its locale, extending 
some bodies in a straight line of extension toward certain objects while occluding others, 
“such that any nonalignment produces a queer effect” (83). In other words, bodies are 
approved by their spaces. We’ve seen how style – clothing and bearing – provided a 
navigational strategy through the new spaces of teeming London. Style bestowed identity 
through a visually confirmed alignment of locale and comportment, requiring constant re-
iteration. To revisit an old example, would-be urbanites must learn to “carry quarrels,/As 
gallants do, and manage ‘em by line” (2.6.56-64). We’ve noted the irony of individuation 
through conformity, which here is spatialized along Ahmed’s terms, the “line” of the duel 
connoting proper movement. By contrast,  “Queer orientations might be those that don’t 
line up, which by seeing the world ‘slantwise’ allow other objects to come into view” 
(103). Face tells Kastril, the prospective brawler, the rules of the fight, which are really 
all about how to arrange one’s body in space: “how it may be borne, whether in a right 
line/Or a half circle, or may else be cast/Into an angle blunt, if not acute…in oblique, 
he’ll show you, or in circle/But never in diameter” (3.4.33-9). “Never in diameter”: Face 
refuses to endorse the public script, a straight line connecting a person with the 
compulsive behavior appropriate to their class. A diameter bisects a circle, connecting it 
to itself with no opportunities for deviance or change. Instead, a queer geometry emerges, 
responsive to local conditions, as the “oblique,” slant lines Face sells Kastril mirror the 
alchemists’ praxis of literally circulating their marks through the house. As I’ll now 
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show, sound provides a unique phenomenlogical bridge between bodies and space, 
upsetting the linear script that unites them.  In The Alchemist, intrusive sounds 
continually overtax the sensorium, “as if a bolt/Of thunder had been driven through the 
house,” radically dis-orienting the characters, who are “All struck in shivers” (4.5.67-70). 
A space opens for ad-libbed movements that, because they resist the straight lines 
preserving social hierarchy, do not reify the movers.   
By far The Alchemist’s most important plot device is the knock, which splices the 
play into a sequence of iterated cons overlaid on the same spatial grid. There are, with the 
exception of Lovewit’s return, no changes of location or perspective – the scenes and acts 
bleed into each other, divided only by the entrance of the latest hopeful from without. 
This breathless continuity suits the structure of urban Jacobean homes, which according 
to contemporary traveller Fynes Moryson “are built five or six roofs high, commonly of 
timber and clay with plaster.”77 These are thin, porous materials, which would have 
allowed external sound to easily filter through. The knock of each visitor, as de Quincey 
notes, ruptures the staid domestic interior, effecting a queer reshuffling of space and the 
orientations of those within it. Here is the very first knock in the play, as Drugger arrives 
to supplant Dapper: “One knocks without. Who’s there? [Calling] Anon! (To Face) 
Conduct him forth, by the back way” (1.2.162-3). The knock precedes the knocker; the 
alchemists hear sound first, a vibration that they “conduct,” channeling it into movement. 
That movement is odd, as “forth” somehow proceeds through the “back,” a linguistic 
impossibility that signposts a spatial one, upsetting linear orientation. A similar scene 
occurs later, as Mammon unexpectedly arrives during the cozeners’ shakedown of 
Dapper: “(He speaks through the keyhole, the other knocking) Who’s there? Sir 
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Epicure,/My master’s i’the way. Please you to walk/Three or four turns but till his back 
be turned,/And I am for you. [Aside] Quickly, Doll!” (3.5.58-60). Again, the knock ties a 
knot in smoothly extensive space, as Face creates a bottleneck forcing Mammon to walk 
“turns,” frustrating and fanning his desire.  
 The knocks also trigger the rogues to cycle their disguise, as in the following 
example: “One knocks. What, more gudgeons?...Stay, Face, you must go to the 
door….Away,/Madam, to your withdrawing chamber. Now/In a new tune, new gesture, 
but old language” (2.4.18-27). The question first announces the guest as unexpected, a 
blip in the alchemists’ smooth cozening course. After taking the knock as stage direction, 
repositioning the bodies of the other two, Subtle tells his cohort to change poses, which 
again are explicitly sonic, a “tune.” The word “tune” suggests a kind of musical harmony, 
which unifies disguise, purpose, and mark as a single vector of successful action, the 
sound of a violin after a knock scrapes the bow. Selfhood here is action, the unification of 
subjective instrument and objective goal. Moreover, “old language” suggests a kind of 
material recycling, as alchemical discourse and its power to stoke desire become tools re-
slottable into new context, again bypassing their signifying power to situate them 
ecologically, open to the local conditions that render them effective.  
Beyond the knocks, language itself, in its denuded form as mere sound, moves the 
alchemists to fresh ideas and orientations. Subtle asks Ananias his name, and then upon 
receiving it instantly conjures a filibuster of rage that expels him from the room, clearing 
it for the next gull: “What’s your name?/Ananias: My name is Ananias. Subtle: Out, the 
varlet/That cozened the apostles! Hence, away!/Flee, mischief!/Had your holy 
consistory/No name to send me, of another sound, than wicked Ananias? (2.5.71-6). 
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While Subtle draws on his knowledge of the biblical Ananias to denigrate this one, it is 
the “sound” of the name that he emphasizes; while pretending to hate the sound, he treats 
it like a thing, pivoting off it into his own sonic anger, expelling Ananias so that he will 
grow desperate and cough up more money for the philosopher’s stone: “This will fetch 
‘em/And make ‘em haste towards their gulling more” (2.5.87-8). Later, listening to Surly, 
disguised as a Spanish don, Face undergoes a similar sonic epiphany: “Mi vida? ‘Slid, 
Subtle, he puts me in mind o’the widow./What dost thou say to draw her to’t, ha?” 
(4.3.63-4). The final scheme that propels the end of the play, the use of Dame Pliant as a 
draw for the Don and his eventual unmasking as Surly, is invented on a whim in response 
to a throwaway bit of dialogue. Crucially, the rogues do not understand Spanish, meaning 
that Face hears “mi vida” as pure sound, supplying the meaning and the use himself.  
One final example crystallizes both improvisatory modes explored in this section, 
the spatial and the linguistic. Promising to conjure for Drugger an astrological sign that 
will tell his fortune, Subtle looks around the room, assembling the man himself from 
spare parts he spies in corners: 
He first shall have a bell, that’s Abel; 
And by it standing one whose name is Dee, 
In a rug gown; there’s D, and rug, that’s Drug; 
And right anenst him, a Dog snarling ‘er’ –  
There’s Drugger, Abel Drugger. That’s his sign. 
And here’s now mystery and hieroglyphic! 
Abel, thou art made (2.6.19-25) 
Drugger is a cyborg, a patchwork of incongruent pieces that Subtle plucked from a quick 
sweep about the room – we can guess this from the ordinariness of the things, a bell, a 
gown, a dog. The passage of course wryly suggests that people are no more than this, as 
the earlier passage describing Dapper’s paltry qualifications did, but unlike that passage 
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this one builds Drugger ecologically from local materials, with no pretensions to mastery 
or wholeness. Subtle also collapses language into sound yet again, treating all words as 
onomatopoeic – “Abel” is just “a bell.” Material language is resituated as a building 
block for a hybrid, patchwork self, like Bailey’s sartorial pastiche but free of market 
forces and upper class ennui; in this play people really “art made” and not born, reactive 
and not active, their agency always contingent on context and time.  
 
b. Collaborative 
 Each of the gulls visits the titular alchemists to become unique, to sketch 
themselves in 3D against a flattening urban backdrop.78 Their desires, while various, 
indicate this: the blessing of the Faery Queen, a princedom, the perfect shopfront, 
confirmation that their Puritanism makes them God’s elect. Subtle asks of Kastril, 
“What’s her brother? A knight?” to which Drugger replies, “No, sir, a gentleman newly 
warm in his land…and is come up…to carry quarrels,/As gallants do, and manage ‘em by 
line” (2.6.56-64).79 London is a kind of finishing school, supplying the behavioral codes 
befitting those “newly warm” in their position; the position itself isn’t enough, contingent 
because bought with impersonal money. Along these lines, Sir Epicure Mammon 
imagines his own identity as the centerpiece of a sartorial pageant: “No more/Shall thirst 
of satin, or the covetous hunger/Of velvet entrails for a rude-spun cloak,/To be displayed 
at Madam Augusta’s” (1.4.14-7). Clothing and display trope here again, in twin service 
of status, although Mammon takes it far enough to exempt human actors – the 
commodity takes on a life on its own, “velvet entrails” the only ones around. Face puns 
on Doll’s name to tell the same story; her social appeal as the disguised Dame Pliant fuels 
her sexual attraction, so that she might “not be styled Doll Common, but Doll 
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Proper,/Doll Singular. The longest cut, at night, shall draw thee for his Doll Particular” 
(1.1.177-9). It is the particularity, and not the pleasure, that is foregrounded here. This 
shift is mirrored spatially: the gulls come in from the city, their ever-more-frequent 
knocks evincing an almost desperate need to enter the securely particularizing confines of 
domestic space.80 The play’s great irony is that the alchemists have filched that space 
from the absent Lovewit, stripping it of its signifying function, and they use it to trick 
each gull in the same way, bringing the city and its massifying logic indoors.  
 What’s more, each gull imagines his reward in the form of a visual blazon, a 
readable, confirmable mark that reifies the bearer. Mammon imagines the following 
scene in his harem: “Then my glasses/Cut in more subtle angles, to disperse/And multiply 
the figures as I walk/Naked between my succubae” (2.2.45-8). He struts a runway of 
distinction, multiplying himself so that he might be seen – naked, his true essence in this 
most private of chambers not requiring clothing – as much as possible. He does not care 
about the illusory nature of the performance, or its dependence on mediation – sheer 
volume is enough, a fantasy that a million flat mirrors might a round character make. 
Similarly, Subtle tells Drugger that “In metoposcopy, which I do work by - /A certain star 
i’the forehead, which you see not./Your chestnut or your olive-colored face/Does never 
fail” (1.3.44-7), promising that one’s fate, one’s essence, was visible to the trained eye.81 
We sense that it is simply to be told this, to be gazed upon by that eye, that draws 
Drugger, as much as any improvement to his grocery shop.  
 The absurd futility of individuation is hammered home again and again in the 
play, but nowhere is the satire so brutal as in the following description of Dapper, 
a special gentle 
That is the heir to forty marks a year, 
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Consorts with the small poets of the time, 
                        Is the sole hope of his old grandmother, 
That knows the law and writes you six fair hands, 
Is a fine clerk and has his ciphering perfect, 
Will take his oath o’the Greek Xenophon 
If need be, in his pocket, and can court 
His mistress out of Ovid (1.2.50-8) 
Purely external trappings define a “special” person here: one’s money, one’s position, 
one’s skillset, one’s textual knowledge.82 The emphasis is on imitation, which fractures 
the self into a multiplicity of copies, “six fair hands” that “cipher.” Participation in a 
market economy requires just this sort of skill, a mercurial adaptability that refuses 
settlement in a single subjective core.83 “Courting” one’s mistress “out of Ovid” mocks 
the Renaissance veneration of classical learning as a kind of slavish parroting, a ritual of 
courtship supplanting any kind of affective, personal attachment.    
 By contrast with the gulls, the alchemists operate collectively, pooling resources 
to process each would-be individual entering the house, slotting and filing them neatly – 
sans their cash – back onto the street.84 The play opens with Face and Subtle quarreling, 
as they grudgingly suppress their individual desires for leadership of the group. Doll tells 
Subtle, “You must be chief, as if you only had/The powder to project with, and the 
work/Were not begun out of equality?/The venture tripartite? All things in common?” 
(1.1.133-5). This quarrel is important because it makes the “venture” an active choice, a 
sonic collective willingly embarked upon, at the temporary and difficult sacrifice of 
individual identity, rather than naturalizing it as the particular province of the poor or the 
grotesque. Face is quick to reintegrate the pair: “Now, do you see that something’s to be 
done/Beside your beech coal and your cor’sive waters,/Your crosslets, crucibles, and 
cucurbites?/You must have stuff brought home to you to work on” (1.3.102-5). This 
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division of labor allows us to understand the referent of the play’s title, The Alchemist, as 
an assemblage, a single being comprised of “tripartite” elements. Accordingly, Subtle 
tells the audience “We must keep Face in awe,/Or he will overlook us like a tyrant” 
(4.3.18-9), troping singularity with panoptic vision, but rejecting it as inefficient and 
stultifying.  
Moreover, as opposed to the optical bent of the gulls’ fantasies, the rogues’ 
schemes are consistently sonic. The play quickly establishes the materiality of sound, as 
Subtle says of goading Face about his lowly origins, “I only used those speeches as a 
spur/To him” (1.1.158-9), literally jolting his recalcitrant body into action. To that body 
he also says “I’ll thunder you in pieces. I will teach you/How to beware to tempt a Fury 
again/That carries tempest in his hand and voice,” to which Face rejoins, “The place has 
made you valiant” (1.1.59-63). Sound is given its three central attributes here: 1.) 
material, able to fragment an individual from within, into “pieces,” 2.) impersonal, as 
Subtle momentarily impersonates a “Fury” to summon its sonic power, and 3.) spatially-
inscribed, since “the place,” a formerly domestic space emptied of its master – a good 
metonym for all of early seventeenth century London– renders sound newly 
appropriable.85 
The rogues speak in short, controlled bursts, thunderclaps. The Alchemist has no 
soliloquies, no grand speeches of intent or motivation, no interiority. It is a depthless 
world, and the rogues respond by fusing sonic assemblages designed to sweep matter 
rather than stimulate minds. Even when arguing, Subtle and Face link their words, 
alliteratively and metrically syncing their insults into a single line of iambic pentameter: 
Subtle: Cheater! 
Face:                 Bawd! 
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Subtle:                         Cowherd! 
Face:                                           Conjurer! 
Subtle:                                                        Cutpurse! (1.1.107) 
Toward the gulls, the pair use a springboard effect, with the words of each propelling the 
other forward in a rhythmic pattern:  
Subtle:   The pleasures of a countess! To be courted –  
Face:     And kissed, and ruffled! 
Subtle:                                       Ay, behind the hangings. 
Face:     And then come forth in pomp! 
Subtle:                                                 And know her state!... 
Face:                                         And has her pages, ushers, 
              Footmen, and coaches – 
Subtle:                                     Her six mares –  
Face:                                                            Nay, eight! (4.4.40-6) 
 
Excitement mounts as they speak, each new idea leaping off the last while carrying the 
whole verbal assemblage forward in a palimpsest of dazzling yet controlled energy, in 
perfect iambs that cannot but overwhelm their interlocutors, who are bowled over by the 
sonic assault. Such speech is sound transformed, worked upon by the craft of the rogues; 
in other words, it is the real alchemy of the play.  
 Before exploring its linguistic tenor, it’s worth probing what alchemy purports to 
do. It claims to purify matter, removing the dross to leave only the rarefied spirit, or true 
essence, free of the particulate tying it to the gross body and the material world. It seeks 
to uncover the philosopher’s stone, which can turn base metals to gold, and provide 
perpetual life for the bearer, thus absenting him from the material decay that is death.86 It 
posits a telos for objects, which have Platonic forms embedded within them that must be 
drawn out by careful labor. In effect, this process mirrors the individuation sought by the 
city dwellers, who view London as a roiling mass of indistinction, the alchemical 
particulate they wish purified from their unique spirits. As Subtle puts it, 
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Nature doth first beget th’imperfect; then 
Proceeds she to the perfect. Of that airy 
And oily water, mercury is engendered; 
Sulfur o’the fat and earthy part – the one 
Which is the last supplying the place of male, 
The other of the female, in all metals. 
Some do believe hermaphrodeity, 
That both do act and suffer. But these two 
Make the rest ductile, malleable, extensive (2.3.158-66) 
 
The passage begins with separation, the alchemical ideal of pure gold and perpetual life, 
but ends in imbrication, the “hermaphrodeity” of all things, passive and active, air and 
earth, male and female.87 Rather than transcending matter, then, all things bear the traces 
of what they are made of – they are palimpsests, whose mottled origin opens out onto 
further “malleability,” change and porous openness. The rogues’ story is told in miniature 
here; they promise the extraction of “perfect” individuals, but always collapse such 
distinction into a sweeping broom of mutually-implicating sound.88  
 Each of the gulls stresses their aversion to the mediating tools of alchemy, 
wanting just the thing itself as emblem of particularity. Mammon tells Face, “Thou shalt 
be the master/Of my seraglio. Good, sir. But do you hear?/I’ll geld you, Lungs.” (2.2.32-
4). He needs Face’s help, of course, to manage his women, but wants to castrate him in a 
fantasy of the pure mediator, which pace Heisenberg doesn’t interfere with the 
merchandise. Even toward his pillow, Mammon “will have all my beds blown up, not 
stuffed;/Down is too hard” (2.2.41-2). He wants air over matter, an immaterial void that 
keeps his head floating on ether. Ananias the Puritan speaks tortuously, trying to wipe 
language clean of its pagan origins, refusing to name the days of the week: “About the 
second day of the third week/In the ninth month?” (3.2.131-2). Even Surly, the would-be 
chivalric hero of the play, tells Mammon “I’ll have gold before you,/And with less danger 
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of the quicksilver/Or the hot sulfur” (2.3.286-8). Referring literally to alchemy’s use of 
“quicksilver” and “sulfur,” but punning on their other uses as treatments for venereal 
disease, Surly deflates Mammon’s desires as doomed to the bodily mire of syphilis while 
still bracketing himself as worthy of transcendence.  
 By contrast, the alchemists turn their profession on its head, repeatedly bringing 
the body back into the rarefied discourse of the gulls. The particulate in their reactions is 
sonic, the material remainder of their linguistic conjurations.89 Let me give an extended 
example. Mammon courts Doll in the guise of Dame Pliant, an aristocratic widow. 
Questioning her, he avers that “These answers speak your breeding and your blood” 
(4.1.42), foolishly equating sound with Derridean presence, as though her status and 
identity were manifest in her words. Spurred by this, he continues “Sweet madam, le’ me 
be particular – Doll: Particular, sir. I pray you, know your distance” (4.1.77-8). Most 
literally she means “keep back,” but we can tease out a deeper implication: Mammon 
should “know” that he is always “distant,” never self-identical or “particular,” as he uses 
borrowed language in a clichéd scene in a satire of love toward a woman who is only 
pretending. Doll enacts this philosophical coup by foregrounding the materiality of 
language, as breath: “This art, sir, i’your words/Calls your whole faith in question. 
Mammon: By my soul – Doll: Nay, oaths are made o’the same air, sir” (4.1.71-3). 
Mammon remains trapped in the prison-house of language, although this one has real 
bricks and mortar; even his spontaneous oath (“By my soul”) is hackneyed, with no 
expressive potential because it too, like all words, is mere “breath,” audible but 
asignifying. Language slides into sound over and over in The Alchemist, forestalling 
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presence not because language is always isolated from matter – as Derrida would have it 
– but precisely because it can only ever be part of it. 
 Such material embeddedness may foreclose identity, but it does not eclipse 
agency; the gulls use language as a blunt instrument, by temporarily adopting vocal 
disguises that become vectors of intent, shifting bodies. Subtle proclaims to Dapper: 
“Hoping that he hath vinegared his senses/As he was bid, the Faeiry Queen dispenses,/By 
me, this robe, the petticoat of Fortune,/Which that he straight put on she doth importune” 
(3.5.5-8). Here the “petticoat of Fortune” refers literally to the blindfold they use on 
Dapper, “vinegaring” his senses so that their ventriloquist act will work, but it also refers 
to their imminent disguises as the Queen herself and her interpreters. Once Dapper is 
blinded, Face tells him to “Keep nothing that is transitory about you (Aside to Subtle) Bid 
Doll play music” (3.5.30-1). Ironically, while insisting that the Queen will bless him if he 
gives up his money, that “transitory” element, it is really the Queen who is transitory, 
conjured in a purely sonic space to the blind Dapper who is already bewildered by the 
mystifying music. The rogues then parrot the Queen, claiming to interpret her alien 
sounds: “Ti ti, ti ti to ta! He does equivocate, she says” (3.5.41). Here, their sound fleeces 
Dapper of his coin, entering his body as fear and coercion; the overwhelming effect of the 




Space drove the last section, but this one takes up time, the ways the alchemists’ 
poses morph faster than the gulls can keep up. Specifically, they take advantage of the 
temporality of sound, as an utterance or event with a limited duration. That duration is a 
space of movement, as sound waves travel outward from their source and finally 
	  
	  71	  
dissipate. Within each wave is the event-space itself, which is virtual – that is, the pure 
potentiality of movement that, because sound materially alters its medium, affords the 
real possibility of change without congealing into permanent identity. Brian Massumi 
calls this soup of potentiality affect, which in its most basic sense is the ability of one 
body to move or effect change upon others. In his words, 
          The conversion of surface distance into intensity is also a conversion of the  
          materiality of the body into an event. It is a relay between its corporeal and  
          incorporeal dimensions. This is not yet a subject. But it may well be the conditions  
          of emergence of a subject: an incipient subjectivity. Call it a ‘self –.’ The hyphen is   
          retained as a reminder that ‘self’ is not a substantive but rather a relation (14)91 
 
A body in motion is liminal, between identities which exist only as the “capture” of 
impersonal affect. Sound is a privileged affective site because it is both material and 
mobile, a wave that displaces air as it moves through it, opening a momentary zone of 
relation not possible before or after. Unlike Dekker’s gallant who remains a frozen 
portrait on display at St. Paul’s, the alchemists don and doff these “relational” selves at 
will, freeing them to establish new zones of interconnectivity.  
Virtuality helps us rethink the critical discourse on the play’s temporality, which 
leans heavily on Jonson’s use of the neoclassical unities as a kind of clockwork 
objectivity. Ian Donaldson avers that “the formal structure of the play embodies a more 
regular, orderly, faithful view of human affairs, depicting a world amenable to 
explanation…a world aptly realized in the great figure of the clock” (105). John 
Shanahan develops the point, arguing that Jonson constructs an impersonal, culture-less 
space that anticipates developments in laboratory science: “The unity of time is so 
extreme and literal, and makes such demands on the characters, that we can rightly liken 
Subtle, Face, and the others to parts in a clockwork or cogs in a vast impersonal system” 
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(40). Problematically, these accounts foreclose agency, rendering the abstracted 
playwright a deist clockmaker-god, his characters volitionless gears. Against such 
determinism, which separates time and character as separate entities, one constricted by 
the other’s imposition, I argue that The Alchemist blends the two into a manipulable blur. 
The rogues cheat their marks by stoking and deferring expectation, frustrating their 
desires for synchronic pleasure; their own disguises, moreover, are fleeting iterations that 
stretch the same con diachronically, affording an agency (un)grounded in motility, 
avoiding the paralysis of selfhood.  
The limited duration of the alchemists’ scheme is declared right from the start: 
“Though we break up a fortnight, ‘tis no matter” (1.1.188).  By contrast, the hopefuls 
seek to master time by fixing it in an eternal present of enjoyment, power, and 
knowledge; Mammon will “then renew/Our youth and strength by drinking the 
elixir,/And so enjoy a perpetuity/Of life and lust” (4.1.163-6). On the opposite side of the 
social register, but with tellingly similar desires, the Puritans Tribulation Wholesome and 
Ananias believe that, secure in their fates as God’s elect, time has already stopped for 
them. They want an earthly reflection of this fixed security: “We may be temporal lords 
ourselves, I take it” (3.2.52). Subtle flatters their desire, explicitly contrasting the stability 
they seek with their former, temporally-bound religious practice: 
You may be anything, and leave off to make 
Long-winded exercises or suck up 
Your ‘ha!’ and ‘hum!’ in a tune. I not deny 
But such as are not graced in a state 
May…get a tune to call the flock together – 
For, to say sooth, a tune does much with women 
And other phlegmatic people; it is your bell (3.2.53-60) 
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Subtle promises them exemption from time, a static mastery without need to constantly 
interpellate new followers with “a tune,” a device foregrounding sound’s temporality 
even while troping it with tedium, “long-winded exercises.” To be in the world, Subtle 
says implicitly, is to live in time, with unfulfilled needs that drift beyond control, 
requiring constant maintenance. The alchemists by contrast embrace the iterable nature of 
experience: “For look how oft I iterate the work,/So many times I add unto his virtue” 
(2.3.106-7). Doing something again is additive, a sedimentary model that (as Judith 
Butler has shown in the realm of gender, for example), offers subversive agential 
potential by dragging into time – and thus change – things that otherwise seem 
immutable.92 
Surly, too, believes in synchronic time, but his invokes the permanence of the 
sign. Having cozened the cozeners with his Spanish disguise, revealing their fraud, Surly 
makes a long Marlovian speech of triumph, in a gesture that typically would end the play 
and restore order, tying events in a final linguistic bow. Face, however, shatters the 
atemporality of the monologue by simply leaving halfway through: “I’ve found from 
whence your copper rings and spoons/Come now, wherewith you cheat abroad in 
taverns…Then weeps Mammon;/Then swoons His Worship. Or he is the Faustus, [Face 
slips out]/That casteth figures, and can conjure, cures/Plague, piles, and pox by the 
ephemerides” (4.6.35-8). Surly so securely believes words fix, that the world operates by 
calls and responses with clearly delineated boundaries, that he literally cannot grasp 
Face’s departure.93 The irony doubles as Surly mocks Subtle’s “ephemerides” at the very 
moment Face proves them more real than Surly’s false transcendence. Face, always 
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attuned to the virtuality of sound over the stasis of discourse, thus enacts another deferral, 




Throughout this chapter, I’ve sought to redirect our London thinking toward the 
phenomenological interface of body and world. A congeries of new, dissonant sounds 
generated by the metropolis wedged a new layer of mediation between self and 
environment, spawning anxieties about alienation and unmeaning but also new 
possibilities for meaningful interaction. By centering a reparative reading on the 
technological praxis of sound, I’ve tried to complicate the sensorial crisis narrative 
proffered by many scholars of early modern London, and round out accounts of social 
practice that focus only on the culturally-appropriate behaviors associated with particular 
urban spaces and the catch-and-release game these practices played with power. 
Moreover, my reading of instrumental sound figures an alternative to such classic 
accounts of urban subjectivity as Georg Simmel’s “blasé” attitude, wherein an individual 
shores up interiority by blunting her receptive faculties to the siege of external stimuli. 
The urbanite “develops an organ protecting him from against the threatening currents and 
discrepancies of his external environment which would uproot him” (13), contracting 
herself into an affect-proof bunker. In contrast, by becoming willing antennas for the 
cacophony of London sounds, an epidemiological spread not unlike the plague forming 
the backdrop for The Alchemist, Jonson’s rogues achieve a communally porous but 
consistent agency that is temporarily individual but never personal. Such agency shares 
certain similarities with clothing – namely, a patchwork iterability and the constitution of 
inner essence from the outside – but exists in an ontological event-space free from 
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exchange-value and the need for ritual, social confirmation. If, as Face reminds us, the 
myriad phenomena of seething London “Would burst a man to name” (2.3.198), then The 
Alchemist is a handbook for burst men, who find the capacity to do in the labile space 
beyond the fixity of naming, establishing a file-sharing community four centuries before 
MP3 files and ironic usernames.  
The play’s denouement offers one final turn of the screw. On the surface, the 
ending seems rather conservative. Lovewit, master of the house, unexpectedly returns 
early from the country to opportunistically claim Kastril’s rich widowed sister for 
himself; Face confesses his crimes and is forgiven; Subtle and Doll are driven from the 
house; social hierarchy and domestic privacy are restored at last. Despite noting the 
“poetic justice” foiled when the passive Lovewit scoops spoils he didn’t win, Andrew 
Gurr claims that virtual identity resolidifies: Face “can only return to his former role as 
Jeremy, Lovewit’s butler” (14). However, Face himself suggests that “Jeremy” is just 
another guise, older and better-practiced but no closer to an original self: “I’ll into mine 
old shape again, and meet him,/Of Jeremy, the butler” (4.7.120-1). Moreover, by reaping 
the profit Lovewit simply supplies the place of Subtle and Doll – the con itself is 
successful, regardless of the individuals carrying it off. The “venture” thus imparts a 
temporally distributed agency: an assemblage. According to Drew Daniel, “The coding 
and territorialization of an assemblage sustains its consistency across the ceaselessness of 
its own becoming…until its subpersonal components get reassembled into other forms 
and relationships” (11). Ironically, in this case the subpersonal elements are people. 
Lovewit instantly adopts the collaborative vocality of the venture by ceding his final 
speech to his servant, splicing the iambic pentameter just as Face and Subtle did before: 
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“Speak for thyself, knave. Face: So I will, sir” (5.5.157). Face’s impromptu addendum 
enacts one final shift from the visually signifying – the “kind spectators” Lovewit wanted 
to confirm his innocence – to the sonically moving:  
                                                   I put myself 
On you, that are my country; and this pelf 
Which I have got, if you do quit me, rests 
To feast you often, and invite new guests (5.5.162-5) 
 
Face pays the venture forward to the audience, aurally interpellated into the scheme, even 
as he zooms beyond them too to those like me, centuries later, queued up waiting to enter 























III. “CHARNEL TALK”: ECHOPOETICS AND THE DUCHESS OF MALFI 
 
 
“What if death is nothing but sound? You hear it forever. Sound all around. How awful.” 
– Don Delillo, White Noise 
 
“In politics diverse elements infiltrate into the others, metabolizing into a moving 
complex—Causation as resonance between elements that become fused together to a 
considerable degree. Here causality, as relations of dependence between separate factors, 
morphs into energized complexities of mutual imbrication and interinvolvement, in 
which heretofore unconnected or loosely associated elements fold, bend, blend, emulsify, 
and dissolve into each other…the electronic news media now serve as the echo chamber 
of this capitalist-evangelical complex” 
 
– William E. Connolly, “The Evangelical-Capitalist Resonance Machine” 
 
Delillo’s Jack Gladney neatly voices contemporary fears about media 
oversaturation, by eliding the privileged category of “information” with its material 
substrate, sound. To be flooded with information is to die, that is to cease one’s existence 
as an individuated pattern of data distinct from the noise. The buzzings finally level out 
into a steady, eternal monotone, reverberating “all around”: echoic because eternally the 
same. Connolly calls the media assemblage producing these echoes a “resonance 
machine,” which functions as a solvent of difference, sucking political screed, religious 
polemic, and sensational event alike into a single message, electronically pulsed into 
every capillary of the body politic. For both Gladney and Connolly, echoes figure the 
fatal erosion of content by form, as what was formerly a vibrant message becomes “just” 
sound. Echoes are, then, perhaps our sturdiest metaphor for always-already mediated 
communication: a scrub-wash of white noise foreclosing any real connection, a dead 
parody of lost originary truth.94  
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 This chapter suggests that early moderns would hardly find Gladney and 
Connolly’s warnings convincing. I’ll argue that in the Renaissance echoes, far from being 
secondary, inert repetitions of “real” truth, were thought to be autonomous forces 
possessing the power to change and redirect received sounds in new, provocative 
directions. Echoes were technological, prosthetic devices for the amplification of voices 
beyond the contexts and spaces in which they were spoken. As such, echoes indexed 
contemporary anxieties about the individual’s relationship to her voice, his body, and 
truth itself; such vocal portability was read by turns as opportunity and chaotic 
disturbance. The last chapter tapped the affordances of a London soundscape defined by 
overwhelming complexity, specifically the individual’s capacity to temporarily adopt a 
sonic guise to spatially shift other bodies for various ends. This one expands on the last 
by charting the technological possibilities individual humans had to amplify their voices 
beyond their own bodies, particularly those provided by the stage. As such, echoic sound 
offered its human users a material agency, but only through articulation with the 
nonhuman; echoes are formed when human voice bounces off nonhuman, ambient 
material like stone or metal, producing a vocal product that is always both/and.  
 The chapter first examines the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century 
discourse about echoes, in both the original Ovidian myth and a spate of sermons and 
tracts that draw upon it. Though the attitudes of these texts toward echoes differ – some 
are anxious about the body/voice split, others celebrate its transformative power – their 
conclusions about the nature of echoes are the same. Echoes were not, as today, “dead” 
repetitions. They rather were undead – that is to say, severed from the self-presence of a 
speaking body, yet still potent and motive. However, I must carefully distinguish such a 
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formulation from spectrality; these echoes were persistently material, able to make things 
happen in the body politic, in God’s ear, or the stage audience.95 Such echoes thus 
challenge Gladney and Connolly’s denigration of materiality – raw sound – as the 
leftover shell of evacuated informational content; what is spoken does not matter, only 
the sonic residue of the speech act itself.  
We’re thus now able to theorize a Renaissance echopoetics, defined as the 
strategic deployment of sound amplification technology to project, amplify, or distort 
one’s voice through its echo. My test case will be The Duchess of Malfi, in which the 
titular Duchess is famously reduced to an echo heard by her husband after her murder in 
the play’s fourth act. Most critics assert that the fifth act undoes the radical feminism of 
the living Duchess, located in her body; once dead, she’s a mere specter, pliably molded 
by her male interlocutors into the ideal Christian martyr and patient wife. In contrast, I 
argue that the Duchess’s death allows her voice to leave the realm of content, as decorous 
manifestation of her social role – wife, ruler, aristocrat – and enter that of form, where the 
echo retains a vibrant, material power to shape the action in the present. In this way, the 
play mounts a feminist critique of the way bodies are fetishized both by early modern and 
contemporary new materialist discourse. Assuming in the echo a reanimated form 
normally allied with male writing – the “dead letter” – but shirking endless différance 
because materially present as sound, the Duchess claims an agency not reducible to her 
body alone. Such an agency retains all the power of a flat ontology, as in Ian Bogost’s 
words a “unit” free to “operate,”96 but without the utopian insistence that all entities are 
equivalent, which ignores the cultural discipline of women’s bodies in lived reality.  
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 Throughout, I use echoes to reframe our critical vocabulary for talking about 
voice. The deconstructive tradition where speech is troped with presence, origin, and 
meaning, supplanted by a lack-and-desire-inducing absence borne of signification, no 
longer obtains: echoes transcend their spoken origin while remaining materially present. 
The same sound returns from a new place. Instead, echoic sound participates in what 
Katherine Hayles describes as the technologically-catalyzed shift from presence/absence 
to pattern/randomness as the structuring binary of metaphysics; in the pattern/randomness 
paradigm, “meaning is not front-loaded into the system, and the origin does not act to 
ground signification…complexity evolves from highly recursive processes being applied 
to simple rules. Rather than proceeding along a trajectory toward a known end, such 
systems evolve toward an open future marked by contingency and unpredictability” 
(285). The “open future” is the ability of the resonating medium to transform the 
message; spoken voice is “unpredictable” in that it may echo in unforeseen directions, or 
be warped by that which it encounters after leaving the body: empty canyon, stone theater 
walls, or even another person. These strange encounters facilitate not alienation, but 
emergence, as entities recombine in generative new ways.  
 
1. Echo Texts 
 
 The figure of Echo would have been a newly resonant one for those living in the 
late sixteenth century, as Arthur Golding’s immensely popular 1567 translation of Ovid’s 
Metamorphoses into English brought her to a much wider audience. While in subsequent 
centuries the figure of Echo has been overshadowed by her mythmate Narcissus, it is 
provocative that two such figures – associated respectively with the ear and the eye – are 
originally brought together, even juxtaposed. Joseph Loewenstein argues that while other 
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Renaissance deployments of Echo used her for all manner of antiauthoritarian purposes, 
the translations of Ovid moralized her story as an allegory of punished flattery: “The 
moral tradition…survives wherever the vernacular Ovids continue to be produced; 
Golding and Sandys maintain this tradition in England” (74).97 While in this version 
Echo’s immodesty draws censure, by reading the myth literally rather than archetypally, 
she emerges as a more sympathetic and powerful character. Alongside the allegorical 
tradition, I contend that Echo also supplied early moderns a way to conceptualize sound 
as both technological and relational, and thus counterposed to the reflexivity of the eye.98 
In other words, the myth invites consideration of Echo and Narcissus’s relationship as 
representative of that between sound and vision. 
In Ovid’s tale, Echo falls in love with Narcissus, but cannot make him notice her 
because she can speak only in response, and Narcissus becomes too transfixed by his own 
image to interact with her. Echo’s affliction – her inability to speak except to repeat the 
last few words of another – is originally a punishment: 
The cause thereof was Junos wrath. For when that with the feate 
She might have often taken Jove in daliance with his Dames, 
And that by stealth and unbewares in middes of all his games: 
This elfe would with hir tatling talke deteine hir by the way, 
Untill that Jove had wrought his will and they were fled away. 
The which when Juno did perceyve, she said with wrathfull mood, 
This tongue that hath deluded me shall doe thee little good (3.450-6) 
 
Echo here is associated with mediation; she prevents Juno from apprising herself of 
Jove’s “daliance.” Moreover, that mediation is sonic, as her “tatling talke [deteines]” 
Juno. The content of the talk is here irrelevant; merely the act of speech, its tangible 
presence as sound to be reckoned with, is enough to divert Juno from her course. Echo’s 
motivation for this is never given; she isn’t described as Jove’s lover or in any way 
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personally involved in the scene, prompting the conclusion that she obstructs for sheer 
obstruction’s sake. And indeed, even the location of this anecdote in the larger story 
figures as interference; it is Echo’s backstory, which is spliced into the middle of the 
narrative that heretofore has shadowed Narcissus, interrupting its chronological course. 
Echoic sound, then, from its classical beginnings is interference channeled through a 
medium, which possesses the autonomous power to inflect or block information.  
 Again, the myth originally casts Echo’s reflexivity as a punishment. It forces her 
into a kind of environmental openness, as she is not capable of projecting or asserting 
herself onto other bodies, only responding to their stimulus. However, that response is not 
merely passive reproduction of data. The process is algorithmic, meaning that each 
functional iteration slightly modifies the words spoken. More importantly, it leaves the 
terms of that modification up to Echo – the mediating technology – herself. Specifically, 
she is able to use Narcissus’s very words in new contexts and arrangements, transforming 
their meaning. When Narcissus scorns her, “And sayth: I first will die ere thou shalt take 
of me thy pleasure./She answerde nothing else thereto, but take of me thy pleasure” 
(3.487-8). His words are twisted from a rebuke into an invitation, as the referenced body 
shifts – his to hers – even in the act of speech. Again, Ovid doesn’t describe her reply as 
rote recitation; “answerde” connotes agency and choice. Moreover, the lack of quotation 
marks bleeds her response into the narration, as though the sound of her reply transcends 
mere phrasing, imprinting her into the story’s very blueprint.  
 For all her clever repurposing, though, Narcissus ultimately chooses his own 
reflected image over the living Echo. In our own time, that story has anchored countless 
others, from psychoanalytic disorders to jeremiads against the Twitter-sphere, which I 
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will not add to here.99 In fact, those thinkers themselves enact a Narcissian reflexivity by 
excising Echo from the story, as her bereavement forms the narrative’s final affective 
crux.100 His unwillingness and inability to call to her, or in our material reading the 
absence of environmental stimulus, causes Echo to shrivel and die:  
And ever sence she lyves alone in dennes and hollow Caves. 
Yet stacke hir love still to hir heart, through which she dayly raves 
The more for sorrow of repulse. Through restlesse carke and care 
Hir bodie pynes to skinne and bone, and waxeth wonderous bare. 
The bloud doth vanish into ayre from out of all hir veynes, 
And nought is left but voyce and bones: the voyce yet still remaynes: 
Hir bones they say were turnde to stones. From thence she lurking still 
In Woods, will never shewe hir head in field nor yet on hill. 
Yet is she heard of every man: it is hir onely sound, 
And nothing else that doth remayne alive above the ground. (3.492-500) 
 
Again the myth positions Echo and the sound she embodies as a relational being; 
Narcissus’s failure to speak gives her no material to transform and resonate outward. But, 
while the myth clearly prompts us to feel sorry for the victimized Echo, as the 
inaccessible Other desire can never reach, the story actually ends with her survival, even 
permanence. “Her bones they say were turnde to stones,” stone being perhaps the most 
resonant of all natural materials, and “they say” suggesting the successful migration of 
her resounding voice beyond the scene itself. In a book about constant change, 
metamorphosis, the endurance of voice is especially striking. Despite “never shewing her 
head,” she “is heard of every man,” and “nothing else…doth remayne alive above the 
ground,” suggesting both that her voice is still alive, and that ground, a material medium, 
is required for its transference. Echo’s body, then, I suggest is not so much lost as 
transformed, into sound itself, thereby freed to resonate in other contexts. Thus, it does 
not signal a transcendence of materiality into spectrality, but rather a shift into the realm 
of pattern, as a self-organizing complexity. She is both dead and alive, undead.  
	  
	  84	  
 Early moderns picked up on this sense of Echo as a refracting medium, and 
indeed she became a powerful locus of contemporary anxieties about the transgressive 
power of female speech, what Gina Bloom calls “the disembodied voice as a source of 
female agency” (160).101 A prime example is Giacomo Affinati’s 1605 dialogue Dumbe 
speaker of Diuinity, A learned and excellent treatise, in praise of silence, which cites 
echoes as dangerous misrepresentations of (male) truth. In his definition, “Eccho is the 
resounding of the voyce, or of a noyse formed in concaue places & cauerny, & 
rebounding thence back again, such as perchance are the vallies, among the mountains or 
stony places, & it hath this property: that if you sing, it sings again, if you lament, it 
lamenteth…and in breefe, it is a counterfetting Ape of the voyce of man.” “Concaue 
places and cauerny” recalls both the larynx and the womb, troping both with a 
paradoxically passive generativity linked also with natural spaces that amplify and 
redirect voice. Anxiety about the primacy of the human also haunts Affinati’s account; 
humans are associated with willed self-presence, manifest in their speech, such that any 
mere repetition isn’t only false – “counterfetting” – but “Ape”ish, pure unthinking 
mechanism. Echo thus represents a threat to the logocentric tradition – explicitly linked to 
male speech in Ovid’s myth and to humanity proper in Affinati’s dialogue – by 
establishing a quite literally monstrous feminine linked to the dead yet somehow still 
circulating voice, severed from its body but still agential and disruptive.  
 Affinati’s warning against repetition redoubles as he proceeds to associate echoes 
with flattery, defined as a knowing recapitulation of others’ words to affirm and please:  
It is to be noated, that as the Eccho neuer answeres where a firme voyce is made, 
or when one smiteth, but as it were a far off, and in a contrary or ouerthwart 
place: Euen so the flatterer shapes his blow, & formes the appearance of faire 
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words, in the eye only of him he flatters, but else-where it resoundeth, in a further 
place it reuerberates, and the intention is in a quite contrary kind 
 
Here the mistrust of mediation returns, as echoes warp their catalyzing voices into other 
spaces, disrupting the logocentric association of bodies with sincere speech flowing 
cleanly from them as their truest manifestation. Echo is also striking, a “blow” that 
“smitheth,” again described as a kind of technological tool-being. As Kim Solga writes, 
“An echo is a sound negative: speech in the act of disappearing, the sound of sound going 
missing, the sound of the origin as unstable ground” (102). “Unstable ground” indeed; 
echoes trouble phenomenologies of space, presenting bodies where they are not, in 
subversive parodies of intention.  
 In a different key, Echo was also a fruitful figure for religious thinking, 
representing the ideal parishioner who had properly received the word of God and whose 
body resonated it outward as a sign. Ramie Targoff writes that “the English liturgy was 
designed to connect the faculty of hearing to its cognitive and spiritual counterparts” (23). 
English vicars imagined their sermons as seeds planted by God in the ears of their 
congregations, who must correctly calibrate those ears to receive and act on the given 
wisdom.102 However, echoes could also turn such wisdom to account, as piety acquired 
through listening then grounded spoken petitions to God for aid. Anglican minister and 
later Archbishop of Canterbury George Abbot avers in his 1600 Exposition on the 
Prophet Jonah that “publike prayers are much worth, which comming ioyntly from 
whole congregations, will eccho vp to the heauen, and pierce the clouds and sky, and as a 
man may say, will offer a kind of violence, to that God who did make vs. It will wring 
mercie, and wrest louing kindnesse from him.” This is quite a surprising statement for a 
Protestant. Far from the inward communion with God that replaces Catholic ceremony, 
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here the linked chain of vocal bodies gain agential power only in their outward 
collectivity, with each praise a simultaneous echo of all the others. Such public speech 
gains a literally material force, turning the tables on God who is forced into the listening 
rather than the speaking role, given a tangible body vulnerable to the aural intrusion of 
his worshippers. Kindness and mercy are “[wrung]” and “[wrested]” from his ear by the 
directed force of resounding echoes. Abbot’s hesitation before the word “violence” is 
also notable; he hedges the word as something “a man may say,” as if the idiomatic 
expression is all his fallen state can conjure. The statement is thus itself an echo, 
secondhand, a translation of an unrepresentable process into our imperfect language – 
translational, technological. Abbot endorses the power of Echo, rather than denigrating it 
as Affinati does, but their accounts both depict echoes as vectored sonic tools detachable 
from the original speech giving them life. This discourse of prosthetic sound also haunts 
Elizabethan and Jacobean England’s most prominent resonator: the theater. It is there we 
turn next, through the example of The Duchess of Malfi, which likewise positions the 
echo as a pointedly mediated, disruptively autonomous sound.  
 
2. The Resonating Stage 
 The Duchess of Malfi self-consciously takes its theatrics for thematics; the play is 
rife with spectacles from severed hands to wax figures to elaborate dances set to music. 
Critics argue that the play actually mobilizes these spectacles in an antitheatrical critique 
of artifice, as an obstacle to “real,” inner truth; Ferdinand and Bosola’s dissembling 
ultimately destroys the Duchess’s integrity. Andrea Henderson contends that the play 
endorses the burgeoning premium on privacy born of print culture, and thus 
paradoxically must cancel itself, as publically displayed spectacle; in her words, “this 
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play, for all its spectacular qualities, is in fact anti-theatrical and reflects a movement 
toward a literary culture which privileges private reading” (206). Katherine Rowe makes 
a similar argument by way of epistemology, averring that the play indexes contemporary 
anxieties about the hidden motives of agents in a newly-contractual society: “The specific 
form these problems take in The Duchess of Malfi is the task of explaining actions 
performed at a distance, by proxy, or through intermediation” (100). Crucially, she links 
this anxiety to a redoubled distrust of theatre; her central example is the stock stage trope 
of the severed hand, which Bosola calls an “engine”: “Bosola develops a…reading of 
‘engine’ as stage machinery: describing the marriage that will unfold, will she nil she, to 
remake the Duchess into her own monument” (96). In essence, then, these critics base 
their readings on the presence/absence binary as sketched above, with malicious artifice 
willfully obscuring the “present” truth of the Duchess’s embodied honesty. By contrast, I 
propose that by reconsidering The Duchess of Malfi through the conceptual lens of 
pattern/randomness, these problems become opportunities as theatre’s artifice becomes 
technology, its falsehood prosthesis. By loosening the theater’s association with truth and 
meaning, we may chart instead its affective power to unsettle and remake its audience 
through technologically manipulated sound.  
Recent theatrical scholarship grounds such a move. Henry Turner has described 
the theater in algorithmic terms, and it is worth quoting him at length on the subject:  
For early modern writers the problem of the “fictive,” or the “imaginary” and 
“invented,” fell within the larger problem of the relationship between “art and 
nature,” which itself formed the discursive domain for many arguments that we 
would today describe as “scientific” or “technological”; the antitheatrical 
arguments we know from Shakespeare’s period may be understood as anti-
“technological” arguments, in the sense that they object to the unnaturalness of 
ars or artifice implied by acting on stage. With this view in mind, I now propose 
that we approach the early modern theatre as a kind of machine with which to 
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fashion or project artificial life, and that these forms of artificial life provide an 
example of…a posthuman condition” (204) 
 
In Turner’s model, the early modern theater was informational, in the literal sense of 
giving form: it spliced diverse material elements into a common code that served as a 
structural blueprint, producing a tangible, “real” product out of abstract data. Steven 
Mullaney reaches a similar conclusion, dubbing the theater a “laboratory of human affect. 
Elizabethan theater comes into being, in fact, through an affective reformation…enacted 
as it shifted away from the morality tradition of late medieval English drama, with its 
abstract personification of states of being, and moved toward the particular, discursive, 
and theatrical embodiment of affective characters” (881). “Particular,” “embodied,” 
“real”: the theater offers a permutational grid of abstract possibilities that are nonetheless 
materially singular. What is unique, then, about the early modern theater is its 
coagulation of multiple “falsities” in constructing the real; a performance is both organic 
and mechanical, alive and dead, singular and rehearsed, such that deconstructive criticism 
hinging on the presence/absence binary cannot fully account for it.  
 Moreover, the theater figures the seamless articulation of human life with 
technology; actors form but one node in the network of performance, their movements 
dictated by scripts, through props, inside a demarcated zone, enmeshing them in a larger 
assemblage. This formulation remarkably anticipates Hayles’s argument about the 
“posthuman condition” by four hundred years. In fact, her description of what happens 
when a human user engages a digital system bears uncanny parallels to early modern 
theater experience: “When a text presents itself as a constantly refreshed image rather 
than as a durable inscription, transformations can occur that would be unthinkable if 
matter or energy, rather than informational patterns, formed the primary basis for the 
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systemic exchanges. This textual fluidity, which users learn in their bodies as they 
interact with the system, implies that signifiers flicker rather than float” (30) Hayles, 
usually wary of the ways information brackets its material substrate, here emphasizes the 
emergent possibilities as user and data corporeally fuse. Theatrical performance works 
likewise, through iteration: each performance is unique because its constituent elements 
are “constantly refreshed,” as actors perform their coding with slight but significant 
differences each time.  
 With this framework in place, we may now hazard some conjecture about how 
sound would have functioned in theatrical space. Namely, sounds would not have secured 
the organic self-presence of their generating body – actor or device – but would have 
been (and, perhaps more importantly, been perceived as) material effects of the 
mechanism that was theatre. In other words, all theatrical sound was echoic, that is, un-
original, un-dead, mediated. Andrew Gurr has demonstrated that early modern audiences 
would have approached plays as primarily aural events, noting “their habitual assumption 
that poetry was words for speech rather than the page…Education and literacy were still 
rare enough and the price of books high enough to make the spoken word far more the 
central mode of communication than it is now” (97).103 Playgoers would thus be 
especially attuned to the sonic makeup of the plays they heard, sensitive, even vulnerable, 
to minute changes. As Allison Deutermann writes, “theatrical speech…might be 
imagined either as sound that penetrates the self regardless of its content or as something 
that can be sampled and selected according to its sense” (231). This possible penetration 
puts the audience in a double bind, forced to screen what they hear to keep critical 
distance, but also unsure of the extent to which they may already have been 
	  
	  90	  
compromised. They too, then, help comprise theatre’s echoic nature, as both discrete and 
enmeshed, self-regulating against environmental noise and secondhand transmitters of 
resonating sound they did not produce. Again, questions of origin and truth cede to those 
of effect.  
 The Blackfriars theater, where The Duchess of Malfi was first performed, would 
have produced a particularly echoic sound. It was made of stone, rather than the Globe’s 
wood. Bruce Smith tells us that “Stone walls are even more reflective of sound than wood 
and plaster, returning 98 to 99 percent of the energy waves that strike them. Paved 
flooring is almost as reflective, returning 97 percent of sound waves…Judged by its outer 
shell, the Blackfriars theater would have been a very ‘live’ space” (214). “Live” connotes 
movement, the circulation of sound throughout the edifice. Smith goes on to say that “In 
its shape the Blackfriars theater fostered a very different kind of sound than the Globe. 
However stage, galleries, and open seating may have been configured, the Blackfriars 
was a rectilinear space. As such, it dispersed sound waves throughout the room rather 
than focusing them in the center” (216). The Globe’s octagonal structure refracted all 
sound toward the middle, meaning that its sonic effects were singular, whole, merely 
amplified extensions of what came from the stage. Blackfriars sound was by contrast 
diffracted, disorienting, centrifugal, making it much harder to link sound to a speaking 
body, and much easier to isolate it as an autonomous force with its own character. In 
short, the Blackfriars was an echoic space, actively transforming received sounds by re-
cycling them. Intriguingly, Webster specifically wrote The Duchess of Malfi for this 
theater, after the chilly reception of The White Devil in the public playhouses. While Gurr 
claims this was for class reasons – the masses couldn’t appreciate Webster’s complex art 
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– I suggest that Webster may also have chosen a stage whose sonic properties suited his 
main character, who becomes a literal echo by the play’s end.104   
 
3. Duchess of Malfi…Still? 
 
 The foregoing discussion demonstrates that The Duchess of Malfi attends to 
echoes as both its manifest content – the plotted events on stage – and form – its sounds 
would resonate crazily in the Blackfriars, leaving the audience no choice but to consider 
sound qua sound. The resonating device – theater walls, actor’s body – replaces the 
originating one as the agential force. We are now ready to discuss the play’s own 
treatment of echoes, which offer a neat heuristic for critical attitudes toward the Duchess 
as both character and play. In 1938 Edgar Wind noted the relationship between echoes 
and death, in a reading of the ruin scene where Antonio and Delio “hear” the Duchess’s 
echo after her death: “What the ruin is to the sense of sight, the echo is to the sense of 
hearing: a faint reflection of the past. A ruin ‘lives’ as long as it yields an echo” (259). 
While this reading grants the possibility that the Duchess might still survive, it hedges 
that possibility by casting survival as a lessening, into a “faint reflection” of her former 
self. Indeed, the quotation marks around ‘lives’ invite us to consider the Duchess’s 
longevity as tragically specious. Nevertheless, Wind introduces a question that 
reverberates through the play’s critical history: does the Duchess survive her death? And 
if so, in what form? In several more recent treatments, that question becomes another: is 
the autonomy the Duchess gains to choose her mate and administer her affairs killed with 
her? If so, what are the implications for a feminist reading of the play? The echo almost 
always assumes a prominent place in this debate, allowing us a vantage point from which 
to survey its current state.  
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Most critics take our modern suspicion of echoes as evidence that the Duchess 
loses her sway post-mortem. Elizabeth Oakes asserts that “When she is reduced to an 
echo at the end, the Duchess is silenced like so many women in early modern drama” 
(63). Echo here is “reduction,” “silence” because the “real” Duchess, imagined to be an 
originary, volitional speaker, is no longer speaking. That self-creation is a liberal 
humanist one, ex nihilo, and as such Oakes takes the Duchess’s late-game reassertion of 
her social role as backsliding: “At the end she is, she says, the Duchess of Malfi, and with 
that title she negates her relationship with Antonio: she becomes the woman carved in 
stone that Ferdinand wanted her to be” (52). Brian Chalk extends the stone imagery, 
arguing that Ferdinand and the Cardinal attempt to render the Duchess a living 
monument, extending their own lives into posterity: “just as monuments are meant to 
compensate for the loss of the dead that they represent, the echo creates the impression 
that some form of posthumous communication is possible. But what Antonio hears is the 
reverberation of his own voice returning back to him in distorted form” (399). Stones and 
the echoes they produce offer nothing but flattered vanity. Reina Green shifts focus to 
echo as the reproduction of received truth, at least granting that the Duchess herself 
speaks: “The Duchess may be punished because she listens too well to Antonio and 
Bosola and ignores the advice of her brothers, but after death she behaves as the ideal 
listening wife, echoing her husband’s words” (467). While Green rightly points out the 
role of listening, we’ve already noted that the play’s staging at the sound-dispersing 
Blackfriars complicates the listener’s autonomy as a discerning filter. Those audiences 
would thus have a harder time endorsing good listening ability within the play as well. 
Thus, to “echo” her husband’s words does not, as Green argues, make the Duchess a 
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passive receptacle, but gives her materially signifying power through resonance 
technology. 
 In contrast with such readings, I argue that the Duchess espouses an echopoetic 
sensibility from the beginning. First, I show that while prior readings of the play vaunt 
the Duchess’s integrity and self-will, these are not her defining qualities. In fact, just the 
opposite: she thinks of herself as a distributed entity, her selfhood dispersed throughout 
the people and places she interacts with. By contrast, the men who seek to control her, 
her brothers and Bosola, rigidly maintain an ideology of discrete, self-enclosed selfhood. 
The contrast between sound and vision subtends this dichotomy; the Duchess thinks of 
herself in sonically mobile terms, while the men trope their judgment and identity with 
the objectifying power of their eyes. Second, I demonstrate that the play imagines its 
sound entirely in echoic terms, through the use of rumor. Rumor is repeated information 
that escapes its point of origin, just as echo is. While the play’s men seek to shore up their 
own identities by gathering and deploying the secrets of others, rumor’s ubiquity 
ultimately compromises their integrity from within. Finally, I explore the well-known 
“echo scene” as less a translation or reduction of the Duchess, and thus an interpretive 
crux, and instead merely a compressed example of the play’s already-dominant topos. 
Throughout, I foreground the overt theatricality of the play’s echoic moments, and the 
way its technological discourses always also refer to the theatrical apparatus itself.  
 
4. The Extended Duchess 
 Before addressing the Duchess’s apotheosis as The Echo, and the alleged changes 
to her feminist praxis, we need to establish just what that praxis is. Critical accounts of 
the play cite the Duchess’s integrity as her key virtue. This integrity is literal; the 
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Duchess finds power and identity in her own body and will, rather than obedience to her 
social role or the various men that structure it. Historically-minded versions of this 
argument commonly cite the special prerogatives granted to widows to administer their 
own estate,105 and/or the theatrical precedent of the self-actualizing male tragic hero,106 to 
ground the Duchess’s radical challenge to Renaissance patriarchy. With respect to these 
arguments, which outline crucial byways and sites by which patriarchy was and is 
contested, I take an entirely different tack, arguing that in fact it is the Duchess’s 
distribution, rather than her enclosure, that defines her strength. The Duchess practices 
what philosophers Andy Clark and David J. Chalmers call “extended cognition,” using 
her surroundings and other people as storage devices for her secrets, bearers of her 
reputation, and heuristics by which to think and make decisions.107 In fact her male 
counterparts, Ferdinand, the Cardinal, and Bosola, kill her for that very reason, because 
they imagine their own blood as hers and thus cannot brook class impurities (in 
Ferdinand and the Cardinal’s case) or believe women to be dangerously dissembling (in 
Bosola’s). It is they, I will show, not she, who defend a notion of self as defensively 
bounded.  
 Critical accounts of the Duchess routinely cycle through the same key passages, 
which seem to forcefully establish the Duchess’s independent will, and so accordingly 
I’ll examine them as well, to make a case for the Duchess as a transembodied, piecemeal 
figure. Famously, she proclaims to Antonio her iconoclastic freedom from the yoke of 
her dead husband, located in her body: 
This is flesh and blood, sir;    
'Tis not the figure cut in alabaster    
Kneels at my husband's tomb.   
Awake, awake, man!    
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I do here put off all vain ceremony,    
And only do appear to you a young widow    
That claims you for her husband, and, like a widow,    
I use but half a blush in 't (1.1.454-60)108 
 
The passage hinges on the contrast between her corporal body and the “figure” that 
submits to its socially prescribed role, but who is that figure? The referent is immediately 
unstable; does she mean her husband, who kneels before God? Her own figure on her 
husband’s monument, ossifying her into obedient submission for all time? Or does she 
mean her actual self, forced to pay tribute to her late husband in the living death of 
widowhood? It isn’t so easy to call the passage an encomium to presence; even the 
famous lines where the Duchess dismisses all without the circumference of her love bond 
with Antonio – “All discord, without this circumference,/Is only to be pitied and not 
feared” (1.1.470-1) – also refers to the wedding ring she gives him, an external, material 
circumference that frames them only in relation to a nonhuman synecdoche that echoes 
the “real thing.” This is borne out as the Duchess discards one role for another, “putting 
off the vain ceremony” of grief for the freedom of widowhood, but both are roles. And 
indeed, since early modern stages featured very little scenery, speech was of prime 
importance for establishing character and scene.109 The ring itself recalls the theater, the 
“Wooden O”, substituting echoic metal and stone for a play staged at the Blackfriars. 
This faint reference to that theater recurs when the Duchess raises Antonio from his 
kneeling supplication at her feet: “This goodly roof of yours is too low built;/I cannot 
stand upright in’t, nor discourse,/Without I raise it higher. Raise yourself,/Or, if you 
please, my hand to help you: so” (1.1.417-20). Equating the actual room with her 
husband’s body, the Duchess imagines both as resonance chambers where her 
“discourse” will resound, just as the theater itself was for the actor playing her. Smith 
	  
	  96	  
tells us that the Blackfriars, unlike the Globe, had a roof, adding to the pinballing 
disarticulation of the sound circulating within.110 Such sound is accordingly both inside 
and outside Antonio’s body, a spatial queering that enfolds both into the theatrical 
assemblage of echoic sound. 
 The Duchess links this sonically distributed selfhood with death, calling into 
question assumptions about what exactly death meant for early moderns and for us.  The 
following exchange is typical:  
Antonio: Give him all.  
Duchess: All?  
Antonio: Yes, your excellent self.  
Duchess: In a winding sheet? 
Antonio: In a couple” (1.1.388-9) 
 
While again, the most obvious reading here celebrates the Duchess’s playful equation of 
coupling with death as a coy maintenance of individuality, such a reading assumes that 
death is a negative value, the loss of “real” life. The Duchess, perhaps recognizing that 
the prospects for her life as an autonomous widow in sixteenth century Italy are grim, 
embraces death as a dispersal of the discrete self into its surroundings, here Antonio’s 
body. In so doing, she participates in what Scott Dudley has called “the moment in 
seventeenth-century culture when the corpse can be seen either as an object that has been 
emptied of all subjectivity, as Protestant theology and the emerging scientific discourse 
of anatomy claim, or as an object in which attenuated and even enhanced subjectivity and 
agency still reside, as Catholic polemics about relics insist” (278). “Death” is thus a 
signifying crux, uneasily suggesting both pure annihilation and motive force. The 
Duchess combines both meanings into a kind of undeath, a perpetual motion (suggested 
by the present-tense “winding” of the “sheet” she imagines herself wrapped in) linked to 
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the mechanism of many parts rather than the singular and ethereal cogito. Such a thinking 
self is vulnerable in ways her newly-dispersed being is not. Take the moment she beholds 
her husband and children supposedly dead, at which sight she invites death herself: 
“That’s the greatest torture souls feel in hell,/In hell: that they must live and cannot 
die./Portia, I’ll new-kindle thy coals again,/And revive the rare and almost-dead 
example/Of a loving wife” (4.1.70-4). As before, the easy reading, that she seeks 
annihilation, is belied by her citation of precedent. It was held that Marcus Brutus’s wife 
Portia killed herself when she learned of her husband’s imminent defeat in battle, by 
swallowing hot coals. By invoking Portia’s example, the Duchess “revives” an “almost 
dead” custom, circulating her death in a publically-legible lineage, while lending her 
sacrifice meaning in the present. Once again, the meditating force, here the splicing of 
real bodies into legend, eclipses the origin.  
 Moreover, that extended self is linked consistently to the sonic redirection we’ve 
called the echoic. After they marry, the Duchess slyly goads Antonio that,  
Duchess: I now am blind.  
Antonio: What’s your conceit in this? 
Duchess: I would have you lead your fortune by the hand 
Unto your marriage-bed./(You speak in me this, for we now are one)… 
Oh let me shroud my blushes in your bosom, 
Since ‘tis the treasury of all my secrets” (1.1.495-504) 
 
To marry is to lose the distinct perspective that vision provides, in favor of a conjoined 
interiority that the Duchess links to voice. Antonio “speaks in [her],” even as she is the 
one literally speaking, again subverting the question of origin. She voices his desire, but 
that desire is enabled by her free choice to speak it. Married words are thus always 
echoes, as each partner voices the other’s self through the	  resonating medium of the 
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other’s body.111 The Duchess then links this echoic partnership to death; “shroud” 
connotes both the act of concealment and the sheet over a corpse. Recalling her image of 
coupling as a “winding sheet,” to repose one’s being in another is to cease living, because 
the “self” has become networked beyond recognizable boundaries.  
The Duchess demonstrates this aural sensitivity throughout the play; when 
Ferdinand surprises her in her chamber, she’s quite willing to hear his complaint: “I will 
plant my soul in my ears to hear you” (3.2.78). Such openness contrasts vividly with 
Ferdinand’s closure; she cannot get him to accept that she is not a harlot, eventually 
interjecting “I pray, sir, hear me: I am married” (3.2.84). Even that marriage itself is a 
verbal concoction, as the Duchess defies canon law to declare herself wedded: “I have 
heard lawyers say, a contract in a chamber/Per verba de presenti is absolute marriage” 
(1.1.479-80). We may be reminded here of J.L. Austin’s “illocutionary acts,” in which a 
thing is effected in the very act of verbalizing it; such is this marriage.112 More 
interesting, though, is the contract’s secondhand nature; the Duchess has “heard” that 
marriage can be spoken into being, demonstrating an ability to repurpose discourse from 
the masculine realm of law for her own domestic ends. Such repurposing skirts Derrida’s 
critique of Austin, that speech does not ground the self-presence required to initiate an 
effect; the knowingly recycled legal talk gives the Duchess a curating, not an originating, 
agency.113 Once more, voiced sound is transmuted into new purpose through a medium – 
in this case, the Duchess herself.  
 
5. Many-Tongued Rumor 
 
 The subject of “having heard” allows us to pivot from the Duchess to her male 
interlocutors, who fear her sexual transgression primarily because the report will escape 
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and tarnish their own names. As such, the greatest enemy they can imagine is rumor, with 
its ability to infect the ears with contagious false truths. Keith Botelho has written of 
rumor’s propensity to eclipse the intentions of its speakers: “Rumors, of course, begin 
with people, but their anonymous function disrupts notions of an originary moment or 
place of information. Thus, the ability to be an earwitness…became a crucial means of 
securing truth” (12). Botelho uncovers an ocean of early modern male anxiety about their 
“informational authority” in the face of rumormongering (5), noting that proper listening, 
or “earwitnessing,” accordingly became a central skill in the formation of masculine 
identity. And indeed, this is the concern Ferdinand has with the Duchess; because she is 
his blood, her reputation is really his. Critics have long interpreted Ferdinand’s 
motivations as narcissistic: Frank Whigham diagnoses his incestuous desire for his sister 
as anxiety about aristocratic purity;114 Lynn Enterline offers a psychoanalytic reading of 
his simultaneous identification with and estrangement from his sister’s maternal body;115 
and most recently Mary Floyd-Wilson has linked him to the proto-scientific male 
discourse of objectivity that sought to pry open occult female secrets.116 These critics, 
however, don’t attend to the threat circulating sound posed to this (male) discrete 
selfhood, by dispersing fragmented bits of it inside the ears of others. Rumor, then, is 
echo in reverse: rather than tracing an originary speech act through its diffusion, it begins 
with scattered information from which it tries to adduce the “truth.”  
Ferdinand grandly lectures his sister on the importance of chastity, eliding the 
deed itself with public knowledge of it in an allegory he propounds to her: ‘Stay,’ quoth 
Reputation,/’Do not forsake me; for it is my nature/If once I part from any man I meet/I 
am never found again.’ (3.2.133-5). The personification underscores Botelho’s point 
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about the autonomy of Rumor, but also places responsibility for its control squarely in the 
hands of each person, allowing Ferdinand to blame his sister for her alleged looseness. In 
an ironic contrast, he imagines that his own actions should serve as model to his court, 
and that they can freely reproduce his image without any distortion: “Methinks you that 
are courtiers should be my touchwood: take fire when I give fire, that is, laugh when I 
laugh, were the subject never so witty” (1.1.124-6). What he does never escapes him; by 
imitating him his courtiers are him. Of course, we learn that Ferdinand is not quite as 
independent as he claims. Delio asks Antonio if the Duke and the Cardinal are “Twins?,” 
and Antonio responds “In quality./He speaks with others’ tongues and hears men’s 
suits/With others’ ears…Dooms men to death by information,/Rewards by hearsay” 
(1.1.172-7). Not only is Ferdinand thus the echo of his underlings’ reports and opinions, 
and of his brother, whose conduct he mimics to the point of indistinction, the audience’s 
knowledge of this is thrice removed, as they overhear a court rumor recounted to 
Delio.117 Ferdinand thus imagines that he is the origin, but he is in fact the copy, the 
echo.118  
 If Ferdinand tries and fails to cordon himself off from rumor’s diffusion effect, his 
case against the Duchess falls flat. No stable epistemological ground on which to stand 
renders truth inaccessible. Antonio, after the Duchess has borne children, notes “The 
common rabble do directly say/She is a strumpet” (3.1.25-6). “Direct” access to anything 
in this play is impossible, as rumor – echo’s inverse – works backwards from partial data 
to posit an inevitably flawed origin. Bosola makes this point to Ferdinand during his 
report of the Duchess’s conduct:  
Bosola:     ’Tis rumored she hath had three bastards, but 
                   By whom, we may go read i’th’stars.  
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Ferdinand: Why, some/Hold opinion all things are written there.  
Bosola:      Yes, if we could find spectacles to read them (3.1.59-62) 
 
Bosola notes the partiality of rumor, in which only a fragment of truth is legible; the other 
part – the children’s parentage, a quite literal origin – is opaque. Notably, he also links 
truth to vision; proper “spectacles” could generate the appropriate critical distance for an 
observer to acquire the needed data. Ferdinand’s eyes are the frequent topic of discussion, 
not least by the man himself; when the Duchess asks “Will you see my husband?,” he 
answers “Yes, if I/Could change eyes with a basilisk” (3.2.88-9), a mythical snake whose 
eyes killed on sight. Pescara warns Delio to “Mark Prince Ferdinand:/A very salamander 
lives in’s eye,/To mock the eager violence of fire” (3.3.48-50). His eyes are thus linked 
not with the cold remove of textuality, but the fantastical rage of basilisks and the 
destructive chaos of fire, which like rumor acquires its own agency to enact “eager 
violence.” Fire, as Anne Harris writes, is Biblically associated with aspiration, the 
transmigration of bodies beyond their proper spheres, from Satan’s flames to the kiln-
fired bricks of Babel.119 More locally, while we don’t know the exact date of the play’s 
first performance, most scholars put it somewhere in late 1613 or 1614, shortly after The 
Globe burned to the ground on June 29, 1613 from a cannon fired onstage. For Webster 
and his first audiences, then, fire would link artifice with mutability and destruction, not 
the epistemological fixity sought by Ferdinand. We must shift our analysis of rumor, 
then, from the fraught epistemology of the truth sought to its material effect on the 
knowing subject.120  
 Late in the play Julia does just this, in an experiment designed to demonstrate the 
folly of secrecy. By so doing she gives the lie to withdrawn, core selves based on it, as 
when Ferdinand boasts, “He that can compass me and know my drifts/May say he hath 
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put a girdle ‘bout the world/And sounded all her quicksands” (3.2.84-6). Stowing Bosola 
behind a curtain, Julia implores the Cardinal to divulge the secret plaguing him, i.e. 
complicity in his sister’s murder. He initially refuses on the grounds that “The only way 
to make thee keep my counsel/Is not to tell thee,” to which she responds, “Tell your echo 
this,/Or flatterers that like echoes still report/What they hear (though most imperfect), and 
not me./For, if that you be true unto yourself,/I’ll know” (5.2.254-8). Julia links echoes 
and rumor as similar distortions of truth. Both “what they hear” and the “reporting” itself 
are imperfect; the information is already tainted when it arrives, and is twisted further in 
the act of reporting. Purity of transfer is impossible. Information is always-already sullied 
by the material mediums that deliver it, and the invocation of “flatterers” suggests that 
such sullying can be deliberate, as we saw in Affinati. Ironically, the Cardinal expounds 
the same logic his sister did in her marriage: sharing secrets is sharing self, although for 
the guilty Cardinal – who often chides Ferdinand for his lack of self-control – this is 
unthinkable. Julia, by contrast, promises that secrets made to a close confidant remain 
reflexively contained, “true unto yourself.” Of course, both she and the audience know 
that Bosola is hiding just off-scene, and so her words are a lie – in the very act of 
utterance the Cardinal is betrayed, diffracted. His final lines evince a desperation to box 
Pandora again, and reverse the entropic drift of rumor: “And now, I pray, let me/Be laid 
by and never thought of” (5.5.107-8). As I have argued, though, death in this play is not 
nothingness, but its opposite: endless, networked circulation. A prayer for annihilation, 
rather than the soul’s immortality, roots endurance, “life,” squarely in the realm of the 
earthly, linked to monstrous undeath.  
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 Indeed, while Rumor in early modern texts is often a dangerous threat, linked as 
Carla Mazzio writes to “anxieties about the powers and vulnerabilities of language itself” 
when “dislodged from its bodily surround” (54),121 The Duchess of Malfi uses its title 
character to reframe rumor as generative. Returning to Hayles, the material instantiation 
of information in a medium causes signifiers to “flicker,” creating new permutations with 
each iteration. From one perspective then rumor degrades old truths, but from another it 
creates new ones. The Duchess, as we’ve already seen in her appropriation of widow’s 
roles, lawyer-speak, and Roman legend, is a master of this recombinative bricolage, and 
rumor is no different. She declares to Cariola her intention to woo Antonio, vowing 
“Even in this hate – as men in some great battles,/By apprehending danger, have 
achieved/Almost impossible actions; I have heard soldiers say so –/So I, through frights 
and threat’nings, will assay/This dangerous venture” (1.1.345-9). The Duchess 
foregrounds the transmission rather than the content of the message; she “has heard” of 
male heroics, and is thus able to adopt them in a vastly different context. Indeed, her 
rhetoric is instantly suffused with military and commercial terms, a “venture” “assay”ed. 
Webster himself, in the play’s dedication to George Harding for its 1623 folio printing, 
writes that “men who never saw the sea, yet desire to behold that regiment of waters, 
choose some eminent river to guide them thither, and make that, as it were, their conduct 
or postilion. By the like ingenious means has your fame arrived at my knowledge” (4-8). 
Emphasis again falls on generative translation; the “means” are “postilion” to the 
message, but end up supplanting it, as “fame” replaces the man. And once more, 




6. “The Echo Scene” 
 All of the foregoing dynamics – distributed selves, echoed sound, and feminism – 
coalesce in a single scene near the end of the play, commonly known as “the echo scene.” 
While, as we have seen, critics usually read this scene as the Duchess’s transformation or 
reduction, I find in it just another example, typical in every way, of the echopoetics the 
Duchess has always practiced. As such, this section rehearses in compressed form the 
arguments I have made, as their culmination. After the Duchess’s murder, her husband 
Antonio and his friend Delio approach the Cardinal her brother’s lodging, in a bold plan 
to force retribution from him. However, as they approach it is the building itself, and not 
the man inside, that anchors the scene:  
Yond’s the Cardinal’s window. This fortification 
Grew from the ruins of an ancient abbey; 
And to yond side o’th’river lies a wall, 
Piece of a cloister, which in my opinion 
Gives the best echo you ever heard, 
So hollow and so dismal, and withal 
So plain in the distinction of our words, 
That many have supposed it is a spirit 
That answers (5.3.1-9) 
 
The edifice is itself translated, an abbey that became a castle, but imperfectly, leaving 
traces of its former status. Already then we detect echopoetics: the act of translation 
inflects the result, diluting the origin’s form-giving power. Delio acts as enlightened tour 
guide to Antonio, coloring his explanation with bemused skepticism, by carefully 
distinguishing the superstition of the “many” who “suppose” from his own proto-Burkean 
aesthetics, ranking the echo as the “best” for the quality product it offers the tourist. 
Antonio, by contrast, resumes the narration in a more somber key, linking the ruins to the 
folly of seeking immortality, to which the Duchess’s echo responds:  
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I do love these ancient ruins. 
We never tread upon them but we set 
Our foot upon some reverend history; 
And questionless, here in this open court, 
Which now lies naked to the injuries 
Of stormy weather, some men lie interred 
Loved the church so well, and gave so largely to’t, 
They thought it should have canopied their bones  
Till doomsday. But all things have their end; 
Churches and cities, which have diseases like to men, 
Must have like death that we have. 
 
Echo: Like death that we have (5.3.9-20) 
 
A conventional warning against hubris is instantly belied by the Duchess’s answering 
voice, which playfully mocks Antonio by negating with his own words the permanent 
death he pronounces. But, if the sound is produced by Antonio’s voice interfacing with 
the stones, how then might we understand it as his wife’s voice, and not his own 
projection? If, as we’ve seen, the Duchess stores herself in Antonio, as a tangible 
repository of her being, the stones disaggregate his voice into shards by dispersing it on 
contact, one shard of which is the Duchess herself. Contemporary staging practice offers 
another clue; Jacobean theater featured a panoply of off-stage sound effects, from 
cannons to pealing bells to birdsong.122 Audiences were thus likely to associate unstaged 
sound, even a human voice, with technological intervention. Antonio thus reads the ruins 
only half-right; one indeed cannot endure just as one was, but to lie “naked to the 
injuries” doesn’t mean to dissolve, it means to change form, to commingle.  
Delio tries to reassert critical distance, prompting Antonio to consider the echo a 
quaint aesthetic curio: “I told you ‘twas a pretty one. You may make it/A huntsman, or a 
falconer, a musician,/Or a thing of sorrow” (5.3.24-6). For Delio, the speaking body (i.e. 
Antonio) retains authority over the speech act, “making” it what it will be. As such, he 
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tries to dissuade Antonio from confronting the Cardinal, citing his free choice in the 
matter, only to be rebuffed by Antonio’s stoic fatalism: “Necessity compels me./Make 
scrutiny throughout the passes/Of your own life; you’ll find it impossible/To fly your 
fate,” to which the echo rejoins “Oh, fly your fate!” (5.3.36-9). Recalling Ovid, the 
Duchess’s echo selectively twists Antonio’s speech into new meaning, here importuning 
him to do exactly the opposite of what he intends, with the same words. Importantly, the 
echo splits the difference between Delio’s absolute freedom through critical distance, and 
Antonio’s grim resignation. The echo promises him a kind of agential choice, but one 
grounded in sensitivity to environmental influence, context-specificity. He can fly 
because she told him to, and only out of concern for her, just as that concern itself was 
bodied forth by Antonio’s voice, forming a daisy-chained, algorithmic response pattern.  
Antonio initially shrugs off the echo’s power by invoking the presence/absence 
binary to debunk its legitimacy: “Echo, I will not talk with thee,/For thou art a dead 
thing,” to which she responds “Thou art a dead thing” (5.3.42-3). But again, the binary is 
vacated in favor of material effect; Antonio himself is “dead” in that his voice has joined 
the stones to produce an echo of his wife, or in other words has expanded beyond the 
bounds of his own body. He is no longer alive by any of the common standards: organic, 
self-present, autopoietic. And indeed, accepting such imbrication forges an affective 
connection to the Duchess, and thus allows her influence: “I marked not one repetition of 
the echo/But that; and on the sudden, a clear light/Presented me a face folded in sorrow.” 
The echo’s sound enters him, reproducing his wife’s image in the way a computer code 
opens a program. Delio calls this “Your fancy, merely” (5.3.47-50), again citing the 
reflexivity of the thinking self, but Antonio is noticeably changed by the encounter.123 
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His final statement, which ends the scene, subtly revises his former stoicism: “Though in 
our miseries Fortune have a part,/Yet in our noble suff’rings she hath none;/Contempt of 
pain, that we may call our own” (5.3.60-2). While seemingly the same sentiment as 
before, resignation to fate, here Antonio – pointedly echoing his wife – claims not an 
absolute, but a regulatory power. Such power doesn’t deny circumstance as Delio’s 
aesthetics do, but it does afford the ability to modulate its effect, just as Ovid’s Echo did 
the voice of Narcissus. And indeed, the self finds its locus in that very modulation, a 
distinctly echoic identity.  
 
7. Conclusion: Ec(h)ocriticism 
This chapter has proposed a link between the early modern conception of echoes, 
the resonance technologies that produced them, and gender. Early moderns heard echoed 
sounds as “undead” events, hybrid assemblages of human speaker and nonhuman 
resonator. Such events have implications for both transmission and reception. On the 
front end, the speaker’s intent no longer governs a speech act, ceding primary agency to 
the mediating device. On the back end, those willing could themselves become 
resonators, opening their ears to sonic stimuli, and then inflecting them in generative new 
directions. I’ve called this process echopoetics. Early modern women like the Duchess of 
Malfi were its most frequent practitioners, allowing me to piece out earlier accounts of 
transgressive Renaissance female speech by linking them with sound reproduction 
devices like the theater. Such fusion makes good on Donna Haraway’s bid for a 
cyborgian feminism, embracing technology as an escape from women’s association with 
the originary nature alienated men seek to reenter: “Every story that…privileges the 
return to wholeness imagines the drama of life to be individuation, separation, the birth of 
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the self, the tragedy of autonomy, the fall into writing, alienation…These plots are ruled 
by a reproductive politics – rebirth without flaw, perfection” (58-9). Lacking a stable 
origin to return to, echoes are freed to resonate in new contexts or directions, through 
new bodies. They escape the biopolitical injuction to extend indefinitely in paralytic and 
managed sameness. The sly power attendant on posthuman fusion with sonic techne also 
helps expand our taxonomy of early modern imaginative relationships to technology. 
Namely, we might move beyond Ferdinand’s border anxiety, to explore what Jean 
Feerick and Vin Nardizzi call “a fuller range of responses to the identifications that 
writers imagined with other life [and nonlife] forms” (4). Contemporary ecocritics might 
also find in the Duchess a model for a renewed critique of the boundary between organic 
nature and technology, which still underwrites much of our scholarship. After all, as 
Patricia Clough writes, “The biomediated body…is not disembodiment. Rather it is a 
recent complexification in bodily matter at the molecular level as its informational 
capacity is made more apparent and more productive” (214). Against our usual story 
about the separation of matter from its informatic soul (and the Terminator-panic or 
brain-in-a-vat arrogance it spawns), new media weds the two, creating fresh sites for 
affects unknown. I have sought to historicize the “new” from such media, arguing that 
echoic sound operated by these dynamics four hundred years ago.  
 With help from The Duchess of Malfi, I’ve also nominated the early modern 
indoor theater as a prime echopoetic medium for its ability to disperse staged sound, and I 
return there for one final example of the way echoes recast content – what is spoken – 
through form – transformative contact. Heretofore I’ve discussed represented echoes 
inside the play, but they also gesture beyond it. The Duchess of Malfi echoes an 
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astonishing number of Shakespearean moments, from plot points to individual lines, but 
always distorts them for its own ends. For example, the Duchess herself recalls Twelfth 
Night’s Olivia, but instead of using grief to prolong her independence, she throws parties, 
and willingly chooses a mate rather than having one thrust upon her. One tiny moment in 
King Lear, Gloucester’s quip, “As flies to wanton boys are we to th’gods,/They kill us for 
their sport,” is parceled across three moments in The Duchess of Malfi. Bosola laments to 
the Duchess that “Our bodies are weaker that those paper prisons boys use to keep flies 
in” (4.2.124-5). Later he claims “We are merely the star’s tennis balls, struck and 
banded/Which way please them” (5.4.56-7) to which Antonio agrees, “Like wanton boys, 
whose pastime is their care,/We follow after bubbles blown in th’air” (66-8). By splicing 
the citation, the play decenters its authority, offering both Webster and his audience a 
curatorial power. There are too many such echoes to list here, although I will try in the 
footnote.124 The play thus approaches metatheatre, but instead of highlighting 
representation itself, it models the permutational iterability of experience. William West 
has called this embodied recycling “intertheatricality”:  
Rather than seeing different patterns and forms of performance as variations on a 
fixed type…it understands them as belonging to a horizontally organized 
repertoire, never completed and slowly changing, of lines, gestures, characters, 
situations, genres, and other smaller elements that cumulatively allow for new 
performances and new concatenations of actions…It is recalling or re-enacting 
that is neither wholly allusive nor wholly citational, in the sense that it does not 
primarily point towards a single past performance, much less an original one 
(154-5) 
 
Again recalling Hayles’s “flickering” signifiers, theatrical “patterns or forms” – among 
which “Shakespeare” acquires the same value as an improvised hat tip – evolve across 
instantiations, as they enter individual bodies, stages, and references.125 We know that 
Webster began his career as a collaborative dramatist, and that he attended his own plays; 
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it’s no stretch to assume he was a regular theatergoer. Moreover, since only a few of 
Shakespeare’s works had appeared in quarto by 1613, Webster must more often than not 
have cited from memory, thus imperfectly stamping the result. These echoes show us a 
culture less textually immured than ours, one that thought in terms of live example and 
not quote. If, as Henry Turner has shown, Renaissance dramatists saw in plays the 
perpetual motion of many scenes rather than synchronic coherence,126 their untimeliness 
is illustrated nowhere better than the intertheatrical echoes enfolded within. Like their 
sisters made of actual sound, these are measurable by their material, not their semiotic, 
effects.  
 As such, echopoetics can operate beyond the conscious will. At the end of the 
play, Bosola kills Antonio by mistake, cutting off his vengeance plot at the knees. Dying 
himself shortly thereafter from the Cardinal’s wounds, he claims to be expiring 
In a mist; I know not how, 
Such a mistake as I have often seen 
In a play. Oh, I am gone!  
We are only like dead walls or vaulted graves 
That, ruined, yields no echo. Fare you well (5.5.112-6) 
 
In his tragic self-consciousness, Bosola recalls many a postmodern hero, lost in the 
funhouse of textuality. He is aware, like them, of his implication in a chaotic world 
indifferent to his knowledge or skill, as a single signifier in an anchorless chain. But, if 
Bosola’s imagined grave “yields no echo,” his words themselves do; they revive his 
earlier narration of ordinary lives to the Duchess, of whom “Sin their conception, their 
birth weeping,/Their life a general mist of error,/Their death a hideous storm of terror” 
(4.2.182-4). The content of the words (dissolution) is pointedly belied by their form, as a 
heard repetition the audience would recognize and keep alive, splintered in as many 
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directions as there were ears in the crowd. Bosola thus unwittingly embraces echopoetics, 






























NOTES TO INTRODUCTION 
	  
1	  Recall also Althusser’s example of the policeman’s hail, the vocal response to which 
interpellates the citizen as a subject of state authority. 
 
2 While logocentric presence depends on the idea that one hears one’s own voice “at the 
same time” of speech, phenomenology introduces a crucial time gap – however tiny – in 
the passage from mouth to ear. That gap replays Zeno’s Paradox, in which halving the 
time or distance between two things – in this case moments, the speaking and the hearing 
ones – will never fully erase the space between them. If I keep dividing a number by 2, 
I’ll never reach zero, pure identity. Thus presence, the absolute simultaneity of a moment 
with itself, is impossible – to think it one has to have already passed to the next moment.  
 
3 Even Austin, who focuses on functionality and not semantics, fails to actually leave 
semantics behind, and thus draws Derrida’s rebuke. “Signature Event Context,” 14-20. 
 
4 As she puts it, “Bodies may become orientated in this responsiveness to the world 
around them, given this capacity to be affected. In turn, given the history of such 
responses, which accumulate as impressions on the skin, bodies do not dwell in spaces 
that are exterior but rather are shaped by their dwellings” (9).  
 
5 Buttressing this point, Robert Markley argues that “The comparatively widespread 
attempts to develop and promote a “Real Character” – an ideographic system of 
representation that defines unproblematically what it names – are themselves evidence of 
the anxieties fed by the belief that the world had grown too complex to describe in 
conventional speech or, alternately, that everyday discourse had been corrupted by war, 
sectarianism, and political instability past the point where it could adequately describe the 
physical or metaphysical universe” (64).  
 
6	  This is John Wilkins’s An Essay towards a Real Character and a Philosophical 
Language, one of many such “universal language” schemes the period produced. 
 
7 An important precursor of this trend is Goran Stanivukovic, who makes the case for a 
citational queerness: “Thus viewed, queerness is a product of literary affiliation, and a 
critical conjecture about specific points of contact between those texts; it is not directly 
related to a bodily act” (47).  
 





9 He uses the term outright earlier in the essay, proclaiming that the grain “is in the 
throat…where the phonic metal hardens and is segmented…bringing not the soul but 
jouissance” (506).  
 
10 2 Henry IV is again instructive here. Compare the reaction of Northumberland, upon 
learning that his son Hotspur has been killed:  
 
 Let heaven kiss earth! Now let not Nature’s hand 
 Keep the wild flood confined! Let order die! 
 And let this world no longer be a stage 
 To feed contention in a lingering act 
 But let one spirit of the first-born Cain 
 Reign in all bosoms, that, each heart being set 
 On bloody courses, the rude scene may end, 
 And darkness be the burier of the dead! (1. 1.154-61) 
 
Is this not jouissance? The desire to break through the chain of signifiers, “act” and 
“scene,” is there, as is the indistinct bliss of annihilation, “in all bosoms” alike. The tone 
may be despair instead of rapture, but the desire for a responsibility-cancelling 
apocalypse echoes uncannily some of the sentiments of contemporary ecocriticism.  
 
11 Even Deleuze and Guattari, in their peyote-popping, scrotum-stitching paean to 
“openness”, insist that “you have to keep small supplies of significance and 
subjectification, if only to…enable you to respond to the dominant reality…You don’t 
reach the BwO, and its plane of consistency, by wildly destratifying” (160). 
 
12 I refer to her seminal essay “Paranoid Reading,” which argues that the hermeneutics of 
suspicion underpinning new historicist scholarship not only “depends…on an infinite 
reservoir of naivete in those who make up the audience for their unveilings” (141), but 
ceases to make sense within a conservative political regime that, contrary to Foucault’s 
ubiquitous power network, is actually eagerly divesting itself of responsibility for its 
subjects. In other words, theory too, like literature, should be historicized into its 
generating contexts. I would argue we’ve reached a comparable point with ecocriticism: 
we know that the human fails to constitute itself, and that its construction excludes both 
its own margins and the nonhuman world, and we get that that harms the planet. 
 
13 Perhaps my favorite illustration of this idea is David Foster Wallace’s searing 
description of Wittgenstein (not a deconstructionist, but close enough) as a “mad 
crackpot genius…who believed that everything was words. Really. If your car would not 
start, it was apparently to be understood as a language problem. If you were unable to 
love, you were lost in language. Being constipated equalled being clogged with linguistic 
sediment.” (73).  
 
14 Katherine Hayles reminds us “how small the fraction of the world’s population is who 





15 For example, see Talal Asad’s recent diagnosis of the violence latent in humanism, in 
which “States that kill in the course of their claim to be engaged in a universalizing 
project, that of raising ‘the best part’ of humanity in the name of humanity as a whole, 
must be distinguished from the violence of ‘lower’ societies” (404). 
 
16 See the introduction to their recent collection Renaissance Posthumanism.  
 
17 Examples of this position abound, such as Rob Nixon’s expose of the ways ecological 
damage is exported safely out of sight to the Global South in Slow Violence.  
	  
	  
NOTES TO CHAPTER I 
 
18 See Carson’s Silent Spring, 9, and Jameson’s Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic 
of Late Capitalism, 6.  
 
19	  For example, Laurie Shannon points out that Robert Hooke and Robert Boyle’s famous 
air pump experiments were less science and more spectacle, performing human dominion 
over animals to a live audience who needed this ritual, visual confirmation. The 
Accomodated Animal, 250-66.  
 
20	  To be sure, Jay actually stresses the continuity of visual culture from antiquity, 
contesting Febvre’s claim that it spontaneously generated in the Renaissance, but he does 
agree that an enormous intensification began in the sixteenth century. See Downcast 
Eyes, 45-57. 
 
21	  Compare Foucault’s gloss on Las Meninas, in which the gaze of the viewer takes 
precedent over the represented image: the “centre is symbolically sovereign…These three 
‘observing’ functions come together in a point exterior to the picture: that is, an ideal 
point in relation to what is represented.” The Order of Things, 14-5.  
 
22 See Schafer’s The Soundscape: Our Sonic Environment and the Tuning of the World. 
 
23 This accords with what Steven Connor has called “implicated space,” in which “insides 
and outsides change places, and produce each other reciprocally.”	  Dumbstruck: A 
Cultural History of Ventriloquism, 13.  
 
24	  See page 16 for a linkage of storms with earthquakes. All weather was thought by early 
moderns to have a terrestrial origin. See Aristotle’s Meteorologica, 275. As Robert 
Markley puts it, “The chemistry of explosive disruption links thunder and earthquakes as 
violations in kind of an idealized climatological and geological stability.” See his 





25 Jane Bennett deploys this term as analogous to her “thing-power,” the capacity of all 
matter (sentient or not) to initiate effects on other things. Vibrant Matter, 9.  
 
26	  For Crooke, the human production of speech is merely one example of a general praxis 
of sound amongst all bodies, “which may bee shewed in bels and musical instruments for 
such bodyes containe a great deale of ayre in them, which airy when it is moued and 
seeketh a vent, doth euery way strike about the sides and euery way causeth a resonance 
or resounding” (645).  
 
27	  Jonathan Sawday argues that “dissection is an insistence on the partitioning of 
something (or someone) which (or who) hitherto possessed their own unique organic 
integrity.” The Body Emblazoned, 2. By contrast with this human-made-object, I embrace 
the autonomy of the body’s parts as a pointed critique of human hegemony.  
 
28	  Quoted in Bruce R. Smith’s The Acoustic World of Early Modern England, 283. Smith 
uses Crooke to emphasize the difference between theatre as performance art and textual 
object to be read.	  	  
	  
29	  Compare James Yates’s also-contemporary account of the quake, in which God 
“send’st us signes, and tokens of thy wrath,/And if with grace we rightly then do 
scanne,/We may thus thinke, and also understand” (emphasis mine). Yates is advocating 
a kind of close reading; God’s works are symbolic presages of his intent, which we can 
learn to “rightly scanne,” or correctly interpret. 
	  
30	  I recognize that I am potentially skirting a rather large elephant here: how was God’s 
voice conceived by early moderns? Implicit in my argument is a kind of perverse 
logocentrism, in which God’s voice may be the ultimate reality, but is not fully accessible 
to fallen humans, who must perforce turn to inferior writing as a kind of ancillary 
prosthesis. The damage that such self-willed alienation from embodied, “real” vocality 
can do is depicted in both Harvey’s letter and King Lear, as I proceed to show. I seek less 
to probe the ultimate cause of the earthquake than the ecological potential afforded by its 
immeasurable vocality. For a good debunking of Derridean logocentrism, which asserts 
that writing is itself an embodied process, see Bruce R. Smith’s The Acoustic World of 
Early Modern England, 10-12. Gina Bloom traces the conception of God’s voice in early 
modern sermons as a kind of seed that produced tangible change, a fully material and 
porous process that accords with my own claims. See Voice in Motion, 111-159.  
 
31	  Karen Raber, triangulating the quake through its putative influence on King Lear, dubs 
it a “hyperobject,” borrowing Timothy Morton’s term for an event, thing, or phenomenon 
that is so massive in scale, and so diffused in effect, that it defies human representation, 
orientation, and intervention. In her words, the earthquake “[reminds] humans of the 
magnitude of natural elements, the impossibility of a “god’s eye” view of earthquake 





32	  The critical literature on Harvey’s letter foregrounds its refusal to pin down the quake’s 
precise origin, casting this skeptical naturalism as the replacement for the religious 
certainty of Churchyard, Yates, and their ilk, consonant with the burgeoning scientific 
revolution. Kendrick Prewitt cites the failure of Harvey’s empirical method to ratify the 
divine, noting that “the conclusion that Harvey reaches about the provenance of the quake 
betrays a thoroughgoing skepticism about human access to knowledge of divine actions” 
(30). Christopher Carter picks up this thread, arguing against the clean demarcation of 
superstition and triumphal empiricism which is the too-easy typical story of the rise of 
science: “The end effect was to create an epistemological debate over the ability to know 
whether a prodigy was natural or not, as opposed to an ontological debate about its actual 
status” (133). Gerard Passannante reaches the same conclusion by circuitous means, 
charting Harvey’s deployment of classical sources that sketch an aleatory and atheistic 
cosmos, particularly through Lucretian atomism: “In tracing the expression of Lucretian 
influence…we will find that the mere specter of an intertextual allusion raises a number 
of deeper questions about the meaning of digression and about the unstable ground of 
tradition itself” (796). What’s missing in these accounts is precisely the earthquake itself, 
as material phenomenon, its “ontological status” as Prewitt puts it. These critics, in 
zooming beyond the physical event to situate it as mere example in the history of human 
thought, fail to attend to what the letter actually does say about the operations of 
earthquakes. By contrast, I argue that by discarding questions of authorial intent or 
epistemological quagmires, we may attend to the transembodied connections between 
quakes and quaking humans sketched in the letter.  
 
33	  The question of void was hotly debated in the sixteenth century. Henry Turner traces a 
profound shift in spatiality, “between a neo-Aristotelian scholastic philosophy that could 
conceive only of container or place and the emergence of a distinct notion of space 
understood as a homogenous, extended medium that precedes and receives all bodies and 
their movements” (177-8). Brian Rotman nominates one surprising culprit for this sea 
change: the number zero, imported to Europe in the mid-fourteenth century from Hindu 
India via Arab merchants, which marks “the origin of a new, radically different mode of 
sign production; one whose novelty is reflected in the emergence of a semiotic subject 
able to signify absence” (57). As with the advent of perspective seen earlier, space is thus 
parsed into actors and sets, unified human subjectivities dialectically established 
alongside inert environments – voids – which a priori wait for human activity to 
instrumentalize them. Harvey’s quake not only renders such a partition literally “absurd,” 
it emphasizes the labile mobility inherent in all bodies; heterogenous matter interacts, 
“forcibly” and “cruelly” inverting the inside and the outside in constant flux.  
 
34	  Although it deals specifically with written text, compare Mikhail Bahktin’s 
“heteroglossia,” which stresses language’s tendency to slip the leashes of its authors: 
“Not all words…submit equally to this appropriation, to this seizure and transformation 
into private property: many words stubbornly resist, others remain alien, sound foreign in 
the mouth of the one who appropriated them” (294). Citing words as “property” grounds 
their material status, and his action verbs firmly invest those words with agentic capacity: 




very act of inscribing characters means that they instantly transcend his ability to 
subordinate their voices to his. The letter thus transforms from echo-chamber to 
amphitheater.  
	  
35	  This and all subsequent citations are drawn from the Pelican Shakespeare edition of 
King Lear, edited by Stephen Orgel (1999). 
	  
36	  Henry Turner notes the disorienting lack of geographic specificity in the play, 
explicitly contra the process of mapping. “King Lear Without: The Heath,”	  164-5. 
 
37 For a linkage of the play’s cartographical taxonomizing with discourses of anatomy, 
underpinning a wider critique of norming practices, see Valerie Traub, “The Nature of 
Norms in Early Modern England: Anatomy, Cartography, ‘King Lear’.” 
 
38	  For an excellent reading against the grain of this trend, see Robert B. Pierce’s “’I 
Stumbled When I Saw’: Interpreting Gloucester’s Blindness in King Lear,” which 
invokes disability studies to debunk the stereotype of blindness as spiritual poverty. 
 
39	  This scene is commonly read as an example of ekphrasis. See for example Andrew 
Bozio, who argues that Edgar’s narration functions as a type of prosthesis; it “ultimately 
persuades Gloucester to trust Edgar’s sight over his own sensations” (271). Such a 
reading still figures the triumph of the eye and human ingenuity. “Embodied Thought.” 
	  
40 Paterson does emphasize Descartes’ empirical turn, in attempting to specify exactly 
how the constitutive features of the eye – retina, pupil, optic nerve – produce vision, but 
he insists that Descartes ultimately viewed his inquiry as more broadly metaphorical, 
where “mechanisms of light and optics might be considered indissociable from his 
reflexive inquiry into truth, method, and certainty.” Seeing With the Hands, 23.  
 
41 Totaro, while mostly citing the curse as an instrument of “bodily government,” does 
admit that it can exceed the agency of the speaker: “From a strictly Aristotelian 
perspective, heat must rise or otherwise escape from confinement. No degree of will can 
change the process.” “Meterophysiology,” 202.  
 
42	  For the definitive treatment of King Lear’s assault on the primacy of the human, see 
Laurie Shannon’s “Poor, Bare, Forked: Animal Happiness and the Zoographic Critique of 
Humanity“ in The Accomodated Animal, 127-73. 
	  
43	  Robert Markley, “’Casualties and Disasters’: Defoe and the Interpretation of Climatic 
Instability,” 111.  
 
44	  See his Waking the Giant: How a Changing Climate Triggers Earthquakes, Tsunamis, 





45	  The swimming rhetoric here is not incidental;	  I’m suggesting that	  human being-in-the-
world increasingly resembles what Steve Mentz has called “swimmer poetics,” in which 
“The swimmer’s vulnerability and effort provide a model for how to live in our world 
today, when landed life increasingly resembles conditions at sea“ “After Sustainability,” 
589-90. 
 
NOTES TO CHAPTER II 
 
46	  See for example Frederick Burwick’s Thomas de Quincey: Knowledge and Power 
(2001). De Quincey himself called it his “specimen of psychological criticism.”  
 
47 Even more can be said here. It is not Macduff, the knocking agent, that breaks the 
spell, but the knock itself. The actual sound jolts the audience into a recognition of 
Macbeth’s crime. Moreover, de Quincey equates the restoration of community with “the 
human,” over and against the “fiendish” pause in which individuality and interiority 
appear, situating the self as a monstrous temporary aberration against social being.  
 
48 See John Stow’s 1598 Survey of London: “the gates of London should bee new 
repayred, and diligently kept in the night, for feare of French deceytes” (41). This 
description invokes the gates only to figure anxiety about their potential infiltration, 
displaying a nostalgic desire for insularity and legibility that characterize the Survey as a 
whole.  
 
49 The Galenic model of humors dominated early modern medical theory. Among modern 
critics, two major arguments exist about the function of humors in social life. Gail Kern 
Paster argues that humors were powerful tools of social discipline, as an ethos of self-
control and balance was used to stigmatize those thought less able to control their bodies 
– women in particular. Michael Schoenfeldt, by contrast, argues for a powerful agency 
granted each individual to regulate the makeup of his or her body. See her The Body 
Embarrassed and his Bodies and Selves.  
 
50 Of course, as Stephen Greenblatt has famously argued, such self-fashioning was 
always doomed to merely replicate the dominant ideology of the day, “not an epiphany of 
identity freely chosen but a cultural artifact,” but the subject at least retains the “illusion” 
of autonomy. Renaissance Self-Fashioning, 256-7.  
 
51 The standard data comes from E.A. Wrigley’s People, Cities, and Wealth: The 
Transformation of Traditional Society (1987), 158-67.  
 
52 Exemplary here is Lawrence Manley’s Literature and Culture in Early Modern London 
(1995), which tells a rosary of institutions and the literary forms that emerged from and 





53 For good summaries of this trend, see Paul Griffiths’ and Mark S.R. Jenner’s 
introduction to Londonopolis (4-9), Ian Munro’s The Figure of the Crowd in Early 
Modern London (7-11), and Nina Levine’s Practicing the City (4-5).  
 
54 Hristomir Stanev’s Sensory Experience and the Metropolis on the Jacobean Stage has 
come the closest to the methodological approach I posit, although his study doesn’t offer 
much of a central argument, because it’s invested in charting the new possibilities 
afforded by the metropolis. In his words, “I explore how Jacobean experience of the city 
helped to articulate intricate forms of sensory practice” (4). I consider his work a kind of 
ground-clearing, from which my own more specific claims about what a person might do 
with those possibilities can emerge.  
 
55 More than urban growth attracted these people, of course. Increasing enclosure of 
arable lands in the country deprived a huge number of tenant farmers of their work, 
forcing them to seek a living elsewhere, most frequently in London. However, we might 
note, enclosure was itself galvanized by the London marketplace and its exchange logic: 
sheep’s wool was worth far more on the market than the rents collected from subsistence 
farmers. On enclosure and its discontents, see Arthur F. Kinney’s introduction to Rogues, 
Vagabonds, and Sturdy Beggars, 19-21.  
 
56 Valerie Traub has traced a shift in this same period from an older, vertically 
hierarchical chain of being to what she calls “the logic of the grid,” in which “spatial 
logic creates not only a uniform model, but a serviceable ratio, a standard for 
comparison,” producing “a universalized body, one whose individuality and particularity, 
and difference are subordinated to the creation of an abstract, common humanity” (56). 
I’d suggest that London’s growth, and the difficulties of categorization and the mobility 
engendered therein, served as crucial catalysts for this shift, toward a notion of 
population we now identify as the biopolitical, characterized by, in Foucault’s words, “a 
global mass that is affected by overall processes characteristic of birth, death, production, 
illness, and so on…not individualizing, but, if you like, massifying, that is directed not at 
man-as-body but man-as-species” (242-3). 
 
57 See his “Walking in the City”: “The ordinary practitioners of the city live ‘down 
below,’ below the thresholds at which visibility begins…The paths that correspond in this 
intertwining, unrecognized poems in which each body is an element signed by many 
others, elude legibility” (93).  
 
58 Ian Munro extends de Certeau’s line of reasoning, finding in the crowd’s unknowable 
anonymity a valuable rebuke to panoptic power: “Rather than an easily identifiable 
peasant rabble ranged against the order represented by the city, the urban multitude was 
inherently ungraspable” (38).  
 
59 Such distinction also obtains at the level of the individual, as consumption became 
increasingly conspicuous to throw the buyer into relief against London’s teeming streets. 




of status-based mastery: “willed acts of purgative catharsis by adult men and women in 
early modern England were a socially visible performance which engaged the body’s 
internal habitus…as the subject of an emergent practice of early capitalist consumption” 
(195). This example is doubly rich, because not only is the purge conspicuous 
consumption, it also models for the audience the elite purger’s self-control, their closed, 
Bakhtinian “classical” body secured against the invasive stimuli of the city.59 Linda Levy 
Peck charts a shift in elite cultural value from what one did to what one had, as property 
slowly melded with status distinction: “While the gentry kept fewer servants and spent 
less on funerals, they increased the number and variety of their material goods,” so that 
“such collections…are more signs…that what it meant to be noble in the seventeenth 
century was significantly different from what it had meant a century and even decades 
before” (277, 283). 
 
60 New Historicist work often stresses this, tying the theatric spectacles of power to the 
actual commercial theater as an extensional apparatus for its ideology. Stephen 
Greenblatt’s “Invisible Bullets” is perhaps the most lastingly influential example. 
 
61 See Howard, 12.  
 
62 This wasn’t just true for the arrangement of buildings or their materials, but also their 
style. The early seventeenth century witnessed a vogue in neo-Palladian architecture, an 
Italian style notable for its classical harmonies and visually-pleasing symmetry. See 
Linda Levy Peck, “Building, Buying, and Collecting in London, 1600-1625,” 271.  
 
63 Cf. Brian Massumi: “Individuals and societies are not only empirically inseparable, 
they are strictly simultaneous and consubstantial…they might be seen as differential 
emergences from a shared realm of relationality that is one with becoming – and 
belonging” (71). As for subversion and containment, Stefan Herbrechter has recently 
claimed that the new historicism parsing it is really just humanism in disguise. This is 
because it’s still after a human essence, even one that is decentered and discursive. As he 
puts it, “The liberal humanist and the Marxist anti-humanist positions…can in fact be 
seen to compete for the same moral authority over so-called human ‘nature’” (44). We 
need instead a post-human practice, which emphasizes not just the constitutive role of the 
nonhuman environment, but also allows us to talk about what action or self might look 
like for the human within it. Early modern sound, I suggest, was used to create such an 
inessential yet effective self.  
 
 
64 Thomas Dekker also makes bells central to one of his advice pamphlets, The Bel-Man 
of London. Dekker uses the titular bellman as a symbol of order, “the Ringing of his 
Bell…assured those within that no theeves were entred” (110). However, this is the 
bellman’s only appearance in the tract, which is surrounded on both sides by a torrent of 
rogues and their socially disruptive tricks. Even more damning, the narrator’s encounter 
with the bellman opens a crucial gap between immediate experience and cultural 




before that, merely hearing the sound, he hears chaos and arbitrary cruelty instead of 
order: “why with such a jangling, and balling, and beating at Mens doores hee went about 
to waken…poore men that were over-wearyed with labour” (110).  
 
65 Quoted in Stanev, 38.  
 
66 For more on the youth subcultures generated by urban complexity, see Paul Griffiths’ 
Youth and Authority: Formative Experiences in England 1560-1640. 
 
67 Jones and Stallybrass, 20-3.  
 
68 As Jones and Stallybrass put it, “Clothes, in other words, were closer both to a second 
skin, a skin that names you, and to money than are the clothes that we wear today” (32). 
 
69 Jane Schneider charts a shift in prevailing colors from the sober black and white of the 
Tudors, signifying the nationalism of English textile production, to the bright hues of the 
Stuart court, as James opened England to a massive new influx of foreign styles and 
tastes. Such an expansion was seen by some as anarchy, the erosion of legible distinction; 
she notes that William Harrison “worried that, their clothes full of jags and cuts and 
garish colors, ‘women are become men and men transformed into monsters’” (118). 
 
70 She actually uses this “flaunting” counterpublic to debunk the stereotype of the 
“placeless market.” Instead, “the purchase and display of apparel in early modern 
England entailed heterogeneous, locally defined practices determined by particular 
subjects’ relations to the commercial cultures available to them” (9). As my reading of 
Dekker will show, I don’t think anxiety about the anonymity and radical equivalence of 
exchange is entirely erased, even among this subgroup.  
 
71 Jean Howard asserts that the pamphlet indexes London’s shift to a consumer culture; it 
“strikingly calls attention to a cityscape defined less by churches and guildhalls than by 
places of consumption and pleasure” (7).  
 
72 On this semantic shift see Jones and Stallybrass, 1. 
 
73 In her words, “The centralization of England’s political life in London, an 
unprecedented surge in population, and economic crises in provincial areas led to the 
mass migration of ‘superfluous’ young men, those second and third sons who, because 
they were not heirs apparent, flooded into the city seeking places,” 13.  
 
74 Contemporary conditions in London corroborate this view, as the influx of new 
accents, dialects, and languages from the provinces and abroad increasingly frayed the 
transparency of English. Jean Howard notes that “Candidates for employment by the East 
India Company regularly presented as chief qualifications their skill at foreign 




Dionne describes a special type of rogue,  “the taker-up or ‘verser,’ who as his name 
implies can parrot different regional accents pretend to be from the same county” (51). 
 
75 Craig Dionne has argued that early modern language did function in this way; thinking 
“language as tool-being” shifts its purpose “from that of masking intent, participating in 
the aristocratic flourish of prodigality and circumstance, to that of survival and pondering 
one’s relation in the interdependence of a denuded world.” Posthuman Lear, 150. 
 
76 See Henri Lefebvre’s classic study, The Production of Space.  
 
77 Quoted in Stanev, 35-6. 
 
78 Derek Alwes makes this point succinctly, although rather than acontextual selfishiness, 
I read the gulls’ desire as a particular response to urban expansion: “Whatever the gulls 
might have been like in the absence of the rogues, what they all reveal is a willingness to 
abandon all meaningful social relationships in pursuit of their own selfish desires” (45). 
 
79 This and all subsequent quotations from the play are drawn from English Renaissance 
Drama, eds. David Bevington, Lars Engle, Katherine Eisaman Maus, and Eric 
Rasmussen (2002).  
 
80 Lena Cowen Orlin has argued that, contra the usual story, privacy and the individual 
subjectivity associated with it were actually the result of proliferating indoor spaces, and 
not the cause. As she says, “early moderns began to accumulate more personal 
possessions and then needed more spaces in which to keep them” (11). However, I’d 
suggest that these possessions, as Linda Levy Peck and others have shown, are 
themselves constituent of an individuated person, meaning we can still read the desire to 
be indoors to store one’s stuff as a fundamentally subjective, private move.  
 
81 John Shanahan has called the play an important precursor to modern laboratory 
science, wherein an expert-class produces “facts” through complex mediation on an 
infinitely manipulable stage: “a more important, and novel, source of authority in The 
Alchemist, one crucial for the future of natural philosophy, is skill with instrumentation as 
a means of making the natural world and human behavior increasingly predictable, and 
perhaps even to an extent controllable” (47). Unlike scientific facts, though, the 
alchemists’ work is not repeatable or stable – it is fleeting, momentary, the opposite of 
the edificial permanence of objective knowledge.  
 
82 Adam Zucker notes that “an abstract placelessness or vague and immaterial sociability 
can seem to define the figure of the gallant. A close look at Jonson’s plays, however, 
reveals his own kind of witty double move, as he first stages, then unmasks or controverts 
his gallants’ presumptive distance from the ordinary world” (56). 
 
83 Patricia Fumerton has argued that such routine psychic fragmentation was a cardinal 




short-term jobs to make ends meet, refusing them the settled certainties of a regular living 
and the identification it gave. In her words, unsettledness was “the nature of being a 
Londoner, and more intensively in the socioeconomic group of London’s services and 
apprentices, whose often fractured and uncertain place as dependent laborers could render 
them psychically (if intermittently) unmoored, even while housed” (22). This paper can 
be read as a handbook for the “unmoored,” charting the agential possibilities afforded 
those who are, as Fumerton calls them, “’no man,’ or perhaps more accurately, ‘many 
men’” (51). 
 
84 Jonathan Haynes has compared the “venture tripartite” to a proto-corporation, dealing 
in the emergent logics and discourse of mobile trade, which dissolved previously solid 
distinctions between the legitimate social sphere and the criminal underworld; Jonson 
“sees not only how the old order is breaking up, but the form and presence of a new 
economy…working through both society and the underworld” (29-30). See also 
Elizabeth Rivlin’s “The Rogues’ Paradox,” 115-129.  
 
85 Adam Zucker makes a similar point about wit, as the bedrock of a new form of status 
not linked to inherent essence or even commercial success, but verbal skill, which 
displayed a familiarity with and ability to navigate new kinds of urban space: “To be 
witty…is not simply to speak or act well but to exist in a privileged relation to the spaces 
and materials of a given environment” (3). My argument carries this point to the level of 
individual bodies, as the rogues make use of new urban cacophony, a phenomenological 
tool instead of the purely cultural rhetorical flourish.  
 
86 Katherine Eggert has recently argued that alchemy was a special discourse of 
“disknowledge,” which its practitioners knew to be fake but carried out anyway, as a 
response to a hermeneutic crisis in a late humanism under siege from new theories of 
science, theology, and matter. In her words, alchemy was “a deliberate means by which a 
culture can manage epistemological risk” (8). Thus freed from its pretensions to make the 
world mean, Jonson’s alchemy can be read as a more immediately practical art, which by 
reducing language to noise bypasses epistemology’s individuating, distinguishing 
impulse – “this is not that” – and so renders sound portable and useable.  
 
87 Mimi Yiu has made an analogous argument about spatial thought in Jonson’s London, 
as it underwent “a gradual shift that would culminate in the rise of Cartesian geography 
and scientific cartography…the ambiguous and dreamlike femininity of choric space 
awakens to a more rigorous, cartographic transparency based on the notion of a chartable, 
nameable, masculine topos” (76-7). In the liminal phase of the early seventeenth century, 
between these two paradigms, space is “epicene,” or as Subtle puts it, “hermaphrodeity,” 
queerly blending opposite elements in ways that occlude absolute measurement or purity.  
 
88 Even Subtle’s name encodes this duality. Jessica Wolfe notes that “At its best, subtlety 
denotes intellectual acuity, precision, or prudent machination. At its worst, subtlety is 






89 William West notes that “the languages of alchemy, kabbala, and other occult practices 
dazzle their hearers rather than escaping their notice; they are, to use the distinction 
Jonson makes of masques, gazed at rather than read” (182). While they may not signify, 
the “dazzling” words still have a material effect.  
 
90 They subsequently banish Dapper to the privy, what Gail Kern Paster calls “the 
dunghill of undifference…the collapse of individuation back into the chaotic urban 
environment” (148) 
 
91 Ahmed ascribes a similar ephemerality to queer phenomenology: “It is given that the 
straight world is already in place and that queer moments, where things come out of line, 
are fleeting. Our response need not be to search for permanence…but to listen to the 
sound of ‘the what’ that fleets” (102). The sonic metaphor is especially felicitous, as my 
focus here is on the temporality of sound, as a material vibration moving through space 
for a given duration, as opposed to the inert image.  
 
92 Caroline Levine has recently suggested we rethink institutions in this way, as 
diachronic structures that accumulate new possibilities and configurations as they’re 
continually reinstantiated: “since institutions persist and survive through repetition – 
through the citation of rules and the performance of practices – they are never present as 
such. They are materialized across time” (62). 
 
93 For an abstract version of this point, see Catherine Gallagher’s seminal essay 
“Formalism and Time,” which argues that pure events are uncapturable; all language can 
do is sculpt the ashes – the fire’s heat and light fleet away. Forms “give the impression of 
overcoming time, rising above or congealing it, and hence, whatever their virtues, they 
appear strangely at odds with the temporal nature of the analyzed work”(231). I’ve leaned 
more heavily on Massumi’s virtuality because its concern is material rather than semiotic.  
 
 
NOTES TO CHAPTER III 
 
94 See also Frances Dyson; contemporary media are, “modulated, distorted, reverberated 
beyond sense and ultimately beyond hearing. As Echo was cursed with the monotony of 
repetition, voicing only the last words of men who spoke, the echo-sphere circulates 
fragments of authorial voices as endings, terminations, leaving nothing more to be said.” 
The Tone of Our Times, 113-4. 
 
95 An important influence here is Derrida’s Specters of Marx, in which he argues that the 
present is always compromised by irruptions of the past. These “specters” arise from 
“this pre-originary and properly spectral anteriority of the crime – the crime of the other, 
a misdeed whose event and reality, whose truth can never present themselves in flesh and 
blood, but can only allow themselves to be presumed, reconstructed, fantasized. One does 




that an utterance is never present but “citational,” dependent on previous use-patterns of 
the spoken words, here the experiential present is shot through with the past, which 
paradoxically compels responsibility for a state of affairs one did not create. Such is the 
case with echoes, which are sounds that bear the traces of their spoken past. Crucially 
though, this happens in the immediate realm of the senses, not the abstract sphere of 
ethics. Echoes don’t so much haunt, then, as revivify, by carrying the original sound into 
new contexts, simultaneously diluting and extending its life. Thus the zombie, and not the 
ghost, supplies the rhetoric I use to discuss the echo. For another critique of Derrida’s 
immateriality, see Gil Harris, 11-12.  
 
96 Bogost, Alien Phenomenology, 22-9.  
 
97 In his words, some later Renaissance commentators inflected Echo with a “mildly, 
cannily antiauthoritarian bias,” as she spoke out “against a variety of repressive forces – 
chastity, discretion, science, vanity, the courts of Elizabeth and James” (35). Surprisingly, 
neither here nor anywhere in the book does he directly discuss gender, one of the most 
crucially “antiauthoritarian” inflections Echo assumed, as The Duchess of Malfi will 
show.   
 
98 Loewenstein speculates that actual echoes were an acoustic experience so uncanny that 
they required a psychological allegory to tame their power, and for this reason were 
written down as myth. I argue that, despite the moralizing, allegorical strain of 
interpretation Loewenstein traces from Ovid through to his Renaissance translators, the 
phenomenological representation of unheimlich Echo survived alongside it. Responsive 
Readings, 5.  
 
99 See for example Adam Zyglis‘s recent cartoon for the Buffalo News, depicting Donald 
Trump as Narcissus staring into the reflecting pool of his phone screen. The cartoon 
implicitly censures both Trump and the enabling technology itself, which tempts him to 
self-absorption. Early modern echoes, by contrast, were a technology for dispersing, 
rather than concentrating, self.   
http://buffalonews.com/2017/01/10/trump-on-twitter/ 
 
100 According to Loewenstein, this tradition begins as early as Jonson, who excises Echo 
from his masque Cynthia’s Revels in order to foreground Narcissus’s vanity, in a 
reflexive exploration of the limits of visuality itself in the masque tradition. 74-5.   
 
101 I am indebted to Bloom for my sense of the echo “Disjoining vocal sound from the 
speaking body and dispersing accountability for an utterance” (161). My account expands 
on hers by emphasizing the technological nature of echoes, which are created through a 
prosthetic device that inflects the speech act. 
 
102 On seedy sermons see Bloom, “Fortress of the Ear: Shakespeare’s Late Plays, 





103 To be sure, Gurr stresses that the auditory dimension was appreciated primarily by 
elite audience members, and charts a steady shift away from conceptions of drama as 
poetry toward a more ocularcentric dramaturgy, culminating in the spectacular masques 
of Inigo Jones – Playgoing in Shakespeare’s London, 98-116. The Duchess of Malfi, 
however, offers a sonic counterpoint to the visual artifice comprising the treacherous 
deceit of her brothers, who “plague [her] in art” (4.1.113).  
 
104 See Gurr, Playgoing in Shakespeare’s London, 99.  
 
105 See Katherine Maus and David Bevington’s introduction to the Norton edition: “In 
Renaissance society, widows of marriageable age who had inherited the property, the 
businesses, or, in the Duchess’s exalted case, the sovereignty of deceased husbands were 
virtually the only women in a socially legitimate position to control their sexual and 
economic lives” (1749).  
 
106 See Dympna Callaghan, Woman and Gender in Renaissance Tragedy: “the presence 
of the female protagonist radically destabilizes the tragic paradigm as it has been 
constructed in criticism from fatal flaw to catastrophe, and, finally, to apotheosis” (68). 
 
107 Clark and Chalmers use as their test case a hypothetical man named Otto, who has lost 
the ability to form new short-term memories, and thus relies on a notebook to keep track 
of appointments, names, and facts. They argue that Otto’s notebook fulfills the same 
function as the memory would for a typical person, and thus allows the theorization of 
extended selfhood. In their words, “Most of us already accept that the self outstrips the 
boundaries of consciousness; my dispositional beliefs, for example, constitute in some 
deep sense part of who I am. If so, then these boundaries may also fall beyond the skin. 
The information in Otto’s notebook, for example, is a central part of his identity as a 
cognitive agent.”  
 
108 This and all subsequent quotations from the play are drawn from English Renaissance 
Drama, eds. David Bevington, Lars Engle, Katherine Eisaman Maus, and Eric 
Rasmussen (2002). 
 
109 Andrew Gurr, The Shakespearean Stage, 173.  
 
110 Smith, The Acoustic World of Early Modern England, 215-7. While the exact height is 
unknown, Smith estimates (following Irwin Smith) a dropped ceiling would have been 
approximately 38 feet high and a vaulted ceiling 53 feet. He notes that the higher the 
ceiling, the longer the delay between staged sound and audience reception. Thus, by 
raising Antonio’s “roof,” the Duchess is actually facilitating more sonic distortion, a 
provocative confirmation of her echopoetic intent.  
 
111 Clark and Chalmers include couples in their extended mind theory: “In an unusually 




sort of role for the other as the notebook plays for Otto. What is central is the high degree 
of trust, reliance, and accessibility.”  
 
112 Austin, How to Do Things With Words, 98-132.  
 
113 In fact this means that Derrida is right, but not for the reasons he thinks. He asks, 
“Could a performative utterance succeed if its formulation did not repeat a ‘coded’ or 
iterable utterance, or in other words, if the formula I pronounce in order to open a 
meeting, launch a ship or a marriage were not identifiable as conforming with an iterable 
model, if it were not then identifiable in some way as a ‘citation’?” (18). He argues here 
that illocution’s power is social; a marriage isn’t sealed by speech itself, but by the 
auditors’ recognition of the institution being invoked. However, he assumes that speakers 
imagine their statements to carry originary force. In this case, though, the Duchess is 
knowingly citing precedent, and the marriage is effected anyway. The question isn’t 
whether an utterance is secondhand, but who manages its secondhand-ness, and thus 
controls its terms. In this case, that is decidedly the Duchess, hence her comment that 
“We now are man and wife, and ‘tis the church/That must but echo this” (1.1.493-4). See 
Derrida, “Signature Event Context.” 
 
114 See his Seizures of the Will in Early Modern English Drama: “I view Ferdinand as a 
threatened aristocrat, frightened by the contamination of his ascriptive social rank, and 
obsessively preoccupied with its defense…The duchess then becomes a symbol, flooded 
with affect, of his own radical purity. In reaching for her he aspires…to be like only 
himself” (191).   
 
115 See her The Tears of Narcissus: “Webster’s version of melancholia represents 
Ferdinand’s crisis as a narcissistic one. In the mirror of his twin sister’s desire, and of her 
maternal body, the melancholic Ferdinand finds himself reflected and estranged at once” 
(242). While Enterline draws a telling contrast between Ferdinand’s Narcissus and his 
sister’s Echo, I argue that he is an aspiring narcissist, constantly fighting a border-war for 
his ego.  
 
116 See her Occult Knowledge, Science, and Gender on the Shakespearean Stage: 
“Webster frames women’s bodies as central objects of inquiry. Indeed, Ferdinand’s 
efforts to discover his sister’s secrets are staged as an inquisition that mingles the 
discourses and practices of proto-scientific experimentation, natural magic, and 
demonology” (111).  
 
117 John Durham Peters writes that the telephone embeds a similar “uncanniness” inside 
mass communication, when the speaking body is severed from its voice, forcing the 
weight of interpretation onto the listener: “Mediated communication, as by the telephone, 
teaches us that we are always eavesdropping” (367). Such a paranoiac experience, I 
suggest, was quite common in the early modern theater, as the nested hermeneutics of 





118 Another provocative instance of origin-confusion occurs after the Duchess’s murder, 
when Ferdinand reveals “She and I were twins;/And, should I die this instant, I had 
lived/Her time to a minute,” to which Bosola replies “It seems she was born first” 
(4.2.265-7). But, as Maus and Bevington point out in their footnote, elsewhere Ferdinand 
is described as her elder brother (4.1.21). Again, the origin fleets; which was born first? 
Which echoes the other? The play deliberately leaves this question unanswerable.  
 
119 Harris, “Pyromena: Fire’s Doing,” in Elemental Ecocriticism, 29-34. She also notes 
that glass – a prevalent motif in the play, linked to truth-finding prostheses like spectacles 
– is itself sand metamorphosed by fire, a transformative core troubling the control it was 
instrumentalized to produce.  
 
120 Mary Floyd-Wilson posits Ferdinand’s lupine degeneration as punishment for his 
overreaching empiricism: “Ferdinand’s lycanthropy functions as the appropriate disease 
for a man whose arrogant experiments may have unwittingly engaged demonological 
forces” (127). I approach the more-than-human world from a different direction; the play 
obsessively queries the human/animal divide, trying to posit some sort of originary 
humanity. “Madness” is linked to animality, which in turn is linked to sound. The 
Madmen tormenting the Duchess emit screeches “Sounding as from the threat’ning 
throat/Of beasts and fatal fowl,/As ravens, screech owls, bulls, and bears!” (4.2.63-5). 
Animality is here the overflow of noise, the inability to anchor or “put yourself/In tune” 
(2.4.62-3), in the Cardinal’s words. The play marks such tuning impossible, however; 
Bosola notes that “in our own flesh…we bear diseases/Which have their true names only 
ta’en from beasts,/As the most ulcerous wolf and swinish measle” (2.1.53-5). Our very 
bodies are echoes of animal conditions; there can be no stable human origin on which to 
stand. I read Ferdinand’s lycanthropy as his realization of this fact, our ur-echoic nature.  
 
121 Mazzio argues that the tongue was for early moderns a synecdoche for language itself, 
detachable from its original context, of which rumor is a prime example. Ferdinand 
himself tropes the tongue’s slippery speech with sexual mobility: “women like that part 
which, like the lamprey,/Hath nev’r a bone in it.” The Duchess rebukes him, “Fie, sir!,” 
to which he rejoins “Nay,/I mean the tongue. Variety of courtship!/What cannot a neat 
knave with a smooth tale/Make a woman believe?” (1.1.337-41). Information is a rogue 
phallus, reconstituting vulnerable female bodies from within, thus prompting Ferdinand’s 
defensive harangue.  
 
122 Gurr, The Shakespearean Stage, 184.  
 
123 Here I depart from Bloom, who argues that “Delio and Antonio dismiss the 
phenomenon as nothing more than ‘fancy’” (161). While I share her sense of the echo as 
transgressive female power, I contend that that power is enhanced further by its 
measurable effect on Antonio.  
 
124 Here are listed all the Shakespearean echoes I have detected. Doubtless there are many 




Shakespeare has allowed these (and not other, which I’ve missed) sidelong references to 
resonate outward to you. Of these, only Titus, Hamlet, Lear, Henry IV 1 and 2, had been 
published in quarto when The Duchess of Malfi was staged, in late 1613 or 1614. 
 
Hamlet: Ferdinand spies on the Duchess to discover her lover’s identity, but then 
hesitates, fearing the effects, like Hamlet (3.2.92-7). Ferdinand tells the Duchess “It had 
been well/Could you have lived thus always, for indeed/You were too much i’th’light” 
(4.1.40-2), echoing Hamlet who is “Too much i’th’sun.” Hamlet’s inward melancholy 
cedes to the Duchess’s physical containment at the hands of her brothers. Bosola echoes 
Hamlet’s transformation from hesitation to blind action (“readiness is all”): “They that 
think long small expedition win,/For, musing much o’th’end, cannot begin” (5.2.119-21). 
The Cardinal tries and fails to pray and atone like Claudius (5.4.28-30).  
Henry IV: The Cardinal grows slowly more impatient with Ferdinand’s rage (“I’ll leave 
you” (2.5.74)), like Worcester does that of Hotspur: “I will talk to you/When you are 
better tempered to attend.” The frequent invocation of horses recalls Hotspur but also the 
post-riders of Part II, associated with degraded or false information: “if he had had a good 
back,/He would have undertook to have borne his horse,/His breech was so pitifully sore” 
(2.4.54-6).  
King Lear: Bosola leans over the Duchess’s corpse willing life into it like Lear over 
Cordelia: “She stirs! Here’s life!” (4.2.344-8). Delio’s devotion to Antonio echoes Kent’s 
dogged loyalty to Lear, and he provides a similarly moralizing epigraph to close the play 
(5.5.127-39).  
Macbeth: Bosola claims that “There’s no more credit to be given to th’face/Than to a sick 
man’s urine” (1.1.238-9), echoing Duncan’s “There’s no art/To find the mind’s 
construction in the face.”  
Othello: the Cardinal boasts to Julia “Come, I’ll love you wisely,/That’s jealously, since I 
am very certain/You cannot me make cuckold” (2.4.24-6), an echo of jealous Othello 
who “Loved not wisely/But too well.” Frequent emphasis is placed on the heart as a locus 
of truth, most notably by Cariola; when Bosola tells her “I should turn this to thee for 
that” she rejoins “Pray, sir, do; and when/That you have cleft my heart, you shall read 
there/Mine innocence” (3.2.146-9). This recalls Othello’s desire to know Iago’s thoughts, 
and his response, “You cannot, if my heart were in your hand.”  
The Taming of the Shrew: the Cardinal describes wooing Julia in falconer’s terms, just as 
Petruchio does for Kate (2.4.27-30).  
The Tempest: The Duchess claims that her children will only curse: “But I intend, since 
they were born accurst,/Curses shall be their first language” (3.5.116-7). This echoes 
Caliban’s famous quip that “thou hast taught me language, and my profit on’t is, I know 
how to curse.”  
Timon of Athens: The Duchess, like Timon, is eaten literally out of house and home: “In 
my last will I have not much to give;/A many hungry guests have fed upon me” (4.2.195-
6).  
Titus Andronicus: Ferdinand threatens “to boil [the Duchess and her lover’s] bastard to a 
cullis,/And give’t his lecherous father, to renew/The sin of his back” (2.5.72-4), just as 




Twelfth Night: as noted, the Duchess is a clear echo of Olivia. Bosola also reads 
Antonio’s dropped horoscope like Malvolio reads the false love letter from Olivia, with a 
similar allegory of textual inscrutability (2.3.58-70).  
The Winter’s Tale: Bosola and the Duchess have an exchange about art improving nature; 
he says ‘Tis a pretty art, this grafting,” and she replies “‘Tis so. A bett’ring of nature” 
(2.1.148-9), recalling Perdita’s lines “There is an art which in their piedness shares/With 
great creating nature.” Here though, there is no Polixines to correct her, meaning the 
Duchess’s statement stands. Ironically though, “art” will be used by her brothers to kill 
her, although doubtless it also refers to her echoic transformation.  
 
125 Further suggesting “live” citation, Andrew Gurr notes that “there is more evidence of 
playwrights making covert allusions to contemporary people and events than there is of 
allusions to passages or phrases from well-known books.” Playgoing, 101. See also 
Jonathan Gil-Harris, who argues that certain plays invoked the performance style or 
“vein” of others to demonstrate their own supercession of them. Untimely Matter in the 
Time of Shakespeare, 66-87.  
 
126 Turner contends that “The evidence of the stage ‘plotts’ indicates that English writers 
composed plays in a series of scenes that were meant to be played continuously in the 
theatre, and not in five acts” (179). He contrasts this with the later shift toward 
conceptualizing plays as texts to be read: “On the page, act and scene…contribute a 
conceptual unity to the play by subdividing its action into discrete parts, and these parts 
are presumed by the reader to fit together into a coherent structural whole” (180). The 
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